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ABSTRACT 
 
Canada’s two-tier occupational pension plans provide public sector workers (who are nearly 
all registered in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) with more than 
twice as much retirement income as the vast majority of private sector workers who either 
have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in defined contribution 
plans offering no income guarantees. Since 2000 the number of workers enrolled in private 
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by 
500,000 from 2 to 1.5 million, while the number of public sector workers enrolled in DB 
plans has remained stable at approximately 3 million. This thesis focuses on the 1.5 million 
workers who continue to be registered in private sector single employer defined benefit 
pension plans. It argues that the complex and often times confusing regulatory regimes 
governing pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB 
plan underfunding, insolvency, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars.  
In contrast to the Canadian Public Accountability Board’s external oversight of the 
accounting profession, the actuarial profession has remained relatively immune from such 
external oversight, raising legitimate concerns about the impact of actuarial discretion on 
pension funding estimates. Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have 
consistently overestimated returns on private sector single employer defined benefit (DB) 
pension plan investments, lowering employer contributions below the “fully funded” level 
required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets must be sufficient to meet its 
liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and insolvencies. Telecom giant 
Nortel’s 2009 bankruptcy is a prime example of opaque funding. Actuaries underestimated 
Nortel’s DB pension funding requirements by $1.5 billion, resulting in benefit reductions of 
up to 43% for 20,000 pensioners and former employees. In United Steel’s (formerly 
Stelco’s) 2014 restructuring, actuaries underestimated the company’s DB pension funding 
requirements by $840 million, triggering potential income reductions of up to 30% for 2000 
employees and 10,000 pensioners.   
 
Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully 
funded by law, the legal issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not 
actuaries have been using their discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable 
interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance 
with the principles of the rule of law. This thesis discusses the merits of potential legal 
remedies to arrest the underfunding and decline in the number of private sector single 
employer defined benefit pensions in Canada, including the introduction of single employer 
target benefit plans, increasing employers’ access to surplus, making actuaries fiduciaries, 
legislating external oversight, abolishing employer-actuary agency, and mandating specific 
discount rates.  It concludes that the best legal remedy is the establishment of an independent 
external actuarial oversight board.  
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Canada’s two-tier occupational pension plans provide public sector workers (who are nearly all 
registered in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) with more than twice as much 
retirement income as the vast majority of private sector workers who either have no employer 
sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in defined contribution plans offering no income 
guarantees. Since 2000 the number of workers enrolled in private sector single employer defined 
benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by 500,000 from 2 to 1.5 million, while the number 
of public sector workers enrolled in DB plans has remained stable at approximately 3 million. This 
thesis focuses on the 1.5 million workers who continue to be registered in private sector single 
employer defined benefit pension plans. It argues that the complex and often times confusing 
regulatory regimes governing pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion, 
contributing to DB plan underfunding, insolvency, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars.  
The actuarial profession has a long history of providing critical expertise to society. However,  
despite the fact that the services it delivers are some of the most complex and mysterious of all  
professions (including estimating billions of dollars in pension funding requirements decades into  
the future), little has been written in the academic literature (outside of the actuarial profession 
itself) about actuaries’ conflict of interest issues which are, in principle, similar to those which  
faced the audit profession prior to the 2001 Enron (a Texas based energy company) accounting  
scandal (the most significant corporate collapse in United States history since the failure of savings  
and loan banks in the 1980s). Enron’s executives pressured consulting auditors to hide billions of  
dollars of debt (from failed business deals) in offshore entities, artificially inflating the company’s  
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profits and share prices. The eventual exposure of these accounting irregularities resulted in $60 
billion of the company’s  market value being wiped out, thousands of job losses, and over  
$2 billion in pension plan losses.  
 
The Enron accounting scandal motivated the American government to enact the 2002  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA)
1
 to "enhance Corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures  
and combat corporate and accounting fraud”. The SOA established the Public Company  
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide external oversight of auditors. Canada followed  
suit in 2003 by creating the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB). In stark contrast,  
Canada’s actuarial profession has remained relatively immune from external oversight, raising  
legitimate concerns about the impact of actuaries’ discretion on pension funding estimates.  
 
Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving them susceptible to the conflict between 
providing advice based on objective analysis on the one hand, and serving the needs of DB plan 
sponsors on the other (whose objective may be to justify ways of spending as little as possible on 
their plans, especially in these times of increased funding requirements resulting from chronically 
low investment returns). As long as an employer can threaten to find another actuary to provide its 
actuarial services, such implied leverage might well have an effect on an actuary’s work product. 
The reality is that at the stroke of an actuary’s pen (by virtue of the vagaries of actuarial science), 
companies can make heroic assumptions about the returns their pension assets will earn, reducing 
the rate at which their funding obligations grow.  
                                                             
1
 H.R. 3763 (107th). 
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The funding requirements of defined benefit (DB) pension plans are in a constant state of flux due 
to their dependence on discount rates. As market returns increase and/or decrease daily, so do 
funding requirements.  Actuaries are charged with the difficult (if not impossible) task of 
forecasting investment returns decades into the future in order to estimate the level of funding 
required to meet a plan’s obligations. Overestimating/underestimating investment returns by as little 
as ½ of 1% can reduce/increase an employer’s contribution requirements by tens of millions of 
dollars or even more, highlighting the significant impact of actuaries’ discretion on the funding 
levels of DB plans in Canada.  
 
Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private 
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer 
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets 
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and 
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque. Increasingly, funding policies have been 
concentrating on reducing contributions, both by directing increasing proportions of plans’ 
investment portfolios to categories that have historically provided higher long-term returns and by 
deferring costs through pre-recognition of expected higher returns from equity investments (which 
often never materialize). In short, employers have been pushing deficits down the road (only18% of 
defined benefit pension plans in Canada had a surplus (assets exceeding liabilities) in the first 
quarter of 2015 compared to 36% a year earlier (Aon Hewitt)), reducing retirees’ pension cheques 
by up to 50% (or even more) in cases of insolvency.  
The use of actuarial discretion to reduce funding requirements (in attempting to sustain DB plans) 
in Canada has resulted in opaque funding, making it difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain a 
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plan’s true funding status.  Telecom giant Nortel’s 2009 bankruptcy is a prime example of this 
opaque funding. Actuaries underestimated DB pension funding requirements by $1.5 billion, 
resulting in benefit reductions up to 43% for 20,000 pensioners and former employees. In United 
Steel’s (formerly Stelco’s) 2014 restructuring (wherein the Hamilton company was granted 
protection from its creditors), actuaries underestimated the company’s DB pension funding 
requirements by $840 million, triggering potential income reductions up to 30% for 2000 
employees and 10,000 pensioners.
2
 An additional $40 million and $100 million in underfunded 
pension obligations are projected for 2015 and 2016 respectively. United Steel’s proposed Business 
Preservation Plan (permitting it to default on tens of millions of dollars of pension obligations
3
 ) 
was approved by the Ontario Superior Court in 2015: 
In light of the difficult financial circumstances now facing United Steel (USSC), the company no 
longer has the financial resources and flexibility to continue to make these pension and retirement 
plan contributions and payments during its restructuring proceedings.
4
  
Furthermore, the Court endorsed United Steel’s request to suspend health-care benefits (at least 
temporarily) to 20,000 of its pensioners.
5
  
Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully funded 
by law, the legal issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not actuaries have 
                                                             
2
 Since the start of its 2014 restructuring process, the company has paid about $5.9 million a month into its 
main pension plans and expects to pay another $23.6 million by the end of the year. Through 2016, pension 
costs could be as high as $18.6 million per month under normal pension funding rules. (Note that in 2006 the 
Ontario Government gave the company 10 years to cover its pension shortfalls and provided it with a $150-
million forgivable loan if it succeeded, which it obviously it did not.) 
3
 Mark McNeil, “Today Is Decision Day for U.S. Steel, Hamilton Spectator” (09 October, 2016). Online: < 
www.thespec.com › Home › News › Business >. 
4
 Steve Arnold, “U.S. Steel Canada Wants to Scrap Pension Fund Payments, Retiree Benefits, and Hamilton 
Taxes” Hamilton Spectator (18 September, 2015). Online: < www.thespec.com › Home › News › Business >. 
5
 Samantha Craggs, “Judge Approves U.S. Steel Transition Plan, Suspends Retiree Benefits” CBC News 
(13 October 2015). Online: < www.cbc.ca/.../judge-approves-u-s-steel-transition-plan-suspends-retiree-
be...>. 
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been using their discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of 
manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law.  
This thesis discusses the merits of potential legal remedies to actuarial underfunding and 
insolvencies, including the introduction of single employer target benefit plans, increasing 
employers’ access to surplus, making actuaries fiduciaries, legislating external oversight, abolishing 
employer-actuary agency, and mandating specific discount rates.  It concludes that the best legal 
remedy is the establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board.  
Chapter 1 begins by introducing the concept of defined benefit (DB) pension plans and the 
magnitude of the underfunding problem in Canada.  It then discusses provincial and federal pension 
standards legislation (the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and the federal Pension Benefits 
Standards Act (PBSA), the focus of this thesis), before concluding with a literature review of 
“professional discretion and the law”.  
Section 1-Background 
         Canada’s Two Tier Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
A. The Concept of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and their Current Status in Canada 
 
The rise of workplace pensions in Canada is very much a 20th century phenomenon. However, 
occupational pensions in Canada date back to 1870 when the federal government passed the first 
superannuation act authorizing the payment of an annual retirement allowance to public servants at 
the of age 60 or upon disability.  The railroads became the first industrial sector to offer 
occupational pensions in 1874, followed by commercial banks around 1900. 
6
  
                                                             
6
 The first workplace pension plan recorded in Canadian history was a plan that the Hudson Bay Company 
established in 1840 (before Confederation in 1867). These plans generally deferred payment of a portion of 
employees’ wages and were not classical “defined benefit” plans per se. (National Union, A Brief History of 
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Defined benefit pension plans (which guarantee workers a monthly retirement income based on 
their earnings and years of service) were introduced in the Canadian federal public service in 1924 
and subsequently in the private sector (the focus of this thesis) beginning in the 1940s when 
employers began offering generous defined benefit pension plans to attract and keep the best 
workers in times of labour shortages.
7
 The most important factor influencing the growth of private 
sector occupational pension plans since the 1940s was the rise of the trade union movement and 
collective bargaining.
8
   
 
Government regulation of occupational pension plans was initially non-existent as they were 
considered small fringe benefits. (Consequently, retaining actuarial advice on funding issues was 
optional depending on whether or not an employer was interested in knowing the costs and risks 
inherent in funding its plan). In sharp contrast, Canadian pension funds (spanning both the public 
and private sectors) are now one of the fastest growing pools of institutionalized capital in the 
country, dominated by large funds.
9
  Regulation is omnipresent with $1.6 trillion in assets held in 
employer sponsored pension trust funds (75% public and 25% private).
10
 (Canada’s top 10 pension 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Pensions in Canada, 2007. Online: < 
www.nupge.ca/files/publications/Pensions%20Documents/History_of_Pensions.pdf >.)  
7
 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Public Service Pension Plan History, 2012. Online: < www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca >. 
8
 National Union, A Brief History of Pensions in Canada, 2007. Online: < 
www.nupge.ca/files/publications/Pensions%20Documents/History_of_Pensions.pdf >. 
9
 Jack Mintz and Vijay Jog, Sovereign Wealth and Pension Funds Controlling Canadian Businesses: Tax 
Policy Implications, University of Calgary, 2013. Online: < 
www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/.../jogmintz-pensionwealth.p >. 
10
 Statistics Canada,The Daily- Employer Pension Plans (trusteed pension funds), First Quarter, 2015. (Just 
over 6.2 million Canadian workers are members of employer-sponsored pension plans. Of this 
group, 5.2 million (83.3%) workers belong to pension plans with assets managed by trusteed funds. The 
remaining members have assets managed by insurance company contracts.  Data in this release refer only 
to trusteed plans and their pension funds.) 
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funds account for about 2/3 of this $1.6 trillion dollar total.
11
)  Approximately 30% is held in fixed 
investments, 15% in Canadian equities, 17% in global equities, 10% in real estate and the remainder 
in other investments.
12
 Considering that 2 out of 3 active pension plan members belonged to a 
defined benefit plan in 2013 (down from 3 out of 4 in 2009), it is not surprising that DB 
investments (valued at over 1.2 trillion dollars) account for the lion’s share of occupational pension 
plan investments in Canada.
13
  
 
The vast majority of defined benefit plans in Canada were fully funded in the latter part of the 
twentieth century when stock markets were booming and bond yields were high, meaning returns 
on pension investments were not only high enough to cover plan liabilities, but also to yield 
surpluses. However, the investment climate changed rapidly by the year 2000 when the stock 
market bubble burst, causing real returns on the Toronto Stock Exchange to plummet to minus 
13.18 % and minus 15.71% in 2001 and 2002 respectively.
14
 The net result was that pension 
solvency (asset/liability) balance sheets (closely tied to changes in financial markets) swung quickly 
from surplus to deficit positions, resulting in regulators demanding increased employer 
contributions. This increased cost resulted in fewer companies offering defined benefit plans to 
their employees. In fact, the number of workers enrolled in private sector single employer defined 
benefit pension plans in Canada declined approximately 25% from 2.0 million in 2000 to 1.4 
                                                             
11
 The Top Ten's $1.1 trillion in pension assets under management in 2014 has more than tripled since 2003, 
over a period in which the world faced one of its most challenging economic periods. The increase has been 
driven by solid investment returns of over $240 billion vs. net inflows to the funds made by members and 
their employers of over $125 billion. (CNW Newswire, Canada’s Top Ten Pension Funds Help Drive National 
Prosperity, 2013. Online: < www.newswire.ca/.../canada-s-top-ten-pension-funds-help-drive-national > & 
BNN Business Network, Canada’s Top 10 Pension Funds Tripled in Size Since 2003: Study, 2015. Online: < 
www.bnn.ca/.../10/Canadas-top-10-pension-funds-tripled-in-size-since-2 >.) 
12
 Canadian Institutional Investment Network, Chronicle-An Overview of Pension Plans in Canada, 2014. 
Online: < https://account.invesco.ca/institutionalPortal/.../CIIN_chronicle_1214.pdf >. 
13
 Ibid (Defined contribution and hybrid plans (discussed later) account for the remaining share of 
occupational pension plan investments).   
14
 Bob Baldwin, Determinants of the Evolution of Workplace Pension Plans in Canada (Toronto: The 
Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2007) at 29. 
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million in 2013.
15
 According to the 2012 Canadian Retirement Trends Survey conducted by the 
consulting firm Aon Hewitt,
16
 50% of all private defined benefit pension plans in Canada have 
either been closed or frozen (not offered to any new employees) over the past decade.
17
 
 
There are currently about 11.5 million private sector and 3.5 million public sector employees in 
Canada.
18
 Less than half of these workers (6 million) are registered in occupational pension plans 
(approximately 3 million in each of the private and public sectors).
19
 In other words, while nearly 
all of Canada’s 3.5 million public servants are covered by a workplace pension plan, only about one 
quarter of the country’s 11.5 million private sector employees are covered. As mentioned above, the 
number of private sector employees registered in single employer defined benefit plans fell from 
2.0 to 1.4 million from 2000 to 2013, while public sector enrolment increased from 2.5 to 3.0 
million over the same period.
20
  This raises the public policy issue of why the number of public 
sector workers being offered so-called “gold plated” defined benefit pension plans has been 
                                                             
15
 This is an estimate based on Statistics Canada, Registered Pension Plans and Members by Jurisdiction of 
Plan Registration, Sector and Type of Plan, 2013. Online: < www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-
som/l01/.../famil120a-eng.htm > & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario Annual Report: (Toronto 2012) at 8 & Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally 
Regulated Private Pension Plans: (Ottawa, 2013). Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca > & Report of the Ontario 
Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008). 
    
16
 Aon Canada offers a range of sophisticated advisory and consulting services in risk control and risk 
management, reinsurance, and human capital. It designs, structures and implements solutions that may 
involve traditional insurance products or risk-transfer programs, alternative financing techniques, or entirely 
new products to address a specific problem.  
17
 The Wall Street Journal, News Release “Canadian Pension Plan Sponsors to Focus on Improving 
Member’s Understanding of Retirement Benefits” (02 May, 2012) The Wall Street Journal online: 
<wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20130502-909056.html.>. 
18
Statistics Canada, “Employment by Age, Sex, Type of Work, Class of Worker, and Province, Monthly 
(August, 2013)”.Online :< Cansim, Tables 282-0087 and 282-0089 > (2.7 million self-employed workers are 
not included in these numbers). 
19
 Statistics Canada, “Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) and Members, by Type of Plan and Sector (2007-
2011),” Online: < Cansim, Table 280-0016 >. 
20
 Ibid. 
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increasing while the number of private sector workers receiving them has been steadily decreasing 
in recent years. 
 
The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) recently conducted a study estimating 
the financial costs of offering a defined benefit pension plan in Canada.
21
 It compared the future 
retirement incomes of two people currently working in the private and public sectors (Mary and 
Jane, respectively) with similar jobs earning equivalent salaries ($79,511 in 2012) throughout their 
projected 35 year careers from 1995 to 2029 (See Appendix 1 on page 269 for the study’s 
assumptions and calculations). Mary and Jane each contributed an equivalent percentage (6.2 % in 
2012) of their annual income into their respective workplace pension plans since they began 
working in 1995. However, Jane’s retirement funds were invested in a Registered Retirement 
Savings Plan (RRSP)
22
 (in which returns and therefore pension incomes fluctuate with markets), 
while Mary’s funds were invested in a defined benefit pension plan in which her employer (the 
federal government) guarantees her pension income (equal to 2% of her annual income for each 
year of service up to a maximum of 70%).
23
 The study projects that upon retirement at age 65 (in 
                                                             
21
 Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB), Canada’s Two-Tier Retirement System (Toronto, 
2013). Online: < www.cfib-fcei.ca/english/article/5423-two-tier-release.html >. 
22
 An RRSP is a type of defined contribution plan in which the pension payout varies with investment returns. 
23
 Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, “Report on the Public Service Plan Pension Plan for the Fiscal 
Year Ended 2012”.Online: < www.tbs-sct.gc.ca >. (The public service pension plan provides pension benefits 
for federal public service employees. It was established and is governed in all aspects by the Public Service 
Superannuation Act. The plan is a contributory defined benefit plan covering substantially all of the 
employees of the Government of Canada, which includes the federal public service, certain Crown 
Corporations, and territorial governments. The government has a statutory obligation for the payment of 
benefits relating to the pension plan). 
The public service pension plan is the largest pension plan in Canada, covering 313,652 active contributors 
in more than 145 departments and agencies, and 246,166 retired members and survivors. During the fiscal 
year ended March 31, 2012, pension plan member and employer pension contributions on a cash basis 
totaled $4.4 billion, while benefit payments to retired members and survivors reached $5.6 billion, creating a 
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2029), the private sector employee (Jane) will receive $605,000 in benefits over 20 years of 
retirement, while Mary (the public sector employee) will receive a guaranteed pension income  of 
$1.4 million over the same 20 year period. The CFIB study attributes this $776,000 difference to 
massive federal subsidies from Mary’s public sector employer (the federal government) and a 
defined benefit formula that guarantees her benefits regardless of the amount of investment returns 
earned by her workplace pension fund.  In other words, Mary has been contributing (and will 
continue to contribute) about 7% of her annual salary to receive 70% income replacement upon 
retirement, while Jane is projected to receive only about 30% income replacement from the same 
annual contributions of 7%. The CFIB study estimates that Jane’s annual pension contribution 
would have to increase from $218,000 to $654,000 (or by $436,000) over her career in order to 
increase her retirement income by$776,000 to equal Mary’s $1.4 million DB pension income. In 
other words, Mary’s public sector defined benefit pension is being subsidized by taxpayers to the 
tune of $436,000, based on the assumptions (investment returns, longevity etc.) in the CFIB study 
(see Appendix 1 on page 269).
24
 Looking at it another way, Jane would need to contribute an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
fiscal year deficit of $1.2 billion in the federal public service defined benefit pension plan. The value of the 
plan’s total pension obligations increased to $145.9 billion by March 3, 2012. 
24
 Ibid. (The Office of the Chief Actuary, an independent unit within the federal pension regulator (the Office 
of the Superintendent of Financial Institution of Canada), provides a range of actuarial services and advice to 
the Government of Canada that includes the federal Public Service Pension Plan. The Office of the Chief 
Actuary is responsible for conducting an annual actuarial valuation of the federal Public Service Pension 
Plan for accounting purposes as well as a triennial (i.e., once every three years) funding valuation. The 
Government is required by legislation to make additional payments into the plan in the event of plan 
underfunding reported in the actuarial valuation.) 
(Following Royal Assent of the federal Jobs and Growth Act, 2012 in December 2012, public sector pension 
reforms came into effect on January 1, 2013. These changes will bring contribution rates for public service 
defined benefit pension plan members more in line with the private sector by introducing a 50/50 cost-
sharing model. This new model is expected to generate ongoing savings to taxpayers of $900 million 
annually once it is fully implemented in 2017.  This change is accounted for in the CFIB pension report 
calculations.) 
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additional 13 % of her pay every year throughout her career to accumulate the extra $776,000 by 
age 65 (i.e.13 per cent more per year than the amounts Mary contributes to her pension plan).  
 
This 13% gap is considered by the CFIB to be a conservative estimate because although the study 
assumes both employees earn  the same salaries, CFIB research  (based on Statistics Canada Census 
data), estimates that federal government employees are paid up to 17 per cent more in wages than 
similarly employed individuals in the private sector. Furthermore, the average retirement age in the 
public service is 61, while the study assumes that Mary will work until age 65, the average 
retirement age in the private sector. Factoring higher wages and early retirement for Mary into the 
calculation, the gap between her total retirement benefits and those of Jane grows to over one 
million dollars according to the CFIB study. 
 
Assuming only half of the remaining 1.5 million workers registered in private sector single 
employer DB plans in Canada have their pensions converted to DC plans, and that the average 
employee has completed half of his or her 35 years of maximum pensionable service (making them 
eligible for half of the DB pension subsidy of $436,000 or $218,000), the economic loss would 
amount to 750,000 (no. of employees) x $218,000 = $163,000,000,000 or approximately 160 billion 
dollars in employer subsidies. Applying the same assumptions to the CFIB’s $800,000 estimate of 
the difference between DB and DC retirement benefits per employee, the economic loss would 
amount to 750,000 (no. of employees) x $400,000 =$300,000,000,000 or approximately 300 billion 
dollars in lost pension income.
25
   
                                                             
25
 These estimates are considered to be conservative estimate because although the CFIB study assumes 
both private and public sector employees earn  the same salaries, CFIB research  (based on Statistics 
Canada Census data), estimates that federal government employees are paid up to 17 per cent more in 
wages than similarly employed individuals in the private sector. Furthermore, the average retirement age in 
 12 
 
It is evident that private sector workers like Jane cannot count on taxpayers to match their private 
pension plan contributions or to bail out their RRSPs in times of low investment returns. In other 
words, they have no hope of generating occupational retirement incomes comparable to Mary’s. 
However, private sector workers and their employers are being counted on by governments to 
indirectly fund public sector pension income guarantees through income, payroll and other taxes.  
Regulatory Jurisdictions  
This thesis focuses on the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act 
26
(PBSA) and the Ontario 
Pension Benefits Act
27
 (PBA), the largest of Canada’s 11 regulatory jurisdictions (P.E.I. is the only 
province without a Pension Standards Act as of 2014). The PBSA oversees federally regulated 
companies (including crown corporations) offering workplace pensions across Canada while the 
PBA regulates both private and public pension plans registered in Ontario. There are approximately 
660,000 and 360,000 private sector single employer defined benefit pension plan workers registered 
under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Ontario PBA and federal PBSA respectively.
28
 
Ontario PBA 
This thesis focuses on the declining number of employees registered in private sector single 
employer defined benefit pension plans in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension jurisdiction with 
approximately half of all private plan members in the country), down by almost 200,000 members 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the public service is 61, while the study assumes that the public sector worker (Mary) will work until age 65, 
the average retirement age in the private sector. Factoring higher wages and early retirement for Mary into 
the calculation, the gap between her total retirement benefits and those of Jane grows from $776,000 to over 
one million dollars.(Plame Petkov, Canada’s Two Tier Retirement, CFIB Pension Research Series at 4, 
2013. Online: < www.cfib-fcei.ca/english/article/5423-two-tier-release.htm: >. 
26
 Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.) 
27
 Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990. 
28
 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report: 
(Toronto 2012) at 8 & Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally Regulated Private Pension Plans: 
(Ottawa, 2013). Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca >.     
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(850,000 to 676,000) from 2005 to 2014.
29
  The market value of pension assets registered under the 
PBA was estimated at $420 billion in 2013, reflecting a 15 per cent increase from $357 billion in 
2009 and a 28 per cent increase from 2008. In 2012 there were about 8000 pension plans (public 
and private) registered under the PBA with approximately 4 million members (2.1 million active 
and 1.7 million retired).
30
 1.3 million of the 2.1 million active members were in the private sector.
31
 
However, only about half (660,000) of private sector workers were registered in single employer 
DB plans,
32
 the focus of this thesis. 
33
  
                                                             
29
 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report: 
(Toronto 2014) at 9 & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario 
Annual Report: (Toronto 2005) at 11.Single Employer Pension Plans (SEPPs) are the focus of this thesis 
because they have been steadily declining in recent years. SEPPs are riskier propositions than Multiple 
Employer Pension Plans (MEPPs) because they each address the issue of “full funding” rather differently. 
While surpluses for MEPPs may be used to fund contribution holidays or benefit improvements (as with 
SEPPs), unfunded liabilities in MEPPs are usually dealt with by reducing accrued or future benefits, including 
pensions already in pay — an option generally unavailable to SEPPs. In other words, the SEPP employer 
(sponsor) must make up any funding deficiencies, as accrued or future benefits cannot be reduced. Of 
course, if MEPP sponsors and their unions agree, benefit reduction can be avoided by renegotiating the 
sponsor contributions that are fixed in their current collective agreement; and in MEPPs that provide for 
member contributions, those contributions may be increased as well. But as a practical matter, these 
alternatives are often difficult to implement. Consequently, benefit reduction is a real and present danger for 
most MEPPs and their members. (Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe 
Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto: Minister of Finance, 2008) at 68). 
 
30
 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report: 
(Toronto 2012) at 8. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Most DB plan members (80%) are represented by unions, and of those, a significant majority (69%) are 
enrolled in plans that are classified as either jointly sponsored and governed (public JSPPs), or governed by 
boards of trustees, at least half of whose members must be union nominees (private MEPPs). Consequently, 
either indirectly through the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or directly through their 
representatives on boards of trustees, active plan members typically have an opportunity to influence plan 
design and decision-making. (Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Toronto, Queen’s 
Printer, 2006). 
33
 SEPPs are characteristically (but not exclusively) located in the private sector, as are some MEPPs and, 
potentially, JSPPs. Private sector SEPPs are therefore especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the sponsor’s 
fortunes and to the risk of the sponsor becoming insolvent. They are also more likely to face restructuring as 
corporate sponsors reconfigure themselves, merge with other corporations or simply decide to redesign or 
close their plans. Public sector plans — largely MEPPs and JSPPs — have faced divestments or 
reorganizations as well, but with somewhat less frequency. 
 
A SEPP is sponsored by a single employer; the chances of that employer getting into financial difficulty to 
the prejudice of the plan are much greater than in the case of a MEPP (or most JSPPs), where multiple 
employers are available to sustain the plan, even if one goes under. Many MEPPs and most JSPPs are 
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The percentage of defined benefit pension plans that fell below the 80% funded level (i.e. a plan’s 
assets are only sufficient to pay 80% of its liabilities) in Ontario more than doubled between 2001 
and 2002, from 23.4% to 50.6%.
34
 Fast forwarding ten years, the Financial Services Commission of 
Ontario’s (FSCO’s)35 2012 Report on the Funding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans36 revealed that 
54% of Ontario’s defined benefit pension plans were less than fully funded versus 52% in its 2011 
report.
37
 (Incidentally, this underfunding problem also existed in Canada’s other 10 regulatory 
jurisdictions).  
Note that strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in 2013 resulted in a dramatic year 
of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Almost 40% of pension plans 
tracked by Mercer
38
 were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% a year earlier. 
Furthermore, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60% in 2012.
39
 The volatility 
in defined benefit pension plan funding was evidenced by falling long term interest rates in 2014. 
(Note that pension plans use long-term interest (discount) rates to calculate the size of their pension 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
more able to spread risks and amortize costs over a larger member base than almost all SEPPs. Funding 
rules should therefore be designed to take account of the different risks inherent in each plan type.  (Ontario 
Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Toronto, Queen’s Printer, 2006). 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) is an agency of the Ministry of Finance that 
regulates registered pension plans in Ontario in accordance with the Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and 
Regulation 909, as amended.   
36
 Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), 2012 Report on the Funding of Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2013) at 6. (This report is based on the latest 
filed funding valuation reports for defined benefit plans that had valuation dates between July 2, 2009 and 
June 30, 2012, and financial statements for the fiscal year ending between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012). 
37
 These funding percentages are based on a going concern basis where the plan is assumed to continue 
operating on the valuation date as opposed to a being based on a solvency basis where the plan is assumed 
to wind-up on the actuarial valuation date. 
38
 Mercer is one of the largest consulting firms in the world, operating internationally in more than 40 
countries with more than 19,000 employees. (Wikipedia). Online: < 
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercer_(consulting_firm) >. 
39 Barbara Shecter,”Defined Benefit Plans Healthier than Ever But Don’t Expect to See More of Them” 
Financial Post, (2 January 2014) FP Street. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../canadian-
pension-plans-start-2014-at >. 
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liabilities; i.e. lower rates raise the level of funding required to meet a plan’s obligations). FSCO40 
reported that the percentage of fully funded defined benefit plans in Ontario fell from 54% to 23% 
over the 2 year period from 2012 to 2014(according to FSCO’s 2014 Annual Report on the Funding 
of Defined Benefit Pension Plans
41
). 
Federal PBSA 
Under the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, Pension Benefits Standards Act, 
1985 (PBSA) and the Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985 (Regulations), the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) regulates and supervises private pension plans in 
federally regulated business, works and undertakings such as banking, telecommunications and 
inter-provincial transportation. OSFI is also the regulator for pension plans established in respect of 
employment in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. It supervised 1226 private 
pension plans covering 631,000 employees or about 6% of all workers registered in workplace 
plans in Canada in 2014.
42
 Approximately 1/4 of these plans were DB, covering 340,000 employees 
(over half of the total) a decline of 60,000 members from the 400,000 DB plan membership in 2003. 
 
Defined benefit pension assets regulated by FSCO increased by $17 billion from $ 95 billion in 
2005 to $112 billion in 2014. Similar to the Ontario PBA, the funding status of federally regulated 
plans also improved dramatically in 2013 due to improved investment returns. 39% of OSFI’s plans 
were fully funded at the beginning of 2014 compared to only 10% a year earlier.
43
 However, similar 
                                                             
40
 The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) is an agency of the Ministry of Finance that 
regulates registered pension plans in Ontario in accordance with the Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and 
Regulation 909, as amended.   
41 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report: 
(Toronto 2014) at 8. 
42
 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally Regulated Private Pension Plans: (Ottawa, 2015). Online: < 
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ar-ra/1415/eng/ar1415.pdf >.     
43
 Ibid. 
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to Ontario, the percentage of fully funded defined benefit pension plans decreased to 21% over the 
next 12 months due to falling interest rates.
44
    
 
Air Canada was placed on OSFI’s “watch” list in the early 2000s.45 In its 2004 restructuring 
(bankruptcy protection filing) the airline asked permission from OSFI to extend the funding of its 
1.2 billion dollar defined benefit plan pension shortfall from 5 to 10 years. Despite receiving 
permission to extend its funding, Air Canada’s pension deficit continued to balloon to 4.4 billion 
dollars by 2011. In response, the federal government passed special legislation allowing Air Canada 
more flexibility in funding its pension deficit.
46
 There have been several factors that have since 
contributed to the elimination of Air Canada’s solvency deficit (which sat at $3.7-billion at the start 
of 2013), not the least of these was an increase in its discount (interest) rate from 3.0 % in 2013 to 
                                                             
44
 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, “Newsletter from the Private Pension Plan Division at 
Osfi” Issue 13, 2015. Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/pp-rr/Pages/default.aspx>. 
45
 Nicholas LePan (Superintendent, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions) (Remarks delivered 
at the General Meeting, Canadian Institute of Actuaries, 2004. online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.cal>. 
46
 CNW, “Air Canada Provides Update of Solvency Update in Registered Pension Plans” A PR Newswire 
Company (07 Feb. 2011) online: <www.newswire.ca/.../air-canada-provides-update-of-solvency-deficit-in-
r...>. (In July 2009, the Government of Canada adopted the Air Canada 2009 Pension Regulations. These 
regulations relieved Air Canada from making any past service contributions (i.e. special payments to 
amortize the plan solvency deficits) to its ten domestic defined benefit registered pension plans in respect of 
the period beginning April 1, 2009, and ending December 31, 2010. Based on these regulations, for the 
period from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013, the aggregate annual past service contribution equals 
the lesser of (i) $150 million, $175 million, and $225 million in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, on an 
accrued basis, and (ii) the maximum past service contribution permitted under the Canadian Income Tax 
Act.).  
 
CBC News, “Air Canada Emerges from Federal Pension Deal” The Canadian Press (15 May 2015) online: 
<www.cbc.ca/.../air-canada-emerges-from-federal-pension-deal-1.3089370 >. (Air Canada announced that it 
had a pension surplus of $1.2 billion and was opting out of the Air Canada Pension Plan Funding 
Regulations, 2014, effective May 26, 2015. Under these regulations, Air Canada was required to make 
solvency deficit payments of $200 million per year, on average, over a seven-year period. The agreement 
also contained several restrictions, including a prohibition on share repurchases, dividends, executive 
bonuses and plan improvements. As a result of opting out, Air Canada will now fund the pension according 
to normal funding rules. The company will make pension solvency payments of approximately $90 million in 
2015 versus the $200 million it would have had to contribute under the special regulations for past service 
costs, in addition to the $125 million they will pay in current service costs. (Note that the plan remains in a 
$445 million deficit given that, under normal funding rules, a plan’s financial standing is based on a three 
year average.)). 
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3.9 % in 2014. For every 1% rise in the discount rate, Air Canada’s solvency liability was reduced 
by $1.5 billion, translating into $1.35-billion in savings.
47
 This was in addition to the $970-milllion 
in savings from the implementation of changes to its pension benefits, including moving new hires 
into a hybrid (defined benefit/contribution) pension plans as part of its 2012 contract negotiations. 
The carrier also contributed $225-million in cash to its DB plan in 2013.
48
  
In 2009 Nortel Networks (another federally regulated company) also filed for bankruptcy protection. 
(However, unlike Air Canada, it did not survive bankruptcy proceedings.) Upon dissolution, 
Nortel’s $5 billion plan carried a 1.5 billion dollar deficit, resulting in benefit reductions up to 43% 
for its 20,000 pensioners and former employees.
49
   
1. Significance of Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding Estimates 
It is evident from the Air Canada and Nortel bankruptcies that employers, employees, and 
pensioners all have a vested interest in understanding the complex and crucial issues involved in 
defined benefit pension funding. Employers need to know what their pension promises will cost 
them, while actively contributing employees and retirees need assurances that their plans have 
sufficient funding to meet current and future obligations. Funding is also critically important to 
those parties one step removed from the day to day operations of defined benefit pension plans, 
including:
50
   
1. Pension regulators (preventing plan failures). 
 
                                                             
47
 The higher the interest (discount) rate, the lower the investment level required to pay future liabilities. 
48
 “Air Canada Eliminates $3.7 Billion Dollar Pension Deficit” The Financial Post (22 January, 2014).Investing. 
Online: < business.financialpost.com/2014/01/22/air-canada-pension-deficit-2014 >. 
49
 Wikipedia, Nortel Retirees and Former Employees Protection Canada, 2013. Online: < 
www.nortelpensioners.ca >. 
50
 Report of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008) 
at 53. 
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2. Tax collectors (preventing the illicit sheltering of corporate income).  
 
3.  Union members (preventing the loss of much-valued and hard-won benefits).  
 
4. Investors and creditors (preventing the unanticipated “legacy” costs of maintaining a 
pension plan gone bad). 
 
5. Policy makers (require an accurate idea of the overall funding status of pensions to plan for 
the social and economic well-being of retirees).  
 
Valuing the funding requirements of defined benefit pension plans is challenging for several 
reasons including:
51
 
1. The pension promise is typically made good over decades. For example, an employee 30 
years of age in 2013 may not retire for 30 years and will continue to draw his or her 
pension for another 20 years until 2063 or longer. 
 
2. The factors that define the value of the pension promise (employees’ years of service 
and income) vary with changes in factors such as life expectancy, salaries, benefits, 
business conditions and regulatory requirements. 
 
3. The cost of paying for the pension promise is constantly changing as asset requirements 
change to meet evolving long term liabilities (which fluctuate with interest rates, among 
other factors). 
 
 
2. Chapter Summaries 
This thesis focuses on the Ontario Pension Benefits Act52 (PBA), the largest pension jurisdiction in 
Canada, and the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act53 (PBA). It is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter 1(the Introduction) introduces the concept of two tier defined benefit (DB) pension plans in 
Canada, highlighting the stark contrast between public sector workers (who are nearly all registered 
in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) and private sector workers, the vast 
majority of whom either have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in 
defined contribution plans offering no income guarantees. It then discusses the magnitude of the 
                                                             
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Pension Benefits Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.). 
53
 Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990. 
 19 
 
funding problem in private sector single employer DB plans, before concluding with a literature 
review of “professional discretion and the law”.  
Chapters 2-7 focus on the current regulatory environment facilitating the underfunding of defined 
benefit pension plans in Canada. Chapter 2 discusses the general regulatory regimes overseeing DB 
plan funding while Chapter 3 provides an overview of specific legislation, regulations, and 
professional bodies governing actuarial funding. It highlights the disconnect between short-term 
funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of DB funding.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of the governance of discount (interest) rates
54
on pension funding, 
concluding that public policy in Canada permits actuaries to use their discretion to estimate higher 
than market discount rates to reduce employers’ funding requirements. It proposes the 
establishment of an independent external oversight board to establish a common framework for 
estimating discount rates, promoting a common understanding amongst actuaries of how to improve 
the consistency of their estimates. 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the underfunding of 
defined benefit pension plans. It examines asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the 
role of the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push DB funding 
problems down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concludes by proposing that an 
independent external oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and usefulness of 
actuarial methods in Canada.  
                                                             
54
 The discount rate is the interest rate that a sum of money invested today would need to earn to equal a 
specified value at a future date. For example, a discount rate of 10% applied to a $100.00 sum expected to 
be received in one year results in a present value of $90.90.  In other words, $100 received in one year is 
worth $90.90 today. 
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Chapter 6 examines the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding 
that courts’ surplus policy over the past three decades (from the “Dominion Stores” case in 1986 to 
Manitoba Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting 
actuarial underfunding and insolvency.  
Chapter 7 discusses the reasons for the economic failure of the traditional DB model and proposes   
the adoption of fixed funding “target benefit” plans (which effectively eliminate the impact of 
actuaries’ discretion on funding) as one possible remedy to the current underfunding dilemma.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion. It proposes various legal remedies to the underfunding of private sector 
single employer defined benefit pension plans including increasing employers’ access to surplus, 
making actuaries fiduciaries, and establishing an actuarial oversight board.  It concludes that the 
establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board would be the best legal remedy.  
 
     Section 2-Literature Review 
Professional Discretion and the Law  
1. Overview 
Professional discretion is regulated by administrative bodies empowered by legislation.  David 
Mullan defines administrative law as "the body of law that establishes or describes the legal 
parameters of power that exist by virtue of Statute or residual Royal prerogative.” 55 This section 
reviews the curial and academic treatment of professional discretion in Canada. 
                                                             
55
 David Mullan, Administrative Law (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2000). 
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Canadian administrative law addresses the actions and operations of governments and 
governmental agencies. It concerns itself with the manner in which courts can review the decisions 
of administrative decision-makers such as a board, tribunal, commission, agency or minister. 
Administrative law is concerned primarily with issues of substantive review (the determination and 
application of the appropriate standard of review to either accept or reject an administrator’s 
decision) and with issues of procedural fairness (the enforcement of a person’s participatory rights 
in an administrative process).
56
 
An "appeal" of an administrative agency’s decision is known as "judicial review," a process 
whereby a court of law is asked to rule on the appropriateness of an administrative agency’s or a 
tribunal’s decision. Judicial review allows a court to consider the entire decision-making process of 
an administrator, including the process and the findings of fact and of law. The power of judicial 
review is found either in the enabling statute or by virtue of the common law.
57
    
Historically in Canada all administrative decisions classified as “legal” were reviewable while those 
classified as “discretionary” could only be reviewed on limited grounds such as the bad faith of 
decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant 
considerations.
58
  In other words, judges determined whether or not an administrative decision was 
reviewable simply by classifying it as “legal” or “discretionary”.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
repudiated this dichotomy in the 1999 case Baker v. Canada.
59
  In Baker the Court held “there is 
great difficulty in making rigid classifications between discretionary and non-discretionary [legal] 
decisions” and that “all decisions should be subject to the same standards of judicial review.” 
                                                             
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 See, for example, Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Government of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, at pp. 7-8; Shell 
Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231. 
59
 Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
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Consequently, virtually all administrative decisions made in Canada are now potentially reviewable 
by the courts.  
2. Discretion Defined 
Discretion is about power and judgement. It arises in the public domain when officials are 
empowered to make decisions on how authority should be exercised in particular circumstances. 
Not surprisingly, discretion has been the focus of countless law and policy initiatives designed to 
preserve, enhance, check, limit, shape, or eliminate it.
60
 The conventional paradigm of discretion is 
captured by the observation that where the law ends, discretion begins. In other words, the rule of 
law has historically been equated with the notion of justice whereas discretion has been viewed as 
the antithesis of the law.
61
  
 
Philip Anisman observed in 1975 (in the first significant attempt to catalogue discretionary power 
in Canada) that the exercise of discretion does not in and of itself suggest any particular value. He 
noted:  “Depending on the context and the actions of a discretionary decision maker, discretion may 
mean beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, reasonableness or unreasonableness.”62 Recent 
academic articles seem to concur with Anisman’s generalized concept of discretion, stating that 
discretion works in varied, historically specific, empirical contexts to enable different forms of 
governance. These various forms of governance include progressive dialogic and democratic forms, 
                                                             
60
 Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, “A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion” (2009) 24:3 CJLS 301. 
[Sossin and Pratt, Discretion] at 301. 
61
 Ibid.  
62
 Philip Anisman, ed., A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970 
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975) at Preface. 
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hotly political and authoritarian forms, racialized, classed, risk-based, biopolitical, sovereign, 
disciplinary, and other oppressive forms.
63
  
 
Sossin and Pratt discussed the standard dictionary definition of discretion as: "The power or right to 
decide or act, according to one's own judgement or choice.”64 In the context of the administration of 
public law and policy, the "freedom to choose" by autonomous decision makers is defined in 
natural opposition to the constraints imposed by legal rules. Indeed, the same dictionary defines 
"arbitrary" (arbitrariness being the most prevalent concern associated with discretionary decision 
making), as "subject only to individual will or judgement, without restriction; contingent only on 
one's discretion: an arbitrary decision... having unlimited power; uncontrolled or unrestricted by law; 
despotic; tyrannical." 
65
 In other words, discretion is all about the power of law, autonomy, and 
freedom of choice.
66
 
 
The development of administrative law was shaped by a particular interpretation of A. V. Dicey’s 
conception of the rule of law, as expressed in his Introduction to the Study of the law of the 
Constitution.
67
 Dicey abhorred discretion, which he viewed as antithetical to the rule of law because 
he believed that it inherently led to the exercise of arbitrary power. The dominant scholarly view of 
discretion (until the advent of the welfare state) was articulated by Dicey in his book Law and 
Constitution, first published in 1915:  
                                                             
63
 Supra, see note 60 at 302. 
64
  Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., sub verbo "discretion" as cited in Sossin and 
Pratt, Discretion at 302. 
65
 Ibid. sub verbo “arbitrary”. 
66
 Supra, see note 72 at 302. 
67
 First published in 1885, it will be referred to here, unless otherwise indicated, in its 10
th
 edition edited by 
E.C.S. Wade:  A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London, MacMillan 
and Co. Ltd., 1959) [Dicey, Law of Constitution] as quoted in Genevieve Cartier, Reconceiving Discretion, 
from Discretion As Power to Discretion As Dialogue (Doctor of Juridical Science Thesis, University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law, 2004). [Cartier, Thesis] 
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No man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a 
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of 
the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based 
on the exercise of persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers of 
constraint….It means that absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to 
the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, or prerogative, 
or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government.  Englishmen are ruled 
by law, and by law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be 
punished for nothing else.
68
   
Dicey believed that government decisions classified as “legal” should be reviewable while 
“discretionary” decisions should not be reviewable. However, considering that all decisions involve 
at least some degree of discretion, he failed to explain how to differentiate (in practice) between 
“legal” and “discretionary” decisions.  
Sharp v. Wakefield,
69
 an 1891 English House of Lords case, held that legal and discretionary 
decisions were mutually exclusive. It held:  
Discretion means that when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of 
the authorities that that something is to be according to the rules of reason and justice, not 
according to private opinion….according to law, not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague 
and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be within the limits to which an honest man 
competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself.
70
 
 
Unfortunately, similar to Dicey’s conception of judicial review, Sharp v. Wakefield failed to 
provide any useful guidelines on how to differentiate “discretionary” decisions from “legal” ones. 
Amazingly, this arcane notion of discretion was the law in Canada up until Baker in 1999.  
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 Ibid. at 188 and 202. 
69
 Sharp v. Wakefield [1891] A.C. 173 as cited in Lorne Sossin, Revenue, Ideology and Legitimacy: The 
Politics of Tax Administration in Canada, (Thesis for Doctor of Juridical Science degree) University of 
Toronto, 1992.  
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 Ibid. at 179. 
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3. Academic View of Discretion 
Historically, academics in Canada have viewed discretion as a top-down exercise of state power 
that could not be reviewed by ordinary courts.
71
 In fact, with the notable exception of the 1959 
Supreme Court of Canada decision Roncarelli v. Duplessis
72
 (where Rand J. clearly questioned both 
the view of discretion as power and the unchallengeable nature of discretion), this kind of thinking 
exercised an overwhelming influence on the conception of discretion and on the structure of judicial 
review in Canada.
73
 In essence, courts limited themselves to policing the boundaries within which 
discretion was to be exercised, on the basis that discretion was intrinsically political and outside of 
their legitimate domain of intervention.
74
 
 
In concert with the rise of the welfare state in the 1960s, students of jurisprudence began to develop 
a more progressive view of discretionary decision making.  They saw discretion as a "humanizing" 
device, permitting decision makers to apply the rules of law to specific circumstances. However, 
this individualized application of the law in determining people’s rights provoked many academics 
to cling to the traditional power model.  Scholars (most notably Kenneth Culp Davis) returned to 
their earlier views that administrative discretionary powers were a serious threat, both real and 
potential, to individual justice.  Since Davis' influential 1969 study Discretionary Justice, 
administrative discretion in Canada has most often been posited as an oppositional threat to the rule 
of law; as a potential source of abuse and arbitrary state action, that needs to be constrained and 
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limited by rules and principles of legality.
75
 Davis believed that "discretionary justice" could only 
be achieved by minimizing the injustice caused by discretionary authority given to government 
officials such as police officers.  He wrote “A public officer has discretion whenever the effective 
limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.”76 
It was Davis who advanced the notion that all public administration had to be subjected to “fairness 
and reasonableness” standards.77  
 
Since the 1960s most jurisprudence on discretion has focussed on the application of legal standards 
to constrain the exercise of discretion. In 1986 D.J. Galligan made a significant contribution to the 
study of legal discretion as he advanced a framework for approaching discretion as a distinct sphere 
of legal action and criticized Davis for, among other things, his failure to include any consideration 
of policy making in his study of discretion, arguing that policy making is "the very heart of the 
discretionary process:    
[It refers to] powers delegated within a system of authority to an official or set of officials, 
where they have some significant scope for settling the reasons and standards according to 
which power is to be exercised, and for applying them in the making of specific decisions. 
The process of settling the reasons and standards must be taken to include not just the more 
obvious cases of creating standards where none is given, but also individualizing and 
interpreting loose standards, and assessing the relative importance of conflicting standards. 
Central to this sense of discretion is the idea that within a defined area of power the official 
reflects upon its purposes, and then settles upon the policies and strategies for achieving 
them. There may be discretion in identifying and interpreting purposes; there may also be 
                                                             
75
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discretion as to the policies, standards, and procedures to be followed in achieving these 
purposes.
78
   
 
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to concur with 
Galligan’s viewpoint, noting in 1992 that "things are not as simple as Dicey perceived them. The 
law is not as certain as he would have it, nor are administrators as arbitrary." 
79
 In the 1990s legal 
scholarship began exploring discretion as a mechanism for dialogue, democratization, and the 
enhancement of human dignity.
80
 Social scientific scholarship, drawing from a slightly different 
conceptual tool kit, also began to explore discretion as a specific mode of governance in its own 
right.
81
 
4. Curial Treatment of Discretion 
 In the 1999 case Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration)
82
 (in which an 
immigration officer denied a Jamaican lady’s application to stay in Canada on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds without providing any reasons) L’Heureux-Dube J. wrote: “The concept of 
discretion refers to decisions where the law does not dictate a specific outcome, or where the 
decision-maker is given a choice of options within a statutorily imposed set of boundaries.”  Robert 
Dworkin seemed to concur with her concept in his famous doughnut analogy stating, “Discretion, 
like a hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt 
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restriction.”83 L’Heureux-Dube and Dworkin effectively encapsulated this conventional view of 
discretion in which three main assumptions are embedded:
84
 
1. The law is the primary instrument of social regulation. 
2. Discretion is a residual category of law 
3. Discretion is exercised by individuals who, though influenced in a wide variety of ways, are 
essentially autonomous. It is…a relative concept.  
 
 
5. Academic Arguments Re Discretion 
The traditional legal debates on discretion have been spearheaded by two main groups of academics 
- A. V. Dicey, Lord Hewart, and F.A. Hayek, on the one side, and W. A. Robson, I. Jennings, J. 
Willis, and H. Arthurs, on the other. Dicey and company perceive discretion as a threat to 
individual liberty, permitting the state to intervene in a way that is uncontrollable by the courts, 
either on a procedural or substantive basis. In other words, discretion is conceived as a means of 
escaping the rigidities of the law because it does not require any form of communication or 
dialogue with the individual or groups affected by its exercise.
85
  
The second group of scholars view discretion as a practical method of implementing the legitimate 
projects of the welfare state, controlled by specialized courts dedicated to the values inherent in 
“welfare policies.”  In their view, the executive (management) of the civil service provides the 
expertise required to implement the projects of the legislative branch, while professionals use their 
discretion in administering them. The delegation of discretion to professionals does not imply that 
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the executive plays an active role in day to day administration.  Quite the contrary, the executive 
confers freedom on bureaucrats to make decisions.
86
 
6. Discretion and the Common Law  
As indicated above, Canadian courts have traditionally limited themselves to policing the 
boundaries within which discretion is to be exercised, on the basis that discretion is intrinsically 
political and outside of their legitimate domain of intervention. The transitional period in the 
evolution of legal discretion commenced with two Supreme Court of Canada decisions, Canadian 
Union for Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation
87
 in 1979 and 
Nicholson v.  Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police
88
 in 1981. In both of 
these cases, the Court de-emphasized the binary distinction between law and discretion in the 
judicial review of administrative decisions. More specifically, CUPE mandated that courts defer to 
administrative determinations of the law unless a decision is patently unreasonable (clearly 
irrational) while Nicholson recognized that procedural obligations could be imposed on 
administrative decision makers by the courts. The CUPE decision in particular created tensions in 
the area of judicial review because imposing procedural obligations on administrative decision 
makers was difficult to reconcile with the idea of discretion as a top-down exercise of power 
unreviewable by the courts (assumed by the majority of judges).
89
   
These tensions eventually resulted in a major restructuring of judicial review in the 1999 Supreme 
Court of Canada case Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration). 
90
 Baker 
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effectively shattered the Nicholson and CUPE distinctions of differentiating legal decisions from 
discretionary decisions, suggesting that procedure and substance cannot be conceived as water-tight 
compartments. Baker saw discretion as a “space controlled by law” as opposed to being inherently 
political, giving the executive branch of government “free reign within legal limits” to make 
decisions.
91
 Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux–Dube stated “there is no rigid dichotomy between 
discretion and law-interpretation, and therefore no justification for different kinds of reviews for 
each.” Moreover, she expressed the view that the “pragmatic and functional approach,92 (developed 
for review of interpretations of the law) was also suitable for the review of discretion, since it 
(discretion) reflected the two central ideas incorporated in the traditional approach to the review of 
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the law: that the decision maker must be given suitable leeway, but that he or she must nonetheless 
act within certain limits.
93
 L’Heureux-Dube stated:  
The pragmatic and functional approach can take into account the fact that the more 
discretion that is left to the decision maker, the more reluctant courts should be to interfere 
with the manner in which decision makers have made choices among various options. 
However, though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, that 
discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the 
principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamentals of 
Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.
94
 
By applying the pragmatic and functional approach to the control of discretion, Baker marked the 
end (at least temporarily) of the dual approach to judicial review of administrative law in Canada.  
Baker also held that the test for determining the reasonableness of an administrator’s discretionary 
decisions would be based on whether or not written reasons (i.e. procedures) were consistent with 
the statute in question. Scholar Genevieve Cartier commented on the transition of administrative 
law in Canada: 
I submit that courts, through Roncarelli, Nicholson, and Baker, have interpreted formal law 
in accordance with principles that internalize those ideals. By imposing on decision makers 
exercising discretion both a duty to act fairly (essentially, a hearing requirement that allows 
for exchange of information and deliberation on the applicable norms) and a requirement 
that they make reasonable substantive findings (including, among other conditions, that 
discretionary decisions be faithful to the values underlying the grant of the power and to the 
process that preceded their making), these decisions legally impose principles that articulate 
participation and accountability.
95
 
 
 
Professor Genevieve Cartier notes that the events of September 11, 2001 revived the idea in Canada 
(and in many other common law jurisdictions around the world) that some executive discretionary 
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decisions cannot and should not be subject to any substantive judicial control.
96
 (In the Supreme 
Court of Canada case Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
97
 the Minister 
formed the opinion that a refugee who was a risk to Canada’s national security should be deported. 
The Court declared that the executive was free to weigh the factors relevant to the decision and that 
the reviewing court was limited to ensuring that those factors had been taken into account by the 
Minister). Cartier continues that Suresh reflected the judiciary’s unwillingness to undertake a 
substantive review of discretionary decisions dealing with matters of national security, returning to 
the traditional interpretation of discretion as an exercise of power unreviewable by the courts.
98
 
However, the Court unanimously expressed its commitment to protecting the fundamental values of 
Canada's democratic tradition, finding that a discretionary decision to deport an individual to a 
country where he or she faced a substantial risk of torture could be made only after a hearing, with 
reasons disclosed by the Minister. In other words, the executive is still procedurally constrained in 
the exercise of discretion, even in matters of national security. Cartier concludes that the extent to 
which procedure constrains any substantive issue is likely to be minimal in national security 
decisions.  
 
Note that the Suresh Decision is in stark contrast to Baker, wherein Justice L'Heureux-Dube clearly 
indicated that courts could legitimately "re-weigh" the considerations taken into account in the 
decision-making process in order to determine the reasonableness of the decision challenged. In 
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effect, Suresh retreated from the view of “discretion as dialogue” and reverted back to the more 
traditional view of “discretion as power” in circumstances of national security.99 
In the 2012 case Dore v. Barreau du Quebec
100
 the court decided that the normal method used by 
the courts to determine whether a law infringing a right or freedom is justifiable (i.e. the Oakes 
Test)
101
 does not replace the administrative framework. Instead, whether an adjudicated decision 
violates the Charter depends on whether an administrative decision-maker has “disproportionately, 
and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right.” This “reasonable analysis” centres on 
proportionality, to ensure that a decision interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee “no more 
than is necessary given the statutory objectives.” In particular, the court noted the established 
principle in Baker that “though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, 
that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed by the statute, the 
principles of the rule of law, the principles administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian 
society, and the principles of the Charter.”  
7. Modern Legal Theories on Discretion 
Scholar Genevieve Cartier maintains that since Baker, a proper understanding of the legal 
constraints imposed on discretion implies a conception of discretion as dialogue as opposed to the 
traditional conception of discretion as power where courts have no authority. She argues that the 
normative foundations for this new conception of discretion can be found in a combination of a 
                                                             
99
 Suresh at 323. 
100
 Dore v. Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395. 
101
 The Oakes Test is the method described by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes, [1986 ] 1 
S.C.R. 103 for determining whether a law that violates a fundamental right or freedom should be saved as a 
reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter of Rights Freedoms. 
 34 
 
relational theory 
102
 exemplified in writings by J. Nedelsky, a democratic theory
103
 of the kind 
expressed by H. Richardson,
104
 and a vulnerability theory,
105
 articulated by J.Handler and L. Sossin. 
She suggests that vulnerability, relationality and democracy can be linked together in a number of 
illuminating ways:  
[A] relational view of autonomy better encapsulates the reality of the modern welfare state 
than the traditional atomistic understanding of that notion. Discretion as dialogue not only 
understands what is important about the relational aspect of autonomy, but provides the 
space for that aspect to be realized. And here, Richardson’s democratic theory helps us to 
understand how democracy requires that the administrative state be reconfigured to structure 
that space in the right way. In turn, vulnerability theories remind us that for vulnerable 
people to be autonomous within a relational framework, the state must itself abide by values 
that provide relational autonomy. Hence, vulnerability requires the state to participate in the 
development of fruitful relations with the individuals and as a result, to sustain autonomy 
and democracy.
106
 
 
Cartier further argues that her view of discretion as dialogue contributes to the recognition of the 
legitimacy of the administrative state. In other words, her conception of discretion as dialogue 
favours the realization of the legitimate projects of the welfare state, while at the same time 
recognizing a role for the rule of law in government. She states:  
Indeed, solutions to contemporary legal questions can hardly be crafted in the light of 
obsolete theoretical principles and assumptions. As an alternative, I have suggested that a 
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dialogic model of discretion and a "rule-of-law project" can together help to alleviate the 
tensions between discretion as a fundamental attribute of a welfare state and the necessity of 
preserving individuals from arbitrary exercises of state power. However, conceptual models 
that seem well adjusted to the contemporary challenges of the welfare state are not 
necessarily easily transferable to practice. I suggest that discretion as dialogue is a 
promising way ahead in thinking about the principles and values that must be protected in 
the context of today's legal institutional arrangements, but we still need to appraise the 
concrete challenges raised by dialogue and to understand the effect that it produces on the 
very persons involved in its exercise. 
107
 
 
In a series of essays,
108
 Lorne Sossin claims that it is both necessary and possible to democratize 
bureaucracy, and that discretionary powers can contribute significantly to democratization.
109
  
Sossin suggests that we should apply Haberman’s theory110 of communicative action to 
bureaucracy, and argues that administrative discretion can be legitimated on communicative 
grounds;
111
 that is, on the basis of reasons that are good in the sense that they are consensually 
agreed to.
112
 This, Sossin remarks, is deeply opposed to the traditional academic view of public 
administration, premised on the need to separate administration from politics, and therefore 
administrative decision makers from political influence writ large.
113
 Sossin believes that public 
administration can be transformed in order to operate rationally from a communicative perspective. 
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114
 He finds Dworkin's "hole in the doughnut" analogy for discretion (in which the law is a belt 
surrounding discretion) unsatisfactory. In its place he offers up the analogy of a sponge (in which 
discretion is intertwined with the law, similar to water embedded in a sponge). Sossin believes that 
the law must capture discretion's potential as a forum for politics.
115
 
 
Sossin further develops a conception of “discretion as engagement,” with the aspiration to nurture 
dialogue and interdependence between decision makers and individuals affected by discretionary 
decisions. His theory of engagement is premised on the idea that “people will accept a judgment as 
legitimate when they believe that the means by which the decision was rendered were just” but also 
if the determination itself is just.
116
  While he admits that “it is not possible to assume that all 
citizens can or should be allowed to take part in all administrative decisions which have a public 
dimension, it is  necessary... that those affected are engaged in [and by] the discretionary judgments 
which public officials are called upon to make.”117 
 
In summary, discretion has been at the centre of some of the most controversial issues relating to 
the idea of administrative law and the administrative state for over a hundred years in Canada. It has 
been viewed from many perspectives including the embodiment of arbitrariness,
118
 a threat to the 
rule of law,
119
 and as a necessary condition for the realization of the many missions of the welfare 
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state.
120
 However, discretion as a binary contrast to law remains the dominant paradigm in Canada 
today. This paradigm is best expressed in Baker:  
Though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, that discretion 
must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the 
rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, 
and the principles of the Charter.
121
 
 
8. Impact of Administrative Guidelines on Discretion 
Canadian law currently dictates that guidelines may not restrain the choices available to a 
discretionary decision-maker. For instance, in the 1994 Ontario Court of Appeal case Ainsley 
Financial Corporation v. Ontario Securities Commission
122
 the court distinguished between policy 
and law in acknowledging the practical reality of the functionally binding nature of guidelines. In 
Ainsley the Ontario Securities Commission acted under a broad regulatory authority, but not one 
that empowered the Commission to issue binding policies. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
reviewing a policy statement issued by the Commission regarding the marketing and sale of penny 
stocks, stated: 
 
There is no bright line which always separates a guideline from a mandatory provision having the 
effect of law. At the centre of the regulatory continuum one shades into the other. Nor is the 
language of the particular instrument determinative. There is no magic to the use of the word 
"guideline," just as no definitive conclusion can be drawn from the use of the word "regulate." An 
examination of the language of the instrument is but a part, albeit an important part, of the 
characterization process. In analyzing the language of the instrument, the focus must be on the thrust 
of the language considered in its entirety and not on isolated words or passages.
123
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The Court concluded that the policy was ultra vires the Commission because it purported to bind 
the Commission’s staff, an authority reserved to the legislature. The first issue addressed by the 
court was the policy's format. Rather than containing general principles, standards, or factors to be 
used as a guide to decision making, the policy read like a "minutely detailed regime complete with 
prescribed forms, exemptions from the regime, and exceptions to the exemptions."
124
 Secondly, the 
Court found that the coercive tone of the policy (which included the suggestion of a threat of 
sanction against a broker for non-compliance) demonstrated that Commission staff "would treat 
Policy Statement 1.10 as if it were the equivalent of a statutory provision or regulation."
125
  
 
The court’s ruling in Ainsley meant that the Ontario pension regulator, the Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario (FSCO), could not issue explicitly binding pension policies, nor could its 
employees’ discretion be restricted by any particular guideline without statutory authority.126 In 
other words, pension plan members or a plan sponsor (i.e. employer) may challenge the pension 
regulator’s decision in court if the decision was fettered by guidelines which were too restrictive in 
allowing a decision maker (i.e. actuaries valuing DB pension plans) to exercise his or her 
discretion.
127
 
 
                                                             
124
 Ibid. at 111. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, 7 W.W.R. 
127
 Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 558; Jesso v.Newfoundland 
(Workers' Compensation Commission), 2001 NFCA 49; Wedley v. British Columbia (Assessor of Area No. 8- 
North Shore Squamish Valley), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1960, 10 Admin. L.R. (3d) 182 (B.C.S.C.) (QL) [Wedley]. 
This is distinct from where binding guidelines are authorized by statute. For a discussion of this distinction, 
see Bell Canada, infra note 92. 
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Professor Gerald Heckman discusses how specific statutes define the concept of discretion either 
broadly or narrowly.
128
 He contrasts the broad nature of the 1995 Ontario Labour Relations Act 
(which states that the labour relations board "may inquire into the complaint of a contravention of 
this Act
129
) to the Ontario Human Rights Code (OHRC), which states “where the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission has not affected a settlement of a complaint, it may refer the subject-matter of 
the complaint to the board of inquiry if it appears that the procedure is appropriate and that the 
evidence warrants an inquiry.”130 In reference to the Patent Act,131 he states that although the Act 
does not expressly confer discretion on a re-examination board to initiate a re-examination, the 
board's interpretation of what is a "substantial new question" involves "the exercise of an implicit 
discretion to elaborate unclear legislative instructions." 
132
 The Act states: 
A re-examination board under the Patent Act shall cause a re-examination of a patent claim 
if it finds that a request for re-examination raises a substantial new question affecting the 
patentability of the claim. 
 
Both the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits  
Act (PBA) defer to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries for the oversight of actuarial discretion. The 
PBSA states: 
 
Except as otherwise specified by the Superintendent, the actuarial reports must be prepared 
in accordance with the standards of practice adopted by the Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries.
133
 
 
Similar wording is used in the PBA. 
 
                                                             
128
 G. Heckman, A Study of Administrative Gatekeeping in Canadian Human Rights Enforcement (LL.M. 
Thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, 1999).[Heckman, Gatekeeping] 
129
 Wackenhut of Canada [1996] 0.L.R.D. No 2535 at para. 9 (QL) as cited in [Heckman, Gatekeeping] 
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Human Rights Code, R.S.O.1990. C.H.19. 
131
 Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4.   
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  J.M. Evans et al. Administrative Law: Cases, Text and Materials 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery 
Publications Ltd.. 1995) at 1021 as cited in Heckman, Gatekeeping at 9. 
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 PBSA, supra, see note 26, section 12 (3.1). 
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Section 3210 of The Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice Guidelines discusses the 
duties of actuaries which require professional discretion. Note how general many of the guidelines 
actually are, providing actuaries with significant leeway in their valuation of DB plans:
134
 
 
.01 The actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan should take account of the 
circumstances of the work.  
.02 The actuary should select an actuarial cost method that is consistent with the circumstances of the 
work.  
.03 The actuary should select an asset valuation method that is consistent with the circumstances of the 
work.  
.04 The actuary’s advice on the funded status of a pension plan should take account of the pension 
plan’s benefits at the calculation date, except that the actuary’s advice may anticipate a pending 
amendment to the pension plan that increases the value of its benefits.  
.05 The actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan should take account of 
expenses if they are expected to be paid from the pension plan’s assets.  
.06 The actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan may, consistent with the 
circumstances of the work, take into account the value and the terms of a letter of credit of which the 
pension plan is the beneficiary.  
.07 If the actuary is providing advice on funding:  
• The actuary should determine the next calculation date, and  
• The actuary’s advice on funding should cover at least the period between the calculation date and the 
next calculation date..... 
 
It is clear from the above CIA guidelines that actuaries are given considerable deference in valuing 
defined benefit pension plans’ funding requirements. However, regulators such as the Financial 
                                                             
134
 The Canadian Institute of Actuaries, The Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice, Section 
3210-Advice on the Funded Status or Funding of a Pension Plan-General. (Toronto: 2013 at 3004). 
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Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) have checked actuaries’ discretion by mandating 
disclosures such as:
135
 
 
1. A description of how fair value has been determined for all investments that are not 
financial instruments. 
 2.A description of the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which 
the plan is exposed at the end of the period, and how the administrator manages those risks;  
3. A credit ratings schedule of interest-bearing financial instruments (AAA, BBB etc.).  
4. A maturity analysis of interest-bearing financial instruments.  
5. A sensitivity analysis of the foreign currency denominated financial instruments, with 
regard to a possible change of 5 per cent in the foreign currency exchange rate (one analysis 
for each applicable foreign currency subject to the materiality requirement).  
6. A sensitivity analysis of interest-bearing financial instruments, with regard to a possible 
change of 1 per cent in the overall level of interest rates.  
7. A sensitivity analysis of equity financial instruments, with regard to a possible change of 10 
per cent in the appropriate equity index benchmark (one analysis for each applicable category 
of equity investments permitted by the SIP&P and subject to the materiality requirement).  
8.  The methods and assumptions used in preparing these sensitivity analyses.  
For example, a 2013 actuarial valuation performed by Mercer (Canada Ltd.)
136
on the City of 
Toronto’s defined benefit pension plan includes a sensitivity analysis illustrating the significance of 
an actuary’s discretion on funding levels by changing the discount rate by only 10%: 
The Pension Fund of The Metropolitan Toronto Pension Plan137 
 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 
Equity price risk 
 
The Plan holds equity financial instruments. The Plan is therefore exposed to equity price risk as 
the value of equity financial instruments will fluctuate due to changes in equity prices. The 
following sensitivity analysis summarizes the impact on the Plans net assets available for benefits, 
following a general 10% change in equity prices. For equity price risk of the Plans pooled fund 
investment, the equity price risk is managed by the investment manager of the pooled fund 
investment. 
 
                                                             
135
Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Disclosure Requirements for Financial Statements Filed 
Pursuant to Regulation 909 s. 76, 2013 at 6. Online: < 
www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/policies/active/.../FSGN-001.pdf >. 
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Mercer is a human resource and related financial services consulting firm.  
137
The Pension Fund of the Metropolitan of Toronto Pension Plan, Financial Statements (2013) at 9 Online: < 
www1.toronto.ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/Pension...%20Employee%20B >. 
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2013      Fair Value   Impact (+/- 10%) 
           $                                            $                
Directly held Investments        
Canadian equities    66,466, 704  6,646,670 
    
Foreign equities    147,475,351  14,747,535 
 
Indirectly held in pooled Funds 
Pooled equity funds   63,713,051  6,371,305 
_____________________________________       
Total     277,655,106  27,765,510 
 
Note that a 10% difference in the actuary’s estimate of equity returns changes the plan’s asset 
valuation by almost 28 million dollars.    
Section 87(6) of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act states that the Superintendent of FSCO has the 
authority to request that a new actuary be retained to perform a plan’s valuation if he or she is 
dissatisfied with the previous actuary’s valuation. It states:  
Special order re preparation of report 
(6) In such circumstances as may be prescribed, the Superintendent may make an order requiring an 
administrator, an employer or any other person to prepare and file a new report or another prescribed 
type of report in respect of a pension plan if the Superintendent is of the opinion that there are reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe, 
(a) that there is a substantial risk to the security of the benefits payable under the pension plan to 
members, former members, retired members or other persons entitled to payments under the pension 
plan; or 
(b) that there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the pension plan. 2010, c. 9, s. 75. 
Same 
(7) An order under subsection (6) may, 
(a) specify the assumptions or methods or both to be used in the preparation of the report; 
(b) require an employer or other person to give the administrator any information necessary to prepare the 
report; 
(c) require the administrator, employer or other person to pay all or part of the cost of preparing the report; 
and 
(d) specify one or more deadlines or periods for complying with the order. 2010, c. 9, s. 75. 
 
However, the pension plan administrator (generally the employer in single employer defined benefit 
plans) may apply for an administrative review of the Superintendent’s decision to request a new 
valuation. The first review must be performed by FSCO’s Financial Services Tribunal and failing 
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that, a judicial review by the court is permitted as per section 88(5) of the Ontario Pension Benefits 
Act (PBA): 
Effect of judicial review 
88 (5) An application for judicial review of an order made under subsection 87 (6) or under subsection (4), 
and any appeal from an order of the court on the application for judicial review, does not stay the order 
made under subsection 87 (6) or under subsection (4), as the case may be. 2010, c. 9, s. 75. 
In other words, the Superintendent’s decisions are reviewable at both the quasi-judicial 
(administrative) and judicial levels in Canada. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of 
Financial Services)
138
 is an example where the Superintendents decision was initially appealed to 
the Financial Services Tribunal and ultimately all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
The foregoing discussion of debates by academics and judges alike on “professional discretion and 
the law” demonstrates their preoccupation with rendering the exercise of professional discretion 
effectively accountable across both social and economic life in Canada. This thesis considers a 
number of methods of rendering actuaries, specifically, accountable for the exercise of their 
professional discretion in estimating the funding requirements of private sector single employer 
defined benefit pension plans. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CURRENT FUNDING AND REGULATORY REGIMES GOVERNING DEFINED 
BENEFIT PENSION PLANS IN CANADA 
1. Overview 
Chapter 1introduced the concept of two tier defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada, 
highlighting the stark contrast between public sector workers (who are nearly all registered in 
defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) and private sector workers, the vast 
majority of whom either have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in 
defined contribution plans offering no income guarantees. It then discussed the magnitude of the 
funding problem in private sector single employer DB plans, before concluding with a literature 
review of “professional discretion and the law”.  Chapter 2 discusses the general regulatory regimes 
overseeing actuarial discretion and underfunding, revealing that private sector Single Employer 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus of this thesis, require more extensive analysis, 
receive more intensive oversight and are required to meet different funding expectations than other 
types of plans.  
 
Even though occupational pension plans originate in voluntary decisions by plan sponsors and 
members, they receive significant public support through tax deferrals. Such financial support is 
based on the policy objective of ensuring adequate income for retirees by encouraging saving for 
retirement. Employment-based pension plans provide a significant proportion of retirement income 
to approximately 6 million or 40% of Canadian workers.
139
 Over 80% of public sector employees 
                                                             
139
 A “pension plan” is the document or set of documents that sets out the employer’s pension obligations to 
employees, former employees who have a right to a pension benefit, retirees and their beneficiaries. It 
typically contains the employer’s contribution obligation, the formula for calculating the pension benefits 
earned while working for the employer and the conditions that entitle one to receive a pension fund. A 
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were registered in occupational pension plans in 2012 compared to only 25% of private sector 
employees.
140
 These workplace plans have been integrated with other public policy initiatives to 
provide guaranteed minimum incomes for older citizens.
141
  The governance and regulation of 
employment-based pension plan funding, therefore, has important public policy implications. 
A. Pension Governance 
Pension plan governance is about delivering on the pension promise consistent with the pension 
plan documents and pension legislation. Pension plan legislation mandates that the pension plan 
administrator (normally the employer in single employer defined benefit plans) is the body 
ultimately responsible for the governance of the pension plan.
142
 Governance may be defined as 
“the structure and processes for overseeing, managing and administering a defined benefit pension 
plan to ensure that fiduciary and other obligations of the plan are met.”143 Processes and structures 
define the division of power and establish mechanisms to ensure the accountability of all funding, 
investment, and administration activities. Funding activities include:
144
  
1. Establishing funding policies for the pension plan (e.g. targeted funding position such as 
fully funded, over-funded, under-funded, surplus cushions, immunization etc.). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
“pension fund” is the sum of all pension contributions and investment earnings on those contributions that is 
the source from which all pension benefits are paid. It must be held by a third party for the benefit of those 
entitled under the terms of the pension plan (Ron Davis, Is Your Defined-Benefit Pension Guaranteed? 
Funding Rules, Insolvency Law and Pension Insurance: Institute for Research on Public Policy (2011) at 34. 
[Davis, Guarantee] 
140
 Statistics Canada, “Pensions In Canada” (2013) Table 280-0016 (Cansim). Online: < 
www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/.../famil120a-eng.htm >. 
141
 According to a study based on data for 2006-07, private pensions play an important role in retirement 
income: “income security benefits [Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement and the Canada 
Pension Plan] and private pensions make up the vast majority of individuals’ income starting at age 
65…Starting at age 55, [private] pensions represent 50% of income [for retired males]…Retirees with 
employment-based pensions or income from a [Registered Retirement Income Fund] have low, almost 
negligible, low-income rates while those without a pension have higher rates particularly at ages before 65. 
(Baker and Milligan 2009) as cited in Davis, Guarantee at 34.  
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 Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), Guideline No. 4- Pension Plan 
Governance Guidelines and Self -Assessment Questionnaire (2004) at 3. 
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 Ibid. 
144
 The Association of Canadian Pension Management, Governance of Pension Plans (1997) at 11. 
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2. Selecting the actuarial cost method to apportion annual funding (e.g. projected unit credit, 
aggregate method, entry age normal method etc.) and assumptions (e.g., inflation, 
investment return, salary growth, etc.). (See Appendix 2 on page 271). 
3. Determining the current funded status of the pension plan through actuarial valuations and 
deciding when to file with regulatory authorities. 
4. Calculating the pension plan’s desired and actual impact on the employer’s financial 
statements. 
5. Preparation of financial statements for the pension plan. 
6. Managing the pension plan’s cash flow. 
In the recent past, pension plan governance issues have emerged in three main areas. First, as 
suggested by Ambachtsheer,
145
 there is a concern about the quality of plan governance. This issue 
arises in part out of a concern about the day to day management of the schemes per se and in part 
out of a concern about how large amounts of capital are being managed.
146
  Secondly, the 
Association of Canadian Pension Management’s (ACPMs) has highlighted the conflict faced by 
sponsors acting in the dual capacity of employers and fiduciaries, noting that at some imprecise 
point the employer role gives way to a fiduciary duty to employees. Thirdly, there are governance 
issues concerning conflicts of interest on the part of actuaries.  Professor Ron Davis addresses the 
extent to which the potential and actual conflicts of interest that pervade pension fund 
administration and investment have influenced the corporate governance activities of pension funds, 
stating:       
Certainly Enron and the fallout from the failure of corporate gatekeepers to exercise even a 
minimum of corporate oversight of corporate governance provide an opportunity to revisit whether 
or not it is wise to leave the corporate governance function in the hands of the experts.
147
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Keith Ambachtsheer, “Cleaning Up the Pension Mess: Why It Will Take More Money” (Toronto: C. D. 
Howe Institute, 2004).  
146
 Evidence of this concern at the international level is presented in OECD [2005]. 
147
 Enron was a U.S. energy-trading and utilities company that housed one of the biggest accounting frauds 
in history. Enron's executives employed accounting practices that falsely inflated the company's revenues, 
which, at the height of the scandal, made the firm become the seventh largest corporation in the United 
States. Once the fraud came to light, the company quickly unraveled and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on 
Dec. 2, 2001. Enron shares traded as high as $85 before the fraud was discovered, but plummeted to 
$0.30 in the sell-off after the fraud was revealed (Investopedia). 
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Each of the above three governance issues is discussed in subsequent chapters.
148
 
 
B. Classical Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plan Funding Risk 
In a classical DB plan, the traditional argument is that almost all of the pension risk is carried by the 
plan sponsor, including:
149
  
1. Investment risk  
2. Expense risk  
3. Inflation risk (if the benefit includes cost of living increases over the payout period)  
4. Interest rate risk  
5. Longevity risk   
However, Professor Keith Ambachtsheer of the Rotman School of Management suggests that the 
embedded risks in defined benefit plans (and who bears them) are seldom clearly stated and rarely 
understood by the plan fiduciaries, or by the plan participants themselves: 
In fixed contribution defined contribution (DC) plans (similar to RRSPs) it is reasonably 
clear that plan participants bear the risk that the assets accumulated at retirement may not be 
sufficient.  In defined benefit (DB) plans however, there is a fiction that all risk-bearing is 
done by the employer, and that employees are guaranteed a pre-defined pension on 
retirement. In practice, this is not how things usually work. It is true that the employer is on 
the hook to make additional contributions when calculated plan liabilities exceed assets. 
However, plan participants are risk bearers too. For example, the employer may go broke or 
simply terminate the plan. Employee pension contributions may also rise. Even if not 
directly, higher employer pension contributions could lead to lower current compensation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Ron Davis, “The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable Corporate Governance by Fiduciaries” 
(2003) 36 UBC L Rev at 571.  
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Institute of Social Policy, 2007) at 38. 
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 John Broadbent, Michael Palumbo and Elizabeth Woodman, The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined 
Contribution Plans-Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management, Bank of Canada (2006) at 7. 
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for employees. Different plans have different vesting provisions. A significant portion of the 
inflation risk embedded in DB plans is typically borne by plan participants, and not the 
employer. For example, some plans promise only fixed dollar pensions that may be updated 
from time to time, depending on the financial health of the pension plan balance sheet. 
Other plans promise pension benefits related to final earnings, but are silent regarding post-
retirement inflation protection. In short, despite the risk-free fiction, DB plans are virtually 
always risk-sharing arrangements.
150
 
 
Employers will generally argue that the resultant defined benefit costs in private sector plans are 
ultimately borne by shareholders of the company or even consumers (if goods produced by the 
company go up in price). However, employees will argue that all of these risks are ultimately borne 
by the workers through their total compensation package. In other words, if an employer’s pension 
costs rise, employees’ wage increases are reduced accordingly.  
It is important to note that public sector defined benefit pension plans are generally more viable 
than their private sector counterparts because government sponsors can rely on guaranteed tax 
revenues to meet their funding commitments.  
2. Current Funding Status of DB Plans In Canada 
According to Aon Hewitt’s151 annual survey of plan sponsors, most defined benefit pension plan 
sponsors in Canada had to make additional contributions toward their pension plan deficits in 2012. 
Approximately 97% of defined benefit pension plans in the survey had a solvency deficiency at the 
end of 2012. (The solvency funded ratio measures the financial health of a defined benefit pension 
plan by comparing the amount of assets to total pension liabilities in the event of plan 
                                                             
150
 Keith Ambachtsheer, Cleaning Up the Pension Mess: Why It Will Take More Than Money, C.D. Howe 
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management, reinsurance, and human capital. It designs, structures and implements solutions that may 
involve traditional insurance products or risk-transfer programs, alternative financing techniques, or entirely 
new products to address a specific problem.  
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termination).
152
 However, strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in 2013 resulted 
in a dramatic year of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Almost 40% of 
pension plans tracked by Mercer
153
 were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% a year 
earlier. Furthermore, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60% in 2012.
154
  
Note that long-term interest rates fell in the second quarter of 2014, leaving most pension plans 
treading water, with minimal change in their funding status since 2013. (Pension plans use long-
term interest (discount) rates to calculate the current value of their pension liabilities; i.e. lower 
rates increase a plan’s obligations. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, according 
to Aon Hewitt, pension funding is now at its highest level since the 2007 global financial crisis with 
37 per cent of plans in a surplus position as of June 2014.
155
 
This resurgence in funding does not mean the trend of declining defined benefit plan membership is 
likely to be reversed anytime soon according to Manual Monteiro of Mercer Financial Strategy 
Group:
156
  
It’s hard to overstate how good 2013 was for most defined benefit pension plans…but that 
doesn’t mean companies and other plan sponsors are likely to reverse the trend away from 
defined-benefit pension plans that guarantee specific payments to retiring employees. 
Rather, they are being urged by pension consultants to take advantage of the improved 
health picture and re-think strategies…. After 12 stomach-churning years of turbulence, 
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many plan sponsors will agree in retrospect that they were too exposed to pension risk. 
Exposure to interest rate fluctuations and equities can change the fortunes of a pension plan 
rapidly and dramatically, as demonstrated in 2001, 2008 and 2011…. Risk reduction 
strategies employed by some pension plan sponsors last year included lower-risk asset 
mixes and settling a portion of liabilities through the annuity market…As companies with 
defined benefit pension plans struggled to fund their obligations in recent years, many opted 
to stop offering the guaranteed retirement benefits to new employees. Others considered 
ways to trim their exposure by reducing benefits or paying upfront to hive off obligations. 
Such de-risking strategies can be costly, particularly in a low interest rate environment, and 
often aren’t designed to pull pension plans out of a current funding deficit position. A 
stronger funding position could make de-risking more palatable. 
Keith Ambachtsheer, a veteran pension expert and a director of the Rotman International Centre for 
Pension Management concurs with Monteiro stating that corporations are done with DB plans and 
that he does not anticipate a “resurgence” but rather, more “de-risking” through means such as 
liability transfers to insurance companies.
157
  
A growing number of experts believe that there are underlying causes of the funding problems of 
defined benefit plans that must be urgently addressed.
158
 The obvious solution is for employers with 
pension deficits to make additional payments, as required under federal and provincial pension 
benefits laws. The problem with this solution is that many companies experiencing financial 
difficulties cannot afford to make the additional payments without risking going into bankruptcy. 
Even financially sound companies are refusing to fund their pension deficits because of low profits 
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in these difficult economic times, raising the question, “Why aren’t regulators demanding that 
companies meet their pension fund obligations?” The challenge pension regulators face is how to 
reduce these solvency deficits without forcing companies into receivership or alternatively, 
converting their defined benefit plans into defined contribution plans. 
A. Federal and Provincial DB Funding Regulations   
There were effectively no controls on defined benefit pension funding in Canada until the 1960s. 
An actuary’s advice to clients on funding and other aspects of plan financing was based on the costs 
and risks inherent in the plans themselves.  
Regulatory laws are applicable to all private sector pension plans. In most jurisdictions, these laws 
do not apply to pension plans that the federal and provincial governments have set up for their own 
employees. Furthermore, registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) or tax assisted individual 
retirement savings accounts are not covered by these occupational pension plan regulations. 
Pension benefit laws in Canada have evolved significantly over the past 40 years. In the first stage 
of their evolution (in the late 1960s and 1970s), the first pension benefit laws were enacted 
provincially and federally, establishing minimum regulatory standards applying to occupational 
pension plans. These standards amounted to meeting minimum funding standards without 
exceeding federal tax deductible limits. However, since the 1970s the inherent risk plan sponsors 
have had to face from their pension plans has changed significantly. Once small fringe benefits, 
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retirement plans have grown to become substantial financial commitments with the accompanying 
risk.
159
 
In the second stage (in the 1980s and early1990s), the minimum regulatory standards were 
improved and strengthened. Emphasis was placed on broadening membership in occupational 
pension plans (to include part-time workers), enhancing the rights of members (by shortening the 
length of the period of service needed to acquire the right to a pension) and expanding benefits 
(instituting survivors’ pensions).160  
The third stage in the evolution of DB pension laws in Canada (2000 to present) focused on 
governance and funding.  Bill 236, the first major pension reform legislation to affect Ontario in 
decades, was passed into law on May 18, 2010 as the Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 2010. It 
introduced immediate vesting (among other things) for all accrued pension benefits (past and 
future). Ontario’s second pension reform bill (Bill 120) was introduced on October 21, 2010.  The 
federal government also introduced substantial changes to the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 
1985
161
 and to the Income Tax Act 
162
 by adopting an omnibus bill (Bill C-9) on July 12, 2010. 
Immediate vesting and more flexible funding rules, including accepting “letters of credit” as 
pension assets, were mandated for federally incorporated companies.
163
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There are currently nine distinct provincial pension regulators (P.E.I. is the only province without 
pension standards legislation) as well as a federal regulator in Canada.  In most cases, pension law 
falls within the provincial power to regulate "property and civil rights" set out in the Constitution 
Act, 1867.
164
 Federal legislation governs pensions associated with federal undertakings, such as 
banks and railroads and also regulates pensions in the three territories. Two-thirds of the 
occupational pension plans in Canada (which include 60% of all occupational plan members) are 
registered in three jurisdictions-federal, Ontario and Quebec.
165
 The operative statutes are the 
Pension Benefits Act
166
 (the "PBA") in Ontario, the Supplemental Pension Plans Act
167
 in Quebec 
and the Pension Benefits Standards Act
168
 (the "PBSA") federally. 
In order to protect workers who often suffer from a lack of information and inequality in bargaining 
power, governments have curtailed certain aspects of an employer's freedom to contract into and 
out of pension arrangements by legislating minimum regulatory standards to which every sponsor 
must adhere. One of the most important of these statutes regulates pension funding. In an attempt to 
defray the risks associated with a sponsor's failure, s.55 of the Ontario PBA addresses pre-funding 
of DB pensions:
169
  
(1) A pension plan is not eligible for registration unless it provides for funding sufficient to provide 
the pension benefits, ancillary benefits and other benefits under the pension plan in accordance with 
this Act and the regulations.  
(2) An employer required to make contributions under a pension plan... shall make the contributions 
in accordance with the prescribed requirements for funding and shall make the contributions in the 
prescribed manner and at the prescribed times.   
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Wording to similar effect appears in the federal PBSA.  The present value of a plan's assets and 
liabilities must be calculated periodically (at least every 3 years) using an actuarial valuation in 
order to inform the sponsor of any necessary contributions required to fully fund a plan’s promised 
benefits.  In preparing these reports, actuaries rely on certain assumptions, including assumptions 
about members' life spans and the rate of return on the investment of plan funds. The actuarial 
valuation may disclose that there are insufficient assets in the plan fund to meet obligations 
(liabilities) promised as of the valuation date, in which case the plan is called insolvent (at least 
temporarily). The amount by which the pension fund falls short is called the unfunded liability.  
Provincial and federal pension regulators are required to ensure that sponsors make "special 
payments" on schedule to re-establish their plans’ solvency.170 Until recently, the maximum time 
limit for these solvency payments was 5 years under federal, Quebec and Ontario laws. However, in 
response to the funding problems that many defined benefit plans in Canada have encountered in 
recent years, the repayment period has been extended up to ten years.
171
  
3. Factors Contributing to the Decline of Defined Benefit Pensions  
A. Mismatch  of Assets and Liabilities 
A greater focus on plan liabilities by sponsors, combined with reduced expectations for returns, is 
currently affecting pension sector investment and risk management in three ways. First, large 
private occupational funds are beginning to modify their policy mix, reducing exposure to publicly 
traded equities in favour of more conservative assets that aim to enhance returns, reduce risk and/or 
better match the long duration of plan liabilities (i.e. changing the asset mix of a pension plan with 
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$200 million of assets from an allocation of 60% equities, 40% bonds mix to a lower risk allocation 
of 30% equities, 70% bonds could result in an immediate increase in the annual pension cost of 
$2.5 million).
172
 Second, asset/liability matching is being implemented by investing in fixed-income 
portfolios to better manage funding risk (i.e. a company invests in 20 year government bonds to 
match liabilities due in 20 years). Finally, the passive management strategies that dominated 
pension investment in the 1990s are giving way to renewed focus on active management (i.e. 
companies are pursuing more professional investment advice).
173
  
B. Demographics 
Demographic changes are often cited as contributing considerably to the decline in workplace 
pensions. Population aging, in particular, generates great pressure on pension systems in all 
industrialized welfare states. The proportion of citizens aged 65 or over is expected to double to 
approximately 25% of the total population within the next 25 years, as the “first wave” of Canada’s 
9 million baby boomers will have turned 65. This will pose 2 major challenges for defined benefit 
pension plans: 
1) The ratio of active to retired plan members is likely to fall considerably. 
2) As the workforce ages and as longevity increases, more retirees will have to be supported 
for longer periods of time. 
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While these developments ought to have been foreseeable, studies suggest that many plan sponsors 
and their actuaries have been using out-of-date mortality tables, underestimating plans’ liabilities by 
as much as 15%.
174    
In 2013 the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) created the first ever uniquely Canadian mortality 
tables (no American data was used) that will in all likelihood lead to higher contributions for 
defined benefit pension plans. The CIA study revealed that the life expectancy of a 60 year old male 
has increased by 2.9 years (from 24.4 to 27.3 years), while the life expectancy of a 60 year old 
female has increased by 2.7 years (from 26.7 years to 29.4 years). Although the effect will vary 
from plan to plan, Towers Watson, a consulting firm, says that adoption of the new mortality tables 
could immediately increase defined benefit plans’ liabilities by 5% to 10%.175   Gavin Benjamin of 
Towers Watson
176
 discusses the impact of these new mortality statistics: 
Just as sponsors were beginning to see a reduction in their pension deficits due to improvements in 
the global equity markets and rising interest rates in 2013, the increase in life expectancy suggested 
by the CIA study could reverse much of this again.
177
  
 
C. Federal Tax Policy 
Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that the Income Tax Act (ITA) regulates virtually every aspect of 
pension plan funding in Canada. Income tax regulations set a “ceiling” on employer contributions 
to DB plans in order to limit the amount of taxable income a company can defer.  Federal (PBSA) 
and Ontario (PBA) pension standards legislation provide a “floor” by setting minimum standards 
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for benefits and funding. In other words, pension plans must operate within these two sets of 
funding limits. Kaplan continues that without registration under the ITA, defined benefit plan 
contributions made by both employers and employees are not deductible for income tax calculation 
purposes, making them immediately taxable. He concludes that these tax deferral strategies are 
fundamentally important to sponsors, pension plan members and the retirement savings system 
generally, promoting accelerated funding levels.
178
  
Bill C-9 was passed into law on July 12, 2010, amending the Income Tax Act. The new law 
increases the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a defined benefit plan for contributions made 
in respect of post-2009 service, from 10 percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities, without 
triggering adverse tax consequences.  
D. Accounting Rules 
Registered pension plans must file annual audited financial statements with regulators such as 
FSCO and OSFI. However, these statements must first be examined by an external auditor who is 
an accountant licensed to sign Audited Financial Statements and is a member of a public 
accounting body conducting an auditing practice. Once the financial statements have undergone 
the auditor's assessment, they are reviewed by DB plans’ Board of Trustees and filed with the 
regulators. 
Pension accounting is based on a set of rules and principles established by certified accounting 
bodies (e.g. Accounting Standards Board in Canada) to enhance comparability between different 
organizations’ financial results.  The “off-balance” sheet accounting provisions used by all 
Canadian corporations up until 2011 served to distort the financial status of DB plans.  In essence, 
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“off-balance” sheet accounting allows companies to refrain from reporting the true amount of their 
pension plan liabilities on their companies’ balance sheets.179 
The shift to a “fair-value” methodology by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accounts’ (CICA) in 
2011 required that all publicly traded companies report pension liabilities on their balance sheets as 
they are incurred. These new rules are based on the approach taken in the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).   
Christine Weidman of the Ivey Business Journal notes that the adoption of this “fair value” 
methodology is driven by the desire of pension plan members, shareholders and the public markets 
to know the true impact of a pension plan’s funding on the sponsor organization’s financial position. 
She continues that the upshot of publicly traded corporations being required to report all of their 
pension liabilities (as opposed to only reporting a select portion of them) is that their balance sheet 
equity (assets/liabilities) is reduced, thereby limiting their access to credit.  
Many companies argue that being required to report all of their defined benefit plan’s pension 
liabilities on the company’s balance sheet is unfair because it results in their balance sheets being in 
a constant state of flux, moving up and down as changes in short and long term interest rates impact 
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Prior to 2011, most Canadian publicly traded companies were required to follow the rules of the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook Section 3461 (CICA 3461) for purposes of reflecting their 
pension plans in their corporate financial statements. CICA 3461 encouraged, or at least did not discourage, 
assuming DB pension risk for the following reasons: 
1. Deferral and amortization of gains and losses: Instead of requiring immediate recognition of pension 
experience gains and losses in the employer’s income statement and on the employer’s balance 
sheet, CICA 3461 permitted recognition of these gains and losses to be deferred and amortized into 
pension cost and onto the balance sheet over time. The ability to defer and amortize gains and 
losses resulted in the masking of the true risk that the plan posed to the employer. 
2. The deferral and amortization of gains and losses also resulted in some employers having built up 
relatively large deferred (i.e., unrecognized) losses in recent years. This resulted in a reluctance to 
undertake certain de-risking actions such as purchasing annuities, since these actions required a 
portion of those deferred losses to be recognized immediately in the employer’s income statement. 
(Gavin Benjamin, Barriers to Pension Plan De-risking, Benefits Canada, 2013). 
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the value of their pension liabilities. However, one factor in favour of corporations getting access to 
credit is the “unsecured creditor” status of pensioners, giving their creditors “priority” status in 
bankruptcy proceedings.
180
    
On January 1, 2013 it became mandatory for pension deficits and surpluses to be fully reflected on 
corporate balance sheets of publicly traded companies in Canada, with components of pension 
expense reported in different sections of companies’ income statements, including the recognition 
of pension gains and losses in comprehensive income.
181
 A risk for companies with large defined 
benefit pension plan deficits is that such accounting rule changes could negatively impact their 
credit worthiness, threatening their very viability.
182
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all defined benefit plans. This new section forms part of the first significant amendments the AcSB has made 
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E. Regulatory Burdens 
Private Sector Single Employer Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus of this thesis, 
require more extensive analysis, receive more intensive oversight and are required to meet different 
funding expectations than other types of plans. The Report of the Ontario Expert Commission on 
Pensions discusses plausible reasons that might explain this: few have governance structures that 
provide internal checks and balances to the sponsor’s unilateral administration of the plan; some are 
quite small and unable to develop, implement or afford sophisticated strategies for investment, 
member services and other functions; none can adjust accrued benefits to meet funding shortfalls; 
and all (even the largest) are closely tied to the fate of the single sponsor that created and funded 
them.
183
 
The Report notes that SEDPPs are almost always governed and administered by the sponsor acting 
unilaterally (although in principle nothing prevents a single employer from agreeing to the 
participation of active and retiree members in governance procedures) and that if one of the 
purposes of funding rules is to ensure that the interests of beneficiaries are properly safeguarded, 
that purpose would become easier to achieve if the beneficiaries themselves had a significant voice 
in the decision-making that affects them, as they do in the case of Jointly Sponsored (JSPPs) 
pension plans.
184
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Single employer defined benefit pension plan members generally have little or no opportunity for 
negotiation with respect to the terms of their plans because of their lack control over the 
management of their own pension funds.
185
 Therefore, in the interests of efficiency and fairness, 
governments have seen fit to intervene by setting minimum pension standards legislation for the 
funding, administration and governance of SEDPPs. This regulation necessarily increases the costs 
associated with defined benefit plans and may negatively impact them by passing on costs to 
workers and inducing businesses to opt out of DB pension plans altogether.   
Recommendations recently made by the Expert Commission on Pensions in Ontario to reduce 
regulatory burden include:
186
 
1) So far as possible, substantive rules intended to define the rights and responsibilities of 
participants in the pension system should be set out in the Pension Benefits Act or rules and 
regulations made pursuant to it.  
2) As a medium-term project, the PBA and regulations should be re-drafted so as to clearly 
articulate both (a) general principles applicable to all pension plans, and (b) comprehensive 
codes applicable to specific plan types. 
3) Revisions to the Ontario Pension Benefits Act should be drafted to provide both rules- based 
and principles-based (general standards allowing some sponsor discretion) approaches, as 
appropriate. In particular, minimum standards with respect to benefits should generally be 
rules-based; some aspects of investment, plan governance and innovation are more 
appropriately regulated by a principles based approach; and funding requirements should 
likely involve a mixture of the two.  
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4. Actuarial Funding 187 
The annual funding cost of a defined benefit pension plan for an upcoming year is projected by 
estimating the annual benefits and expenses to be paid in that year, less estimated investment 
earnings in that year. This can be expressed mathematically as:  
Annual Projected Cost= (Projected Annual Benefits Paid + Projected Annual Plan Expenses) 
- (Projected Annual Investment Earnings)  
Actuarial funding of a defined benefit pension plan, while complicated in detail, is conceptually 
simple. It consists of three parts. First, a target level of assets required to pay all accrued pension 
obligations as of the valuation date is projected based on the actuary’s assumptions regarding 
member behaviour (probabilities of retirement, death etc.) and economic behaviour (rates of 
interest, investment return, inflation etc.). This annual asset target level is the projected cost of the 
plan and is called the actuarial accrued liability. Secondly, the actuary estimates the employer’s 
annual contribution of assets or the normal cost (not including annual employee costs/contributions 
or investment returns) required to meet the actuarial accrued liability. Thirdly, since all the actuarial 
assumptions will normally not be met (because actual asset values of a defined benefit plan realized 
at the end of each valuation year will be different from the initial projected actuarial estimates for 
that year), an additional payment (which could be negative if actual asset values exceed the target 
asset values) must be added to the normal cost.  This additional payment, spread (amortized) over 
future years, is referred to as the unfunded or over-funded actuarial accrued liability. Actuarial 
funding is expressed mathematically as: 
Actuarial Funding (Minimum Annual Employer Funding) =Normal (Annual) Costs (Required to Meet 
Total Accrued Liability to End of Valuation Year) +Unfunded Actuarial Liabilities.  
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5. Actuarial Methods 
The sole purpose of defined benefit pension plan assets is to pay specified liabilities at a specified 
benefit date. 
188
  Actuaries use tools called actuarial methods to help them determine the level of 
assets required to meet defined benefit pension plan obligations. The choice of funding methods is 
influenced by several factors, including:
189
 
A. The plan’s benefit design; in particular, whether the pension benefit is related to salary.  
B. The plan sponsor’s objectives. 
C. The requirements under the appropriate regulatory environment. 
The actuary normally considers the purpose and nature of the measurement of defined benefit plan 
assets when selecting an asset valuation method. It may be appropriate for the actuary to select 
different methods for different purposes. For example, the actuary may consider spreading a 
particularly high funding requirement in a particular year (which may be unaffordable for the 
employer)
190
 over a number of years, using a technique called smoothing. This method allows the 
employer to spread his or her annual funding requirement in a given year over a number of years. 
Alternatively, in a terminating plan, the actuary normally considers selecting an asset valuation 
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method that produces an actuarial value of assets net of any significant liquidation or surrender 
charges reasonably expected to be incurred.
191
   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the general regulatory regimes overseeing actuarial discretion and funding, 
revealing that private sector Single Employer Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus 
of this thesis, require more extensive analysis, receive more intensive oversight and are required to 
meet different funding expectations than other types of plans. Plausible reasons might explain this: 
few have governance structures that provide internal checks and balances to the sponsor’s unilateral 
administration of the plan; some are quite small and unable to develop, implement or afford 
sophisticated strategies for investment, member services and other functions; none can adjust 
accrued benefits to meet funding shortfalls; and all (even the largest) are closely tied to the fate of 
the single sponsor that created and funded them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, CASE LAW AND PROFESSIONAL          
ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNING ACTUARIAL METHODS 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed the general regulatory regimes overseeing the funding of defined benefit 
pension plans. Chapter 3 reviews the specific legislation, regulations, case law and professional 
bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between short-term 
funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of DB funding 
obligations. 
192
  
It is important to note that the regulation of private sector occupational pension plans in Canada is 
not harmonized across the country. Each province (except P.E.I.) has its own pension standards 
legislation which regulates the minimum funding requirements in that province. In addition, the 
federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (the “PBSA”), 1985193 regulates pension plans for 
employees in the three territories and those employed in any business under the legislative authority 
of the federal government, including crown corporations and railroads. This chapter will focus on 
three pieces of pension legislation-the Pension Benefits Act (the “PBA”) in Ontario (where most DB 
plans are registered), the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (the” PBSA”) and the federal 
Income Tax Act (the “ITA”). The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the 
basic pension funding concepts and actors governing actuarial methods, Section 2 provides an 
overview of the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits 
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Act, while Section 3 reviews specific legislation, regulations, and case law governing actuarial 
methods.  
Section 1-Overview of Governance of Actuarial Methods    
A. Minimum Pension Funding Legislation 
Pension funding policy consistently struggles to achieve the appropriate balance between providing 
guidance and flexibility. Minimum funding standards serve to ensure that plan sponsors can meet 
their promise to plan members and beneficiaries in light of constantly changing market dynamics as 
well as changes in the corporate environment, such as workforce reductions and corporate 
reorganizations. However, flexibility is also necessary to allow pension assets and surplus to be 
used in the best interests of plan members and their beneficiaries.
194
 
 
All registered pension plans in Canada are required to be funded in accordance with provincial or 
federal legislation, depending on the province or the federal jurisdiction in which they are registered. 
An actuarial valuation of a plan’s assets and liabilities is required to determine whether a defined 
benefit occupational pension plan is sufficiently funded. Under federal and provincial pension 
benefit laws, such an evaluation must be conducted at least every three years. However, the federal 
regulator (the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)) and Ontario provincial 
regulator (the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) require annual plan valuations if 
the solvency (asset to liability) ratio is less than 120%
195
 and 85%,
196
 respectively. An actuarial 
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valuation must be done on two bases in Canada: a solvency basis and an ongoing basis. Whiston 
and Gottlieb [2006] describe these as follows:
197
 
An ongoing valuation focuses on the ability of the plan to meet its obligations, assuming 
that it continues to operate. For example, in a final average earnings plan, the valuation on 
an ongoing basis views the plan as if members will continue to accrue benefits and receive 
pay increases, in accordance with the plan terms and assumptions used in the valuation 
respectively. The ongoing valuation attempts to show whether the funding of the plan is on 
course …. 
 
A solvency valuation is defined as a valuation of the assets and liabilities of a plan using 
actuarial assumptions and methods that are in accordance with accepted actuarial practice 
for the valuation of a plan, determined on the basis that the plan is terminated at the 
valuation date. The actuary is generally required to make assumptions concerning the 
proportion of members who would elect a commuted value (and transfer from the plan) and 
the remainder who would leave their deferred or immediate pension benefits in the plan. 
When calculating commuted values in a solvency valuation, the actuary must follow a 
Standard of Practice prescribed by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA). This standard 
currently prescribes the UP-94 mortality table projected forward to the year 2015 using 
mortality projection scale AA, no pre-retirement mortality or other decrement (adjustment) 
and an interest rate of x% per annum for 10 years and y% per annum thereafter. The rate “x” 
is equal to the market yield on 7-year Government of Canada benchmark bonds plus 0.5%. 
The rate “y” is a more complicated blend of market yields on such 7-year bonds and on long 
term Government of Canada benchmark bonds, again plus 0.5%. Lower interest rates apply 
when the plan provides indexation of pensions; the formulae are specified in the Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries (CIA) Standards of Practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
A plan administrator will generally be permitted to file an actuarial report every three years if:  
1. The solvency ratio disclosed in the most recent actuarial report filed with OSFI was 1.20 or greater. 
2. The pension plan meets the definition of a designated pension plan (Designated Plan) under 
Regulation 8515 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) (Designated plans are generally executive 
compensation DB plans not maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, in which the 
total of the pension credits of all specified individuals in the plan is more than 50% of the total of all 
pension credits of all individuals the plan for the year.) (Canada Revenue Agency, Registered 
Pension Plans Glossary. www.cra-arc.gc.ca).  
196
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required where the actuarial valuation either excludes liabilities in respect of plant closure or permanent 
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Intuitively, it may seem more likely that a plan would be fully funded on a solvency (commuted) 
basis than an ongoing valuation basis, simply because members cease to accrue benefits in a 
solvency valuation. However, this is not always the case. The terms of the pension plan or the 
applicable pension benefit law may result in the commuted plan having additional liabilities upon 
termination that it would not have if it continues on an ongoing basis. The solvency of a plan is 
calculated as follows:  
[(the aggregate of the market value of the plan’s current assets) + (the present value of 
future special payments (the plan’s future earnings))] divided by [the liabilities (pension 
costs and administration costs) of the plan (where the liabilities are determined on a plan 
termination basis)]  
 
B. Maximum Pension Funding Legislation 
The federal Income Tax Act (ITA) regulates virtually every aspect of pension plan funding (other 
than minimum funding) in Canada. Income tax regulations set a “ceiling” on employer 
contributions to DB plans in order to limit the amount of taxable income a company can defer.   As 
discussed earlier, federal (PBSA) and provincial (PBA) pension standards legislation set a “floor” 
by establishing minimum standards for pension benefits and funding.  
The ITA and its regulations contain a prescriptive regime of rules that must be adhered to for 
pension plans to achieve and maintain registration for income tax purposes. Pension plan 
contributions made by both employers and employees are only tax deductible if they are registered 
under the ITA; if a plan is not registered, benefits provided to employees are fully taxable up to a 
rate of approximately 40%. Clearly, these tax deferral strategies are fundamentally important to 
sponsors, pension plan members and the retirement savings system generally.  
Bill C-9, amending the Income Tax Act, was passed into law in 2010. This new legislation increased 
the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a defined benefit plan for contributions made in 
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respect of post-2009 service, from 10 percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities, without triggering 
adverse tax consequences. However, only an actuary has the legislative authority to determine 
whether or not a plan has a surplus. The actuary must calculate and value a plan’s liabilities and 
assets using various actuarial methods. It is not known whether a plan has a surplus (or an unfunded 
liability) until an actuarial valuation report is prepared. As noted above, a pension surplus is an 
actuarial construct, which brings into focus the critical importance of the governance of actuarial 
methods.
198
  The Canadian Institution of Actuaries (CIA) is charged with overseeing the 
professional conduct of actuaries in the valuation of DB pension plans.   
C. Canadian Institute of Actuaries 
The Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA), the national self- regulating organization of the actuarial 
profession in Canada, was established by an act of the federal Parliament in 1965.
199
 
It serves the public through the provision of actuarial services and represents the actuarial 
profession in the formulation of public policy. It promotes the advancement of actuarial science and 
sponsors programs for the education and qualification of CIA members and prospective members. 
Both provincial and federal Pension Benefits Standards Acts require that actuarial valuations of DB 
plans adhere to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) Standards of Practice.
200
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D. Actuarial Standards Board of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries  
The Actuarial Standards Board (ASB) of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) is an 
independent body responsible for monitoring and developing actuarial standards of practice. It 
constantly strives for clear, accurate and user friendly valuations.
201
 The ASB has responded to the 
demand for more transparency in actuarial funding estimates by implementing the following 
revisions to the professional standards of actuaries: 
202
  
1. In 2007, actuaries were required to provide rationales for the selection of their assumptions in 
valuing pension funds.  
2. In 2011, actuaries were required to:  
a)  Disclose the rationales for methods used and method changes. 
b) Provide a sensitivity analysis demonstrating the effect of a 1% decrease in the interest rate 
assumptions used to discount future pension fund monies. 
c) Provide the cost of benefits between the mandatory triennial valuation dates (generally on an 
annual basis), not only on a “going-concern” basis, but also on a “solvency” (or hypothetical wind-
up) basis (otherwise known as the “incremental cost”) whenever funding ratios fall below specified 
levels. The 2013 Ontario Budget indicated the intention to implement a new “funding concerns” 
test to determine when plans will be required to file annual valuations. Currently, plans that are 
funded below 85% on a solvency basis are required to file annual valuations. However, no new test 
has yet been established. 
d) Best-estimate valuations are now allowable, meaning that the actuary need not include a margin 
for conservatism in the assumptions, thus potentially increasing the valuation interest rate (and, as a 
result, lowering required funding levels). 
e) Actuaries are no longer permitted to include an allowance in their interest rate assumptions for 
the benefits of an actively managed investment portfolio in excess of the additional fees charged for 
active management. (However, an exception is made if the actuary is able to justify that such 
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additional returns will be consistently and reliably earned over the long term.) This requirement is 
expected to result in lower valuation of the pension fund.
203
  
 
E. The Role of the Actuary 
Each pension plan must have an “administrator” who bears ultimate responsibility for the plan. 
This administrator is either the plan sponsor (employer) or a board of trustees. The administrator 
has a legal duty to appoint the actuary and any other professionals required for the operation of the 
DB plan. The actuary acts as a pension consultant to the administrator and is hired to prepare a 
valuation report using assumptions and methods which provide some contribution flexibility for the 
employer, while ensuring that the pension fund protects the interests of the plan members. However, 
the actuary is not (and does not want to be) a plan fiduciary.
204
 In other words, the actuary can 
recommend certain actions to the administrator but cannot compel the administrator to act. Jean 
Claude Menard of the federal Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions discusses the 
purpose of actuarial valuations:  
The particular methods of valuation used by an actuary in ongoing pension plans serve one 
overall purpose-maintaining capital regulation to ensure adequate contribution levels based 
on estimates of current service costs to maintain fund integrity.  The actuary normally 
strives to compare some measure of the value of the benefits that have been earned in the 
plan (the liabilities) against some value for the investments held in the fund (the assets). The 
purpose of the valuation will dictate the assumptions and methods used by the actuary. For 
example, a going concern valuation performed to indicate the long-term funding position of 
the plan may be very different from one used to demonstrate solvency on wind up or to 
establish a value for a sale or acquisition of the business.
205
 Assumptions fall into two main 
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categories: economic and demographic. Economic assumptions include factors such as 
inflation, real wage increases, and real rates of return on assets while demographic 
assumptions include factors such as mortality rates, retirement dates, terminations and 
disability rates.
206
 Actuaries are generally guided by PBA/PBSA regulations and the 
governing standards and principles of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries in preparing 
valuations.
207
 For example, Section 16 of the Ontario PBA states that “the actuary is 
required to use “methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted 
actuarial practice.” The content of an actuarial valuation in an ongoing pension plan 
generally includes the following information, which must be certified by the actuary:
208
  
 
1. The normal cost of the plan in the next year.209  
2. A cost estimate in the following years including the methodology used in the calculations 
and a breakdown of employer and employee costs. 
 
3. The present value of future employee costs.  
4. An estimate of the total annual employee contributions in each year to which the report 
relates.  
 
5. The present value of future special payments (for funding deficits), including adjustments 
since the last valuation and the commencement and end dates for amortization. 
 
6. The extent to which “escalated adjustments” in respect of post retirement indexing...are 
recognized in the ongoing liabilities and the normal cost.
210
 
 
7.  Any actuarial gain (surplus) or loss (deficit) experienced during the period of the 
valuation. 
 
8. The intended use of any actuarial gain (for example, contribution holiday) or remedial on 
any actuarial loss (that is, whether any special payments are required). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
employees’ salaries upon retirement. Solvency valuations are only required to use wages earned as of the 
valuation date to estimate employees’ accrued pensions.    
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9. A statement that there is no solvency deficiency, or alternatively, a list of the special 
payments required under the solvency rules, including  the amortization period and the 
amounts required to be paid into the pension fund.   
 
10. A statement that the valuation complies with generally accepted actuarial principles and 
the requirements of provincial pension standards legislation. 
 
11. A statement that the solvency ratio is not less than 1.0, otherwise a statement of the ratio 
including the assets and liabilities. 
 
12. An identification of all assumptions and methods used to determine the ongoing and 
solvency liabilities.  
 
13. In the event that the plan benefit is based upon an employee’s final average or career 
average earnings, any earnings projections that may increase the plan’s liabilities. 
 
F. Transparency Issues 
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions discussed the importance of transparency in actuarial 
valuations:  
Transparency of actuarial valuations, funding decisions and other operational matters is 
essential to any system of pension regulation. Transparency aims to provide regulators with 
the information they need in order to prevent harm to plans or to the pension system, and to 
enforce the law if infractions occur. It also reminds sponsors that funding decisions must be 
reasonable and based on sound analysis.
211
  
 
Transparency also aims to ensure that actuaries provide analyses capable of standing up to third-
party scrutiny and that plan administrators understand that their decisions related to valuations may 
be subjected to critical oversight by plan members as well as regulators. Active pension members, 
retirees and their advisors are all dependent upon transparent valuations, considering pensions plans 
are often among a family’s largest investments. The question, therefore, is whether or not pension 
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valuations are sufficiently transparent. The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions discussed the 
lack of regulatory transparency in Ontario as follows:
212
  
1) Certain benefits may be provided without requiring them to be funded or included in the plan 
valuation. 
2) Changes in certain variables in the funding formula may be spread over a number of years. 
3) Non-disclosure of some pertinent funding information is permitted.  
4) There is reliance on actuarial standards and practices which are opaque or imprecise in certain 
respects. 
 
1. Exclusions 
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions (OECP) noted that excluded benefits are mainly 
related to solvency valuations but have some application to going concern valuations.
213
 For 
example, while indexation paid to current retirees must be included, the cost of future indexation — 
whether on a formulaic basis or ad hoc — need not be included in either solvency or going concern 
valuations. While exclusion can be seen as an inducement to sponsors to provide this form of 
protection, indexation is generally an expensive benefit, so its exclusion may substantially 
undervalue the liabilities of a plan. 
Plant closure benefits must normally be funded and included in a valuation. However, they may be 
excluded in Ontario if they are provided pursuant to plan-specific arrangements in place prior to 
1991. While this exclusion amounts to a form of “grand-parenting” for a limited array of plans, it 
too represents a hidden factor contributing to their actual cost. 
Benefit improvements, including expensive improvements related to past service may be amortized 
over a period of five or 15 years. This means that even though plan members are entitled to the 
additional benefits as from their inception, no immediate contribution is necessary to cover the full 
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costs of providing the benefits. Such benefits may be introduced even though a plan is already less 
than fully funded, exacerbating the level of underfunding.
214
  
2.  Smoothing 
The OECP commented on smoothing: 
Ontario regulations allow limited “smoothing” of asset values and discount rates in solvency 
valuations — that is, they allow a deferred recognition of gains and losses on investments, 
and a discount rate averaged over a period of time. CIA standards, applicable across Canada, 
allow smoothing on elements of the going concern valuation. However, the degree of 
smoothing allowed for solvency valuations in Ontario is greater than in other provinces. The 
15-year amortization period of going concern unfunded liabilities is also arguably a form of 
smoothing, as is the five-year amortization period for solvency deficiencies. 
There are good reasons for smoothing. It acknowledges the long-term nature of the 
obligation and avoids contributions being subjected to sudden and extreme changes. 
However, smoothing methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined 
by actuarial practice, and the potential exists for changes in smoothing to be used not to 
respond to altered circumstances, but opportunistically to hide a funding problem. More 
importantly, smoothing can detract from clear understanding of a plan’s funded position if it 
is not fully explained in the valuation report.
215
 
The use of smoothing to lower a company’s annual pension funding obligations in times of low 
investment returns is certainly preferable to a plan becoming insolvent. However, the misuse of 
smoothing to chronically understate plans’ funding deficits in order to increase companies’ profit 
margins is unacceptable because it jeopardizes the viability of employees’ pensions. This situation   
undoubtedly sparked the introduction of new International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
requiring the immediate recognition of DB plans’ gains and losses on public company’s balance 
sheets. The adoption of this “fair value” methodology should greatly improve DB plan funding 
transparency in Canada.  
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3. Funding Information 
The OECP argued that valuations should be transparent not only to the sponsor, the plan 
administrator and the CIA’s professional standard-setting and discipline bodies, but also to the 
regulator and to active plan members and retirees. It noted that one important matter not presently 
provided in an actuarial valuation is whether or not a contribution holiday
216
 (a reduction or 
suspension of normal cost payments using a plan’s surplus) is being factored into the contribution 
schedule: 
The rules currently require a valuation to identify surplus in a plan, which would permit it to 
take a contribution holiday; however, the rules do not require disclosure of whether that holiday 
has actually been factored into the proposed three-year schedule of contributions. Quite apart 
from whether or when contribution holidays are appropriate, the fact that they are going to be 
taken should be transparent. Information about contribution holidays is essential for an 
understanding of plan funding, both for the regulator and for all plan participants, and should be 
provided in a document that is fully accessible to them.
217  
 
4. Actuarial Standards and Practice 
As discussed above, many reports and calculations under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) 
and its associated regulations must be prepared by a Fellow of the CIA (a self-regulating, 
professional body) in accordance with its standards and accepted actuarial practice. In other words, 
the CIA and its members are, in effect, part of the apparatus of pension regulation. The OECP states:  
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Of course, the extent of their (actuaries) role depends largely on their willingness and ability 
to anticipate, respond to and reinforce changing regulatory strategies — greater transparency 
not least among them — and on the willingness of the regulator to pre-empt, defer to or 
supplement professional norms. 
Happily, the CIA has recently changed its standards to improve the transparency of actuarial 
valuations. For example, all material assumptions must now be explained in a valuation. 
And it is likely that the new CIA standards will also require each assumption to be 
“independently reasonable,” rather than collectively producing a reasonable outcome, as at 
present. These two developments together would greatly enhance the transparency of 
valuations, and it would be helpful if the CIA were to promptly adopt the second as well as 
the first. However, if it is unable to do so, the government retains the power to require it by 
regulation.
218
 
The Economist magazine discusses aggressive actuarial assumptions: 
219
 
Perhaps the most egregious way in which companies smooth profits is by valuing pension 
assets using expected rather than actual returns. They are allowed to do this because the 
assets are invested to meet pension promises in the distant future, so they can dismiss short-
term swings. But whether they are inherently optimistic, or because they wish to hide the 
true state of their pension plans, companies generally expect unrealistically high returns. 
This reduces their obligations to the pension fund and thus inflates their own profits. 
 
By virtue of the vagaries of actuarial science, at the stroke of an actuary’s pen a company 
can make heroic assumptions about the returns its pension assets will earn and so the rate at 
which its own liabilities will grow in future, allowing it to claim that the pension-deficit 
problem is manageable…. the potential for mischief exists because companies have great 
flexibility in measuring the size of pension obligations and assets, and hence the pension 
deficits or surpluses that feed into profits.  
 
 
An American study of 3,247 DB plans found that from 1991-2000 many firms boosted their 
corporate valuations by over estimating pension-return assumptions, lowering current pension 
liability estimates.
220
  The issue of transparency was also highlighted by Towers Perrin in its White 
Paper on Canada’s retirement system: 
Increasingly, funding policy is concentrating on avoiding having to make contributions – 
both by directing increasing proportions of a plan’s investment portfolio to mismatched 
categories that have historically provided higher long-term returns and by deferring cost 
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through pre-recognizing the expected higher returns from equity investments in the discount 
rate used to determine the plan’s liability.221 
 
In other words, actuaries reduce plan liabilities to unrealistically low levels by estimating higher 
rates of return than actual market rates. 
Section 2-Federal (PBSA) and Ontario (PBA) Funding Regulations  
A. Pension Benefits Standards Act (the PBSA) 
The federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) covered  some 1,250 pension plans or close to 
10 per cent of the asset value of all registered plans in Canada (350 of the federal plans are defined 
benefit pension plans, 800 are defined contribution arrangements, and 100 are combination plans 
(hybrids) offering both defined benefit and defined contribution components) in 2012. It sets out 
minimum funding standards for federally registered pension plans to ensure that the rights and 
interests of pension plan members, retirees, and their beneficiaries are protected. The Government 
of Canada’s only role is to ensure that the framework is appropriate and enables all parties to make 
informed decisions. The main regulatory body governing actuarial methods for federally regulated 
plans is the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).
222
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B. Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) 
The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) was created in 1987 by the 
Government of Canada (under the OSFI Act) to contribute to public confidence in the Canadian 
financial system. OSFI's mandate with respect to pensions is:  
 (a) to supervise pension plans in order to determine whether they meet the minimum 
funding requirements and are complying with the other requirements of the Pension 
Benefits Standards Act, 1985 and its regulations and supervisory requirements under 
that legislation; 
(b) to promptly advise the administrator of a pension plan in the event that the plan is 
not meeting the minimum funding requirements or is not complying with other 
requirements of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 or its regulations or 
supervisory requirements under that legislation and, in such a case, to take, or require 
the administrator to take, the necessary corrective measures or series of measures to deal 
with the situation in an expeditious manner; and 
(c) to promote administrators of pension plans to adopt policies and procedures designed 
to control and manage risk. 
 
The administrator is generally required to file a valuation report with the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) every three years when a plan is in a surplus 
position. In the event of a plan deficit, OSFI generally requires a valuation report to be filed 
annually. However, the regulator has the power to request valuation reports on a more frequent 
basis if necessary. Solvency funding regulations are intended to protect the benefits of members and 
retirees in the event that a plan terminates.
223
  
 
C. Ontario Pension Benefits Act   
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act (the “PBA”) prescribes a host of rules that affect the design and 
administration of a pension plan. Generally, the legislation is designed to accomplish two 
objectives: secure employee pensions from discretionary revocation and preserve the financial 
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integrity of earned pension entitlements. It does so by guaranteeing minimum vesting rights for 
employees, permitting the portability of pensions on termination of employment, and requiring the 
locking-in of benefits to preclude access to the funds prior to retirement age.
224
   
 
The legislation also entitles similarly situated employees covered by a pension plan to join the plan 
once they have satisfied certain eligibility requirements, prescribes minimum spousal and other 
beneficiary entitlements, and mandates prescribed levels of disclosure to employees and other 
beneficiaries. Finally, as noted above, the legislation and regulations set out minimum contribution, 
funding, and solvency rules to ensure the security of current and future pension payments. The main 
regulatory body governing actuarial methods for the Ontario PBA is the Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario (FSCO).
225
 
 
D.  Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) 
The Financial Services Commission  of Ontario (FSCO), like its counterparts in other provinces 
administers its statute and regulates the pension sector by maintaining various forms of oversight: 
passive (monitoring routine filings), active (providing approvals, issuing advisories and rulings), 
proactive (conducting audits and investigations), and reactive (responding to information or 
complaints from active and retired members, creditors or service providers). 
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All persons who establish or administer a pension plan within the meaning of the Pension Benefits 
Act and all employees or other persons on their behalf who are required to contribute to any such 
pension plan belong to the “pension sector,” one of six regulated sectors governed by Financial 
Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997 (the FSCO Act).
226
 The FSCO Act establishes the 
Financial Services Commission of Ontario
227
 (FSCO), the purpose of which is to “provide 
regulatory services that protect the public interest and enhance public confidence in the regulated 
sectors.” 228 There are 4 bodies associated with FSCO that participate in the regulation of actuarial 
methods in Ontario- the FSCO Board, the executive Branch of government, the Superintendent of 
Financial Services, and the Financial Services Tribunal. The major pension regulatory functions 
under FSCO are carried out by the Superintendent of Financial Services and the Financial Services 
Tribunal. Each is discussed in below. 
 
E. Superintendent of Financial Services 
Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan discusses the role of the Superintendent of Financial Services:
229
 
The Superintendent of Financial Services is the person with the most significant and 
numerous responsibilities with respect to the regulation of defined benefit pension plans in 
Ontario. The Superintendent administers and enforces the FSCO Act, serves as chief 
executive officer of the FSCO board, and is responsible for FSCO’s financial and 
administrative affairs. The Superintendent is a civil servant appointed under the Public 
Service Act. With respect to pension regulation, the Superintendent is vested with the 
responsibility to “exercise the powers and duties conferred on or assigned to” him,  
“administer and enforce … every Act that confers powers on or assigns duties to” him,  and 
“supervise generally the regulated sectors.”…. 
 
The Superintendent may use FSCO staff, as well as engage other persons, to provide 
professional, technical or other assistance. In addition, the Superintendent has the power to 
delegate to any person employed by FSCO in respect of the exercise or performance of any 
of the Superintendent’s statutory powers or duties. The Superintendent’s functions under the 
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PBA can be divided into three broad categories: decision-making functions, administrative 
and procedural functions, and policy-making functions…. 
 
The PBA also confers on the Superintendent broad tools to investigate compliance. The 
Superintendent has the power to compel an employer, an administrator or any other person 
to supply any such information as he or she may require during an investigation of actuarial 
methods; require an appraisal of any or all of the assets of the pension fund by one or more 
independent valuators; undertake examinations, investigations and inquiries, and require the 
production of any book, paper, document or thing related to a pension plan or pension fund;  
The PBA confers on the Superintendent broad tools to investigate compliance…. The 
Superintendent has the authority to consider whether an administrator or its agents have 
complied with the statutory standard of care expected by administrators in the 
administration of a pension plan fund, as codified in the PBA. This is a fiduciary (legal) 
standard.
230
  
 
 
F. Financial Services Tribunal 
Most decisions and proposed orders of the Superintendent that affect pension rights are reviewable 
by the Financial Services Tribunal,
231
 a multidisciplinary adjudication board established under the 
Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) Act. The rules of the Financial Services 
Tribunal are made under the authority of both the Financial Services Commission of Ontario and 
the Statutory Power Procedures Act (SPPA).
232
 The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
all questions of fact or law that arise in any proceeding before it and to exercise the powers 
conferred on it under the FSCO Act and the PBA. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal has 
the authority to uphold the Superintendent’s decision or “substitute its opinion for that of the 
Superintendent.” All decisions and orders of the Tribunal are subject to a statutory right of appeal to 
the Ontario Superior Court (Divisional Court). In contrast to the Superintendent’s responsibility 
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under the PBA, the Tribunal’s role is adjudicative only- it has no policy functions as part of its 
pension mandate:  
The Tribunal’s role is not to establish or manage this system, but to adjudicate individual 
disputes as to rights under the Act. It is not engaged in the delicate balancing of the interests 
of various constituencies in a legislative or policy making function. It hears disputes and 
decides them in accordance with the legislation.
233
  
 
 
G. DB Pension Plan Administrator 
The Ontario Pensions Benefits Act (the PBA) requires that every pension plan has an administrator. 
A pension plan that does not identify an administrator is not eligible for registration. The identity of 
the administrator is a matter of plan design. The PBA sets out the prescribed person, persons or 
entity that may be an administrator. Specifically, an administrator may be an employer, an arm’s 
length “pension committee” comprised of employer and employee representatives or just employee 
representatives such as an insurance company, a board of trustees, a statutory corporation, board, 
agency or commission, a person appointed by the Superintendent where the plan is being wound up, 
or any other prescribed person or entity.
234
  
 
In cases where employees or representatives of the employer or trade union perform tasks for the 
administrator, they can be found to be an employee or an agent of the administrator, and held to the 
statutory standard of care imposed on the administrator. How far up and down the food chain this 
duty extends remains unsettled law. Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan discusses the duty of care of 
actuaries as agents of the administrator:
235
 
One very sensitive issue in plan administration concerns the extent to which 
actuaries are agents under the PBA or otherwise owe duties of care to employees. 
There is little dispute that actuaries play an integral and integrated role in the day to 
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day operations of a pension plan, especially defined benefit plans, from the inception 
of the plan, and at regular and prescribed intervals, with respect to the plan’s 
solvency and demographics, to the termination of the plan. Moreover, the 
Superintendent may specifically require an actuary to file and certify an actuarial 
valuation in certain circumstances and the Superintendent has the authority to refuse 
to accept actuarial valuations where the assumptions or methods used in the 
preparation of the report are not consistent with “accepted actuarial practice”. 
 
Are actuaries agents under the PBA?  Given the broad meaning of “agent” that has 
been emerging from the case law, the answer is probably. An actuary preparing a 
valuation report is performing an administrative function, and moreover, they are 
almost always paid out of the pension fund with respect to their regulatory activities. 
One court has described an actuary’s functions as “analogous” to that of an 
employee of the administrator where the actuary had developed and implemented a 
pension conversation on behalf of the employer. On the other hand, there is an 
argument that precisely because of their specified statutory functions actuaries are 
not agents, and, if the legislature intended them to be agents, it would have made it 
explicit. 
 
Kaplan notes that when not performing regulatory functions actuaries will often characterize 
themselves as advisors, similar to lawyers, who merely give “advice” to the administrator or 
employer, which may in turn choose whether or not to act upon their advice. Can an actuary 
at common law be a fiduciary? To date, courts have been reluctant to find that actuaries owe 
fiduciary obligations to the administrator, especially where liability can be determined 
through other causes of action, such as negligence or breach of contract.  
 
Kaplan concludes that whether or not actuaries can owe duties directly to employees 
depends, of course, on the facts of each case. In the 1999 case McLaughlin v. Falconbridge 
Ltd., the Ontario Superior Court certified a class proceeding initiated by a group of 
employees against their employer which included a claim against the actuary for breach of 
fiduciary duty. The court refused to strike out the claim against the actuary, notwithstanding 
evidence that the employees not only had no contractual relationship with the actuary, but 
many were unaware of the existence of the actuary prior to the litigation. The court 
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determined that “the presence or absence of a fiduciary relationship cannot be determined on 
the basis of categorizing the relationship according to the identity of the persons involved.” 
The statement of claim disclosed a cause of action in its allegations that the actuary held and 
exercised discretionary power in the manner in which he had the authority to select from a 
range of different actuarial assumptions to determine the values of employees’ pension 
benefits and, accordingly, it was not plain and obvious the claim would fail. The case 
subsequently settled prior to a determination on the merits and scope of the actuary’s duties. 
Given the important and integral role that actuaries and consultants play in pension plan 
administration, the scope of actuarial liability to plan stakeholders will undoubtedly be 
canvassed in future case law.
236
 
 
The 2011 case Ault v. Canada held that pension service providers may have fiduciary duties to plan 
beneficiaries, emphasizing the importance of accurate and full disclosure all relevant information to 
plan members. In this case, the actuary put his own interests ahead of the plaintiffs (members). 
Furthermore, unknown to the members, the actuary had a financial interest in the company (Loba) 
sponsoring the pension plan into which the members transferred their pension funds. The court held 
that there was a relationship of trust and confidence with the actuary that commenced when the 
members met with the actuary and provided personal information to him, relying upon his expertise 
as an actuary and expert in the field of pensions. In other words, the actuary was in a fiduciary 
relationship with the members. However, the Court in Ault v. Canada left unanswered the question 
of whether or not a pension actuary has a general fiduciary duty to his or her client or to plan 
members, stating that providers such as actuaries may owe fiduciary duties to pension plan 
beneficiaries, depending on the nature of the relationship and the circumstances. 
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A plan administrator may find itself in a perceived conflict of interest where it is also the employer 
sponsoring the pension plan. The employer is perceived (if not de facto) to prefer his or her own 
interests over that of his or her employees. At common law, a fiduciary has an absolute duty to 
avoid any conflict of interest, regardless of whether the conflict is actual or perceived. Cowan vs. 
Scargill
237
 was a 1985 case where the union trustees appointed to the administration of the pensions 
board were deemed to be acting a conflict of interest for not taking off their union “hats” when 
evaluating the plan’s investment policy. The Court held:  
The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests 
of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially 
between different classes of beneficiaries. This duty of the trustees towards their 
beneficiaries is paramount. They must, of course, obey the law; but subject to that, 
they must put the interests of their beneficiaries first. When the purpose of the trust 
is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as is usually the case, the best 
interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests. In the case of 
a power of investment, as in the present case, the power must be exercised so as to 
yield the best return for the beneficiaries, judged in relation to the risks of the 
investments in question; and the prospects of the yield of income and capital 
appreciation both have to be considered in judging the return from the investment. 
 
The Ontario PBA similarly prohibits an administrator, as a general rule, from “knowingly” 
permitting its interests to conflict with its duties and powers “in respect of the pension fund” or 
receiving any benefit other than pension benefits, a refund of contributions, and reasonable fees and 
expenses related to the administration of the plan permitted by common law or provided for in the 
pension plan. Other provinces’ pension standards legislation also contain conflict of interest 
provisions applicable to the plan administration.        
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Section 8(10) of the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) also prohibits conflicts of 
interest by administrators. It actually contains an express clause stating that if there is a material 
conflict of interest between the role of the employer acting as an administrator and the employer’s 
role in any other capacity, the administrator shall act in the best interests of the members of the 
pension plan.  In the context of this conflict of interest the question that arises is, “Does a single-
employer administrator violate the statutory conflict of interest prohibition solely by reason of the 
fact that it is both the employer and the administrator?” It appears not. In the 1995 case Imperial Oil 
Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)
238, a group of employees (the “Entitlement 55 Group”) 
objected to their employer’s amendment to the pension plan that made the eligibility requirements 
to receive an early retirement pension more difficult to obtain. The employees argued the 
amendment was void on the basis that the employer was simultaneously acting in its capacity as 
employer and its capacity as plan administrator. The employees argued that the employer was 
acting with an improper purpose, in that the amendment had the effect of reducing the potential 
liabilities of the pension fund, increasing the amount of surplus available in the plan (i.e. the 
employer was attempting to reduce its annual service costs at the expense of its employees). The 
Pension Commission of Ontario (FSCO’s predecessor) rejected this theory and, in accepting the 
amendment for registration, affirmed what has since been referred to as the “two hats” principle of 
employer sponsored administration: 
The Act recognizes that an employer may wear “two hats” in respect of pension plans. 
Indeed, section 8 specifically states that an employer may be an administrator. In that way, it 
acknowledges that an employer may play two roles and it is self -evident that the two roles 
may come into conflict from time to time. … This leads us to the conclusion that, at least in 
the first instance, when the word “administrator” is used in section 22, it is used to mean the 
person or body administering the fund and who stands in a special fiduciary relationship 
with the plan members courtesy of the fiduciary standard of care set out in subsection 22(1). 
We are of the view that an employer plays a role in respect of the pension plan that is 
distinct from its role as administrator. Its role as employer permits it to make the decision to 
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create a pension plan, to amend it and to wind it up. Once the plan and fund are in place, it 
becomes an administrator for the purposes of management of the fund and administration of 
the plan. If we were to hold that an employer was an administrator for all purposes once a 
plan was established, of what use would a power of amendment be? An employer could 
never use the power to amend the plan in a way that was to its benefit, as opposed to the 
benefit of the employees.  
 
Imperial Oil is an important case because it recognizes that structural conflicts of interest are 
explicit in the PBA and must be tolerated. This is especially true given that pension plans are so 
often administered by a single employer. Under the “two hats” principle, when an employer acts in 
the capacity of “administrator”, the employer is subject to the statutory and common law fiduciary 
standards imposed on plan administrators. However, when an employer acts in its “employer” 
capacity, it likely does not owe employees a statutory duty of care.  The sanctioning of this conflict 
of interest precedent in Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) means employers 
in Ontario continue to be in a conflict of interest position in hiring actuaries who value their DB 
pension funds. This practice gives employers the opportunity to influence the assumptions (discount 
rates, mortality tables etc.) used by actuaries in estimating funding contributions.  
 
Although there is little (if any) empirical evidence in Canada that employers are breaching their 
fiduciary duties under the “two hats” principle, a 2006 U.K. study (using financial information from 
sponsoring firms including total value of assets, profitability, leverage, and taxes)
239
 investigated 
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 The study focuses on two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the presence of insiders is a 
source of agency problems, if it allows insider-trustees to favor shareholders of the firm over members of the 
pension plan. As described by Treynor (1977), a company with a DB pension plan owns a put option. If 
the assets (the firm and DB assets) fall short of the pension fund liabilities, the firm has the option to give 
these assets to the DB beneficiaries as payment. Since the value of a put option increases with the risk of 
the underlying assets, insider-trustees may have the incentive to increase the risk of the assets (the firm 
and DB assets) beyond what is optimal for the members of the pension plan, for example by investing the 
pension plan assets into equities. The agency problems may also be reflected in the contributions paid into 
the pension plan. Pension plan liabilities are similar to long-term debt, and pension plan members are debt-
holders of the company (see Webb, 2004). Insider-trustees who favour shareholders of the firm over pension 
plan members may have an incentive to reduce firm contributions to the plan. The second hypothesis is that 
insider-trustees facilitate a more efficient management of tax liabilities, which may be positive for both 
shareholders and pension plan members. More precisely, companies may be able to generate tax savings if 
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how the management of defined-benefit pension plans is affected by the presence of trustees who 
are also directors of the sponsoring companies, or trustees who are insiders to the company. It 
provided statistical evidence that insider-trustees act in the interest of shareholders of the 
sponsoring company, and not necessarily in the interest of the pension plan members. In particular, 
the study found that pension plans of more leveraged firms with a higher proportion of insider-
trustees invest a higher fraction of the pension plan assets in riskier financial assets such as equities. 
Thus, the study provided empirical evidence that such risk shifting by more leveraged firms 
actually does occurs, an effect previously well understood theoretically but unproven empirically. 
 
Professor Divya Anantharaman of Rutgers Business School in New York notes in her article 
Actuarial Independence, Client Importance and Pension Assumptions,
240
 that actuaries’ pension 
assumptions are a conduit for earnings manipulation for many reasons. First, statutory accounting 
requirements for pensions and post-retirement benefits are complex, and even sophisticated 
investors have trouble understanding them fully (Brown 2004; Franzoni and Marin 2006; Picconi 
2006). Second, actuarial assumptions involve very long-term forecasts about the future. 
Disentangling deliberate manipulation of these forecasts from honest errors is difficult (Brown 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
they integrate their financial and pension investment policies: If a company increases leverage, uses the 
proceeds to fund the pension plan, and invests these funds in bonds, it may generate tax savings without 
affecting financial risk (Black, 1980, Tepper, 1981). This is because the increase in leverage generates a 
debt tax shield, while the return on bonds held in the pension plan is tax-exempt. 
 
To test these alternative hypotheses the study collected information on UK companies that have DB pension 
plans. It collected information on their pension plan assets (including how they were invested), pension plan 
liabilities, contributions paid into the pension plan, and actuarial assumptions. In addition, it collected 
information on the identity of the trustees of the pension plan, and whether they were executive directors of 
the sponsoring company. Finally, it collected a variety of information for sponsoring companies, including the 
total value of their assets, profitability, taxes paid, leverage, dividends paid, and investment.  (Joao F. Cocco 
and Paolo F. Volpin, The Corporate Governance of Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United 
Kingdom, 2006.  Online: < www.faculty.london.edu/pvolpin/pensions.pdf >.) 
240Divya Ananatharaman, Actuarial Independence, Client Importance, and Pension Assumptions, Reuters 
Business School, 2012. Online: < 
www.kelley.iu.edu/feaconference/.../Paper_Upload_Anantharaman_D_76670 >.  
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2004). Finally, pension assets, liabilities and expenses are an economically significant part of 
corporate balance sheets and earnings. Even a small change in pension assumptions has the 
potential to significantly impact financial statements. 
Matt Nevisky of the National Bureau of Economic Research summarizes (below) an article titled 
Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension 
Plans (NBER Working Paper No. 10543), co-authored by Daniel Bergstresser, Mihir Desai, and 
Joshua Rauh (He notes that the authors identify a simple way in which firms manipulate their 
earnings: by manipulating the assumed rates of return on the firm's pension assets. The authors 
show that such manipulation is linked to CEOs' incentives and that firms change investment 
decisions both to justify and to capitalize on this type of earnings manipulation)
241
:  
Many firms have pension plans that are large enough to allow them to substantially increase 
reported earnings in the short run by changing the assumed long-term rate of return for the 
pension assets they manage for their workers. Those managers who determine that 
manipulating the rate-of-return assumption can boost their firms' stock price, as was 
apparently the case during the 1990s, have strong incentives to set this long-term rate of 
return assumption opportunistically, particularly as they undertake mergers and approach 
option vesting periods. 
Asset allocation within pension plans is another investment decision that may reflect 
earnings manipulation. Instrumental-variables analysis suggests that managers increase 
equity allocations to justify their higher assumed rates of return on pension assets. Large 
equity allocation in most firm pension plans remains a persistent puzzle. The authors note 
that their analysis suggests that the interaction of managerial opportunism and pension 
accounting may help to explain part of this puzzle, as managers increase equity allocations 
to justify a rate-of-return assumption. The study concludes by showing that managers who 
are the least constrained by their shareholders appear to be the most aggressive with their 
rate-of-return assumptions. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the earnings manipulations 
being examined do not benefit shareholders. 
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Professor Anantharaman continues that in spite of the vital role that actuaries play in pension 
reporting, very little is known about the actuarial profession’s effect on financial reporting.  
 
Actuaries belong to a self-regulated profession with an institutional framework very similar to that 
of the accounting profession prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.
242
 Canada’s Public Accountability Board 
(CPAB) was created in 2003 by the Canadian Securities Administrators, the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants as part 
of a series of reforms designed to improve investor confidence. CPAB’s duties include: 
…conducting inspections of participating audit firms directly or through or in cooperation with 
professional regulatory authorities in order to assess the compliance of each participating audit firm 
with the rules of the Board, professional standards and the firm’s own quality control policies, in 
connection with the issuance of audit reports on the financial statements of reporting issuers. 
(Canadian Public Accountability Board, 2012) 
 
The issues surrounding the professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those 
that faced the auditing profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s 
(Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds 2009)
243
. Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, 
leaving them susceptible to the conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on 
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 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002), also known as 
the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act" (in the Senate) and "Corporate and 
Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act" (in the House) and more commonly called Sarbanes–Oxley, 
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United States.  
 
243 Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds, “Independence, Conflict of Interest and the Actuarial Profession” 
(2009) 89 (1): Ethics at 77 - 89. 
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the one hand, and serving the needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective 
may be to justify ways of spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent 
review of the U.S. actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another 
actuary to provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the 
actuary’s work product” (CRUSAP Task Force 2006)244.  
 
Anantharanan addressed the issue of whether or not economic bonding created by fee dependence 
affects actuarial independence by using a sample of 2,583 firm-year observations spanning 1999-
2007. She found that greater fee dependence (measured as the ratio of fees received from each plan 
sponsor client to the sum of fees received from all clients by that actuarial firm in that year) is 
associated with a higher (obligation-reducing) discount rate, consistent with economic bonding of 
the pension actuary leading to assumptions that understate the pension obligation. Moreover, this 
effect is stronger amongst the sub-sample of firms with stronger incentives to understate the 
pension obligation (i.e. highly leveraged firms with underfunded plans, and firms with long 
duration plans, for which a higher discount rate does not create countervailing effects of increasing 
the pension expense on the income statement). Anantharaman found that greater fee dependence is 
associated with a lower obligation-increasing discount rate for firms preparing to freeze their 
pension plans, which have incentives to overstate the pension obligation to exaggerate the economic 
burden of their plans and successfully negotiate the freeze with their workforce. She comments on 
her survey’s findings on the conflicted role of the pension actuary: 
 
…on average, economically important clients receive higher (obligation-reducing) discount 
rate assumptions. This effect is stronger in highly leveraged firms and firms with longer 
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duration plans, whose incentives to understate the pension obligation are higher. Moreover, 
economically important clients are more likely to receive a lower (obligation-increasing) 
discount rate assumption just ahead of a pension freeze, when the firm has incentives to 
overstate the pension obligation. Overall, the results suggest that economic bonding of 
actuary to client may result in actuarial recommendations that understate or overstate the 
reporting funding status of the plan, depending on the incentives of the plan sponsor.
245
 
 
Professor Anantharaman concluded that the economic bonding created by fee dependence does 
appear to affect the chosen discount rate, a primary driver of the reported pension obligation and the 
resulting funding status. Clients from whom actuarial practice offices derive a large fraction of their 
revenues receive recommendations for obligation-reducing discount rates when the plan sponsor 
has strong incentives to understate the pension obligation, and for obligation-increasing discount 
rates when the plan sponsor has incentives to overstate the pension obligation. The results hold after 
controlling for the economic determinants of discount rates, and are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications. The results suggest that actuarial incentives to resist client pressure – 
litigation risk, for example – are possibly weaker than in the context of accounting firms, consistent 
with suggestions by researchers and commentators. 
 
Anantharaman notes that her study took only the first step in examining the incentives facing the 
actuarial profession and their impact on the accounting numbers reported for defined benefit 
pension plans. She states: 
 
Potential avenues for future research include examining the causes and consequences of 
switching of actuaries, examining in further detail the differential incentives, if any, faced 
by larger versus smaller actuarial firms, and studying the potential consequences for pension 
assumptions of the provision of non-actuarial services such as compensation consulting. 
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The “take away” from Anantharanman’s study is that the conflict of interest between the actuary 
and the employer (where the actuary is being paid by the employer) tends to bias actuarial 
projections of investment returns toward the high side, resulting in lower employer contributions 
and the underfunding of DB plans in these times of low investment returns.
246
  Although no such 
study has been conducted in Canada, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting similar 
actuarial biases exist in valuing private sector single employer DB pension plans  
 
The establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board similar to the one 
established in Great Britain would be one possible legal remedy to better control actuarial 
underfunding in Canada. After more than a century of self-regulation, the U.K. Faculty and Institute 
of Actuaries (comparable to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries) agreed in 2005 that its regulatory 
responsibilities would be subject to external oversight (as per the accounting profession) through 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), accountable to the U.K. government. The Council’s core 
functions include: 
 Promoting high standards of corporate governance.  
 Setting, monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing standards.  
 Setting actuarial standards.  
 Overseeing and regulating auditors.  
 Operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for public interest cases. 
 Overseeing the regulatory activities of the professional accountancy and actuarial bodies. 
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sheet) of $11.2 billion at the end of fiscal 2001 and 27 of the 58 reported a pension-related asset on their 
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The FRC delivers these functions through six operating bodies, three of which are involved with 
matters directly related to actuaries: the Board for Actuarial Standards (BAS), the Professional 
Oversight Board (POB) and the Accountancy & Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB). The FRC 
aims to ensure that:  
 The users of actuarial information can place a high degree of reliance on its relevance, 
transparency of assumptions, completeness and comprehensibility. 
 The clients and employers of professionally qualified actuaries can rely on them to act with 
integrity and competence, having regard to the public interest. 
It is Important to note that the UK Actuarial Profession fully supports the FRC’s goals, reflected by 
a cornerstone of its strategic plan–to build a quality framework which promotes public confidence 
in the work of actuaries, resulting in regulators and organizations representing the public respecting 
the professional ethics and standards demonstrated by actuaries.
247
 
Section 3-Specific Legislation and Regulations Governing Actuarial Funding 
The future of defined-benefit pension plans is increasingly being questioned. Sponsors are worried 
about the impact of fluctuating market returns on funding. Pension regulators are concerned about 
the large deficits that many DB plans have been accumulating and consequently, their exposure to 
insolvency. As a result, many active and retired employees are worried about the security of their 
promised benefits. Jim Armstrong of the Bank of Canada discusses the impact of defined benefit 
plans on the financial system: 
The potential for continued erosion of the viability of defined-benefit plans raises concerns with 
respect to the financial system, particularly in the area of efficiency. Without the option of defined 
benefit pensions, risk-averse savers are likely to pursue less-efficient allocations of capital. 
Furthermore, without the presence of such plans, the financial system is less likely to experience the 
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efficiency gains provided by active market investors with a long-term perspective. Inefficiencies 
from either of these sources could result in significant costs to the Canadian economy.
248
 
 
In other words, pension investments are used to finance long term projects such as building roads, 
schools and hospitals. 
 
A key impediment to DB plan funding is the issue of asymmetry, whereby pension fund surpluses 
are increasingly seen as the property of plan members, while deficits remain the sole responsibility 
of the sponsor. The high opportunity cost
249
 of inaccessible surpluses increases minimum funding 
strategies by sponsors, exacerbating underfunding.
250
  The result is that very few new defined-
benefit plans are being created, many existing plans have been closed to new members, and others 
are being converted to defined-contribution plans. For example, private sector single employer DB 
plan membership in Ontario declined by almost 200,000 members (850,000 to 660,000) from 2005 
to 2012.
251
Appendix 3 on page 275 discusses the various federal PBSA, Income Tax Act and 
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 In other words, if employers cannot access surpluses, they will not want to invest any extra money in their 
pension plan to maintain surplus funding; rather they will invest extra money in more accessible investments 
outside of the plan (i.e., there is a high opportunity cost of investing extra money in DB plans if it is 
inaccessible as surplus pension funds). 
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 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report: 
(Toronto 2012) at 9 & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario 
Annual Report: (Toronto 2005) at 11. 
Private Single Employer Pension Plans (SEPPs) are the focus of this thesis because they have been 
steadily declining in recent years. SEPPs are riskier propositions than Multiple Employer Pension Plans 
(MEPPs) because they each address the issue of “full funding” rather differently. While surpluses for MEPPs 
may be used to fund contribution holidays or benefit improvements (as with SEPPs), unfunded liabilities in 
MEPPs are usually dealt with by reducing accrued or future benefits, including pensions already in pay — an 
option generally unavailable to SEPPs. In other words, the SEPP employer (sponsor) must make up any 
funding deficiencies, as accrued or future benefits cannot be reduced. Of course, if MEPP sponsors and their 
unions agree, benefit reduction can be avoided by renegotiating the sponsor contributions that are fixed in 
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Ontario PBA amendments which were introduced from 2009 to 2014 in an attempt to address DB 
plan underfunding.252 Unfortunately, these amendments generally serve to push funding problems 
down the road, rather than fixing them. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the most recent pension legislation, regulations, case law and 
professional bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between 
short-term funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of 
DB funding obligations.  
The chapter noted that actuaries are impacted by two major legal factors. Firstly, actuaries are 
agents of plan sponsors, meaning that they are prone to being influenced by their employers’ wishes 
to make minimum contributions. Secondly, because actuaries are not fiduciaries, they are not liable 
for plan deficits. These two factors have been instrumental in allowing employers to pressure 
actuaries into estimating lower, more affordable contribution levels (by projecting higher 
investment returns on pension assets than actual market rates). In short, actuarial discretion has 
(either advertently or inadvertently) become an important factor in the funding policies of both the 
Ontario PBA and the federal PBSA, allowing financially challenged plans to remain solvent 
through unrealistically low employer funding.
253
 The problem with this type of funding policy is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
their current collective agreement; and in MEPPs that provide for member contributions, those contributions 
may be increased as well. But as a practical matter, these alternatives are often difficult to implement. 
Consequently, benefit reduction is a real and present danger for most MEPPs and their members. (Report of 
the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto: 
Minister of Finance, 2008) at 68). 
252
 Murray Campbell and Ken Burns, Lawson Lundell LLP, Pension and Employees Benefits Bulletin: 
“Pension Reforms 2009”. Online: < www.lawsonlundell.com/media/news/143_Pension_Reform.pdf >. 
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 Because actuaries are self-regulating, they make many of the rules that govern their own profession. This 
is a recipe for conflict; actuaries competing for lucrative HR consulting work may not have the guts to deliver 
hard news to the same employer who is also administering a pension plan. Nothing could be more 
 98 
 
that chronically low returns have resulted in large deficits. Many DB sponsors have responded by 
switching to defined contribution (DC) plans, freezing their DB plans (i.e. not allowing new 
employees to join), or declaring bankruptcy (note that pensioners are unsecured creditors).  Two 
potential legal remedies to this underfunding problem include eliminating employer-actuary agency 
(by creating an oversight board which hires pension actuaries) and/or making actuaries fiduciaries 
(thereby making them legally liable for any funding deficits). However, to date courts have been 
reluctant to find that actuaries owe fiduciary obligations to plan members, especially where liability 
may be determined through causes of action such as negligence or breach of contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
dangerous to the industry than this cozy relationship. (Murray Gold, The Law-A World of Concerns, Benefits 
Canada, 2005).   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IMPACT OF THE GOVERNANCE OF DISCOUNT RATES ON THE UNDERFUNDING 
OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS 
 
Overview 
 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the most recent pension legislation, regulations, case law and 
professional bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between 
short-term funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of 
DB funding obligations. Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the governance of discount (interest) 
rates on funding, concluding that actuaries are permitted to use their discretion to estimate higher 
than market rates in order to reduce employers’ funding requirements. It proposes the establishment 
of an external oversight board to establish a common framework for estimating discount rates, 
promoting a common understanding amongst actuaries of how to improve the consistency of their 
estimates. 
Despite all the sophisticated tools available in financial markets, projected annual asset and liability 
cash flows rarely balance exactly, making the funding status of defined benefit pension plans 
unclear. Therefore, actuaries use discount rates, which are at the heart of most actuarial calculations, 
as tools to condense complicated cash-flow information into more meaningful present value 
numbers for comparison purposes. The discount rate is defined as the rate of return on the present 
value of assets which equates them to their estimated values in future years. The higher the discount 
rate, the lower the current value of assets/liabilities required to equal their future values. 
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Alternatively, the lower the discount rate, the higher the current value of assets/liabilities required 
to equal their future values.
254
   
In the 1980s and 1990s most defined benefit pension plans had surpluses due to high investment 
returns. However, in 1999 investment returns began to fall dramatically, turning surpluses into 
deficits. Persistently low discount rates over the past 15 years have impacted DB plans in the 
following ways: 
1. Accumulation of surpluses mostly disappeared. 
2. Present value calculations of projected annual deficits steadily rose (i.e. the value of 
liabilities, which are bond-like in nature, increased with declining interest rates).  
3. Present value calculations of projected annual investments required to fund annual deficits 
rose (because lower investment returns meant more investment capital was required to meet 
increasing funding obligations). 
 
Pension regulation relies on the actuarial profession to control the funding risk in calculating the 
contributions required to fund promised pension benefits. The discount (interest) rate is the most 
important parameter in the valuation of defined benefit (DB) pension plan liabilities, which equal 
the net present value of all expected future pension plan payments.
255
  Kendra Kaake notes that 
traditional actuaries have long argued that pension liabilities should be discounted at rates that 
reflect the expected long-term returns on plan assets, while financial economists have countered 
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 Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, “Actuaries and Discount Rates”, 2013. Online: < 
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/programs.../sites/.../ActuaryFinalSept2013.pdf >. 
255
 In general, the pension liability will change over time as a result of benefit accruals and improvements, 
actual versus expected plan experience, plan closure or freezing, changes in plan demographics and 
regulations. However, the pension liability will be the most sensitive to changes in the liability discount rate 
and inflation. (K. Kaake, Asset Allocation and Risk Management for Defined Benefit Pension Plans: A 
Canadian Perspective, 2012). 
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that pension liabilities should be discounted at market rates (either risk-free government bond yields 
or high-grade corporate bonds).
256
   
Kaake continues that Canadian regulators have prudently adopted a balanced solution, ensuring that 
single employer DB plans are funded on a going concern basis (the projected value of future 
benefits discounted relative to the expected return on plan assets) and on a solvency basis (the 
market value of existing accrued entitlements). As a natural extension, the investment risk assumed 
should then evolve, in concert with each particular plan’s governance process, as a balanced trade-
off between the upside return potential and the downside risk of increased contributions. The key 
advantage of having both requirements is that the flexibility of the going concern approach is not 
allowed to go so far as to leave a consistent shortfall on a solvency basis. In other words, solvency 
valuations establish a minimum statutory funding level regardless of the level of the going concern 
valuation (i.e. the highest of the two valuations must be funded). 
 
Intuitively, it may seem more likely that a plan would be fully funded on a solvency (commuted) 
basis than an ongoing valuation basis, simply because members cease to accrue benefits (based on 
wage increases, longevity increases etc.) in a solvency valuation. However, this is not always the 
case. The terms of the pension plan or the applicable pension benefit law may result in the 
commuted plan having additional liabilities upon termination that it would not have if it continues 
on an ongoing basis.
257
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 Dmitri Vittas, Discount Rates and the Value of Pension Liabilities, World Bank, 2010. 
257
 For example, Grow-In benefits must be included in solvency valuations under the Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act. As of July 1, 2012, a pension plan member is entitled to grow-in to certain benefits (referred to 
as “grow-in benefits”) if his or her pension plan provides defined benefits, and he or she ceases to be a 
member because his or her employment is terminated (subject to some limited exceptions) or the plan is 
wound up. This right entitles the eligible plan member to receive the pension beginning on the date on which 
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Pension funding has experienced much volatility in recent years. In the early 2000s, a sharp decline 
in long-term interest rates along with changes in actuarial standards, including increased longevity 
assumptions, resulted in increasing plan liabilities. Combined with poor investment returns, these 
factors led to many plans being underfunded on a solvency basis. This funding volatility resulted in 
governments implementing funding relief regulations and special regulations for specific sponsors 
(i.e. Air Canada). The existence of temporary solvency funding relief measures and special 
regulations pointed to the need to improve the regulatory framework governing the funding of 
private DB pension plans. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, solvency funding relief regulations were enacted in the Ontario PBA and 
the federal PBSA in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The new regulations attempted to balance the 
goals of maintaining benefit security for employees and retirees, and preserving the financial 
condition of corporations. This was accomplished by reducing contributions for pension solvency 
deficits to allow more resources to be put toward operations. The solvency relief measures included 
in both the Ontario and federal regulations provided a number of options to plan sponsors with 
respect to solvency deficiencies, in recognition of the fact that each sponsor may have different 
priorities and restrictions. Plan sponsors now have a number of options available and need to 
consider the disclosure, communication, and filing requirements associated with each of the options. 
Under the 2010 federal PBSA amendments, "average" solvency ratios over 3 years replaced 
"current" solvency ratios in determining minimum solvency funding requirements in respect of a 
defined benefit pension plan. Annual filing of valuation reports were mandated in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the member would have been entitled to an enhanced or unreduced pension under the pension plan, if his or 
her employment or membership had continued to that date.  
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implementation of this new funding model. The "current" solvency ratio rule still applies for other 
purposes. The 5-year target period for funding solvency deficiencies remained unchanged, requiring 
DB plans to remit (on a quarterly basis), 20% of the solvency deficiency each year in which a 
solvency deficiency exists.
258
 
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act Regulations were amended in 2012 by Ontario Regulation 
329/12 to implement solvency funding relief measures for private sector defined benefit (DB) 
pension plans. The new solvency relief measures are similar to the measures introduced in 2009 and 
consist of: 
1. Up to a 12-month deferral of new amortization schedules. 
2. Consolidation and re-amortization of existing solvency deficiencies over a five-year period.  
3. Amortization of new solvency deficiencies over a 10-year period, subject to a process which 
will allow members to object to this relief option. 
Although solvency valuations address the ability of a DB plan to pay commuted benefits in the 
event of employer insolvency, only going concern valuations address the ability of a plan to meet 
its long term pension commitments.
259
 Dr. Ron Davis and Dr. Janis Sarra discuss the impact of 
discount rates on these valuations: 
After a defined benefit pension plan is registered, it must have actuarial reports concerning 
its funded status prepared and submitted to the regulator at least every three years or when 
changes are made that change the contributions required and/or the plan’s liabilities. Where 
the actuarial reports disclose that additional liabilities have been created or existing 
liabilities have been increased, then the plan sponsor must make additional special 
contributions calculated by an actuary as sufficient to pay-off these liabilities over a five to 
fifteen year time frame. 
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 Eckler Consultants, New Rules for federally Regulated Pension Plans, 2010. Online: 
www.eckler.ca/newsletter-55-new-rules-for-federally-regulated-pensionwww.eckler.ca/newsletter-55-new-
rules-for-federally-regulated-pension>. 
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 Kendra Kaake, Russell Research, Evaluating the Selection Process for Determining the Going Concern 
Discount Rate, 2010. 
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The Ontario PBA provisions protect against the failure of the plan sponsor to make adequate 
contributions by requiring the sponsor to pre-fund the normal cost of a promised benefit in a 
defined benefit pension plan. “Normal cost” is defined in the PBA Regulation as “the cost of 
pension benefits and ancillary benefits with respect to a fiscal year of a pension plan 
determined in accordance with the methods and actuarial assumptions used in a going 
concern valuation”.  This definition has an impact on the solvency risk for pension plans, 
given the provisions that regulate actuarial methods and assumptions and the investment of 
the pension fund’s assets. An important factor affecting the adequacy of the funding in a 
defined benefit pension plan is the amount of the initial contribution and the investment 
income that contribution can earn over a relatively lengthy time period. While the 
prefunding obligations discussed above ensure that contributions are made, they do not 
specify how an adequate amount is determined except in the most general manner. The 
chosen means for specifying the amount is to rely on accepted actuarial practice as 
determined by an actuarial practitioner governed by a self-regulatory body rather than any 
express regulatory standards. 
Davis notes that a “going-concern valuation” in the PBA Regulation “means a valuation of the 
assets and liabilities of a pension plan using methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent 
with accepted actuarial practice for the valuation of a continuing pension plan.” Thus, the 
contributions required to fund each year’s benefits are determined by calculating the normal cost of 
those benefits using the actuarial assumptions and methods for a going-concern valuation that are, 
in turn, determined by accepted actuarial practice. However, there is a large range of discretion that 
actuaries have over the assumptions that will be used to calculate future returns on investment in 
pension plans. This variance of assumptions can be compared across jurisdictions, with those used 
in large Canadian pension plans being more conservative than those used in the U.S. Weidman and 
Weir have reported that the median return on asset assumptions in 2004 of the 100 companies with 
the largest pension funds in Canadian Compustat
260
 was 7.3% while that of the pension funds 
sponsored by the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index was 8.5%. 
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 A database of standardized financial data on over 20,000 North American companies, of which more than 
1,000 are Canadian. These are publicly traded companies only. Online: < www.lib.sfu.ca/help/subject-
guides/business/compustat >. 
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Davis continues that the statutory requirement in Ontario that the tri-annual actuarial valuation 
assess the plan’s funded status on a solvency basis, provides a “check” on the results of going 
concern “normal cost” calculations. The solvency funding calculation requires an actuary to value 
the plan’s liabilities and assets as if the plan was being wound-up, to determine if sufficient assets 
are in the plan to fund the accrued benefits. If there are not, then the plan sponsor must commence 
making payments that will extinguish any solvency deficit over the next five years. As a result, any 
deterioration in the funded status of the plan over the previous three years as a result of a 
divergence between actuarial assumptions and actual experience due to the effect of economic 
events on the value of plan’s liabilities or assets, can be remedied by equal monthly instalment 
payments over the next 5 post valuation years. The insolvency risk is that during the (up to) eight 
year period encompassing the period between actuarial valuations and the five year amortization 
period, the plan sponsor may become insolvent resulting in insufficient plan assets to pay accrued 
benefits.
261
 Similar going concern and solvency requirements exist in the federal PBSA. 
Impact of Actuaries on Discount Rates 
The discount rate assumptions used in defined-benefit pension funding are often chosen 
strategically to make plans appear better funded (i.e. reduce liabilities) than they actually are 
(Feldstein and Morck, 1983; Asthana, 1999; Bergstresser et al., 2006, Baloria, 2011). As pension 
assets, liabilities and expenses are an economically significant part of corporate financial statements, 
even small changes in pension assumptions can impact earnings and balance sheets substantially. 
While managers of the firm sponsoring the plan (“plan sponsor”) are ultimately responsible for 
choosing pension assumptions, these assumptions are typically chosen on the recommendation of 
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 Dr. Janis P. Sarra and Dr. Ron B. Davis, Study for the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions: Analysis 
of the Factors Leading to the Insolvency and Restructuring and Their Effects on Pension Wind-Ups and 
Disclosures: UBC Faculty of Law (2007) at 17. Online: < www.facultypubs.library.ubc.ca/results.php >. 
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the pension actuary. Professor Divya Anantharaman of Reuters Business School discusses actuaries’ 
conflict of interest: 
Actuaries are self- regulated…They render opinions for a fee, making them susceptible to 
conflicts between providing advice based on objective analysis, and serving the needs of 
plan sponsor clients, when the two diverge. This conflict has long been a subject of 
discussion within the actuarial profession—for example, “…as long as a client can threaten 
to find another actuary to provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an 
effect on the actuary’s work product” (American Academy of Actuaries Task Force, 
2006)—across all areas where actuaries function, such as pensions and insurance (Feldblum, 
1993; White and Atkinson, 1993, Carmichael, 1997).
262
  Vaughan, Cooper, and Frank 
(1993), in a survey of insurance actuaries, report that “responding to pressure from clients or 
management to change assumptions” was considered the most serious ethical challenge 
facing the profession. These issues have received some wider attention, but the generally 
low visibility of the profession and lack of public exposure to its work has limited a robust 
debate on actuarial independence from developing in the United States. 
These concerns about the professional independence of actuaries, when juxtaposed with 
academic evidence on firms’ strategic use of pension assumptions, beg the question of 
whether the pension assumptions that plan sponsors ultimately use are affected by actuaries’ 
economic incentives, i.e., whether certain plan sponsors successfully exert pressure on 
actuaries to tilt assumptions in a specific direction. If the threat of losing fee revenues from 
a client affects the actuary’s work product, this might manifest in actuarial assumptions that 
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 In other examples, “An actuary can only really claim independence if the advice given is totally open and 
public, and is capable of being relied on by any interested party. The fiduciary relation which a consulting 
actuary has with his or her client (not to mention the receipt of a fee) implies that they are beholden to their 
client...” in published comments to Bellis (2000)’s speech to the Institute of Actuaries. In the insurance arena, 
Feldblum (1993) argues in a discussion paper of the Casualty Actuarial Society that the insurance actuary is 
“torn between the two roles” of professional expert (certifying to insurance regulators that loss reserves are 
reasonable) and business manager (seeking to optimize company performance), and provides the 
interesting example that “almost all major insurers have unqualified actuarial opinions”, but yet “most 
actuaries believe that industry reserves are seriously deficient on a statutory basis”.   
 
For example, there is ““subtle pressure on the actuary to come up with numbers that make the pension fund 
look good” (Mary Williams Walsh, “Actuaries scrutinized on pensions”, The New York Times, May 21, 2008). 
Warren Buffett, in his 2007 letter to shareholders, famously decried pension expected rate-of-return 
assumptions for being unrealistic, adding that somehow, “the auditors and actuaries charged with vetting 
these return assumptions seem to have no problem with it”. Standard & Poors’ insurance analyst Steven J. 
Dreyer asserts, “The accounting profession has come in for a lot of criticism in recent years. Meanwhile, the 
insurance industry has done something almost as egregious by, in effect, overstating prior-year earnings by 
billions of dollars. Somehow, actuaries have avoided the spotlight for abetting this.” (Dreyer, Steven J., 
Siddhartha Ghosh, John Iten, Robert G. Partridge, and Mark Puccia. “Insurance Actuaries: A crisis of 
credibility.” November 19, 2003. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct: New York, NY.) as cited by Divya 
Anatharaman, Reuters Business School, The Role of Actuaries In Defined Benefit Plan Reporting, 2013. 
Online: www.8.gsb.columbia.edu/programs.../sites/.../ActuaryFinalSept2013 >.           . 
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better fit the client’s reporting objectives. Actuaries do, however, face countervailing 
incentives to resist client pressure - from the threat of litigation, the need to maintain 
reputation, and perhaps more fundamentally from personal integrity and professional codes 
of conduct. Whether these incentives dominate economic considerations, is an empirical 
question.
263
 
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions voiced similar concerns about the professional 
independence of Canadian actuaries:  
An actuary considers a number of discretionary factors (including the discount rate) in 
valuing the funding requirements of a defined benefit pension. Ideally, the breadth of the 
options offered should be influenced by the actuarial firm’s desire to serve both the sponsor 
and the plan members. The employer, (responsible for hiring the actuary) is the party with 
the most influence. This situation exposes actuaries to subtle — even overt — pressures to 
exercise their discretion in a way that produces outcomes agreeable to the sponsor. In the 
end, of course, the sponsor makes the choice — but it is actuarial discretion that confers 
legitimacy on that choice.
264
 
Professor Anatharaman conducted a survey of 4,149 American actuarial firms to determine whether 
discount rate estimates varied systematically across large and small actuarial firms, and also, 
whether or not the discount rate varied within actuarial firms based on the economic importance of 
the plan sponsor to its actuary. She observed: 
In a sample of 4,169 firm-years from 2000-2008, there is evidence that clients of the largest 
actuarial firms use systematically lower, or more conservative (i.e., obligation- increasing) 
discount rate assumptions, consistent with larger actuarial firms having incentives to enforce 
conservative pension valuations. Within actuarial firms, there is strong evidence that 
economically important clients (i.e., that account for a greater proportion of their actuary’s 
client portfolio) use higher, or more aggressive (obligation-reducing) discount rates, 
compared to less important clients. Examining client importance at three levels – the 
actuarial firm level, the actuarial practice-office level, and the level of the individual actuary 
signing the actuarial report, client importance at both practice-office and individual levels is 
incrementally associated with higher discount rates (i.e. lower funding requirements). 
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 Divya Anatharaman,The Role of Actuaries In Defined Benefit Plan Reporting, Reuters Business School, 
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 Harry Arthurs, Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable 
Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto: Minister of Finance, 2008) at 165. 
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Partition tests
265
 show that the effects of client importance are driven, as expected, by client 
firms with strong incentives to overstate discount rates - highly leveraged plan sponsors 
with poorly-funded pension plans (“financially weak” plans). This effect exists both within 
actuarial firms (across their client portfolio), and within client firms (over time). In these 
plans, there is some evidence that client importance effects at the practice-office level are 
stronger when auditor oversight of actuarial valuations is weak. 
Finally, the effect of client importance manifests in both large and small actuarial firms. 
Interestingly, however, sorting plans by absolute size shows that the effect of client 
importance is driven by relatively small plans in combination with smaller practice-offices. 
In other words, the plan sponsors that appear to successfully exert pressure for aggressive 
assumptions are not the very largest plans by absolute size (these plans may face significant 
external scrutiny that constrains manipulation) but rather, smaller plans that happen to be 
relatively important to their actuarial practice-office.
266
 
This chapter examines the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuarial discretion and the 
underfunding of defined benefit pension plans in Canada. It is divided into three sections examining 
the theory, legal framework, and policy options, respectively, applicable to the governance of 
discount rates.  
Section 1-Theory of Discount Rates 
1. The Concept of Discount Rates  
A discount rate is a financial concept that accounts for the time value of money. It recognizes that a 
dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received tomorrow. In essence, a discount rate is 
an interest rate which reflects the amount of risk one is willing to take in receiving a value of 
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 Several existing test methods (e.g. Equivalence Partitioning [32], Category Partition [2], and Domain 
Testing [33]) are based on the model that the input space of the test object may be divided into subsets 
based on the assumption that all points in the same subset result in a similar behavior from the test object. 
This is called partition testing. Even if the partition test assumption is an idealization it has two important 
properties. First, it lets the tester identify test suites of manageable size by selecting one or a few test cases 
from each subset. Second, it allows test effectiveness to be measured in terms of coverage with respect to 
the partition model used. Online:<www.csrc.nist.gov/acts/grindal-offutt-andler.pdf >. 
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 Supra, see note 263. 
 109 
 
money at a future date rather than today. Professor Ron Davis discusses how actuaries calculate 
discount rates: 
For example, in order to pay a benefit of $100 per month for life starting in ten years, 
suppose the actuary projects that it will take a total of $60,000, based on average life 
expectancy. The actuary must estimate how much money must be contributed today to earn 
a total of $60,000 in ten years, based on the anticipated rate of return (the discount rate). In 
making this calculation, the actuary takes into account the type of investments the plan 
makes. The returns on equity investments generally outpace the returns generated by “risk-
free” fixed-income investments such as bonds. Therefore, the greater the proportion of 
equities in a pension fund’s assets, the lower the initial pension contribution required in an 
actuary’s estimated cost calculation.267  
One study suggests that most of today’s DB retirement plans try to make DB pensions affordable by 
investing 50-70% of funds in equities. The objective is to increase the annual rate of return on the 
pension fund by about 2%, while delivering an acceptable compromise between affordability and 
stability. Increasing the expected rate of return by 2% reduces the steady state pension contribution 
rate by about 40%.
268 
In summary, actuaries calculate “present values” in order to compare assets and liabilities. Cash 
flows of assets and liabilities in future years are discounted to an equivalent present value using (1) 
a factor based on the number of years before the money is scheduled to be received and (2) an 
interest rate called a “discount rate.”  An example of a present value calculation is presented below:  
A payment of $1,000 in 2 years, discounted at 5% per year, is worth approximately $907 in 
today’s dollars. It tends to be easier to understand this calculation by reversing the process. 
If today we put $907 into a savings account earning 5% per year, it will grow to a value of 
$1,000 in 2 years. That is, the $907 would earn $45 (at 5% interest) and total $952 at the end 
of year 1.  This $952 would earn $48 (at 5% interest) and total $1,000 at the end of year 2. 
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 Ron Davis, IRRP Study, “Is Your Defined Benefit Plan Guaranteed?” (2011) at 9. Online:< 
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 Malcolm Hamilton, “Investment and Longevity Risks”, Retirement Savings Research Program. Ottawa: 
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The mathematics can become complicated, but the logic always remains the same; a present 
value growing at an interest (discount) rate for some number of periods equals the ultimate 
target amount that was originally discounted to today’s dollars.269   
 
2. Types of Discount Rates  
Discount rates are essential in determining a DB plan’s current funding status because its assets and 
liabilities are spread over many years. Discount rates can generally be classified in one of three 
categories:  
(i) Expected rates of return:  
Actuarial rules specify that the discount rate should be based on the expected long-term return on 
investment in the pension trust. Therefore, a plan would be viewed as fully funded if it has 
sufficient investments to make its obligated pension payments at the estimated interest (discount) 
rate. For many years actuaries estimated the return for the average plan at about 6%, although 
estimates for individual plans always varied up or down by one or two percentage points. Fred 
Vitesse, Chief Actuary at Morneau Shepell, explains how actuaries arrived at a 6% rate of return:
270
 
1. Estimate future inflation: The average inflation rate since 1924 has been 2.94% though 
actuaries generally assume lower future inflation because (a) inflation has been low for quite 
a while, (b) economic growth in the developed world looks like it will remain sluggish for a 
long time to come and (c) the Bank of Canada is targeting inflation at 2% per annum. 
Taking all this into account, the typical estimate of future inflation is about 2.25%. 
 
2. Forecast the real return: Calculate the return on each asset class over and above the inflation 
rate. Assuming three asset classes with 40% in long-term government bonds, 30% in 
Canadian equities and 30% in international equities. 
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 Fred Vitesse, Financial Post, “Calculating Investment Returns, Actuarially Speaking, 6% is a Good Rule 
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3. Expect bond yields to rise: Bonds are currently at the bottom of a 60-year interest cycle so 
yields are expected to rise over the next 25 to 30 years. As yields rise, long-term bonds will 
produce capital losses that will reduce total return. This has already started as bond funds 
have registered a net loss in the first eight months of 2013. Indeed, there have been 25-year 
periods when bonds lost money in real terms. Nevertheless. …the consensus that real returns 
on long-term bonds will average about 1.25% over the next 25 years. 
 
4. Expect equities to rise less: Actuaries generally expect that Canadian equities will generate 
real returns of 5.25% over the next quarter century; this is less than the 6.7% or so that they 
have generated historically but an aging population implies a slower economy. Real returns 
on international equities are expected to be a little higher, about 5.75%. 
 
5. Factor in rebalancing: Put this all together and a nominal return of 6.05% is derived. 
(Nominal means the inflation component is added back in ) This can be bumped up by the 
closest thing to a free lunch that you are apt to find in the investment world: Assuming the 
portfolio is going to be rebalanced regularly (to maintain the 40-30-30 mix), the actual 
return will be a little higher than if the asset mix is allowed to drift. The estimated return can 
therefore be rounded up to about 6.4% to reflect regular re-balancing. 
6. Assume 6% gains: Finally, we knock off about 0.5% for management fees to come up with 
our final estimate of 5.9%, which we will round up to 6%.
271
 
 
(ii)  Risk-free rates: 272 
Central to the establishment of discount rates is the concept of a risk-free rate. If pension assets are 
invested in government bonds which have been guaranteed to be paid, then we would expect them 
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 Even though this seems like a lot less than the 8.5% return that fund managers actually achieved over the 
past 50 years, the past and the future may not be as different as they look. The 8.5% return cited above 
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For example, interest rate assumptions used to value the going concern liabilities (based on the latest filed 
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continued to fall within a relatively narrow range, with 73% of the plans using a rate between 5.0% and 6.0% 
inclusive. (2013 Report on the Funding of Defined Benefit Plans, “Overview and Selected Findings”, 2010-
2013, FSCO, at 15.   
 
272
 Note that government bonds or treasuries are not subject to credit quality ratings. These securities are 
considered to be of the very highest credit quality. (Investopedia). Online: < 
www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentgrade >. 
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to be valued on a discount basis which assumes certainty or in other words, is risk free. The 
boilerplate definition of risk-free is a zero-coupon government bond curve.  
 
Financial economists generally advocate the use of a “risk-free” rate, such as the return on a 
government treasury bond of equivalent duration to the pension obligation. Currently, this would 
produce a discount rate of 2% to 3%. Financial economists argue that a plan’s assets should be 
invested at a risk free rate to guarantee that increases in pension liabilities (usually 2-3% per year) 
are matched by similar increases in pension assets.  This “risk free” concept conflicts with the well-
established actuarial principle of investing pension assets in more volatile equities to achieve higher 
expected rates of return:  
Professor Ron Davis notes that critics of this practice (focussing on the bias toward equity 
investment created by the “equity premium)” argue that there is no justification rooted in financial 
economics principles or research for using differing costs for  a fixed obligation based on what form 
of investment one makes (see, for example, Bader and Gold 2003; Exley, Mehta, and Smith 2004; 
and Sutcliffe 2005). In their review, the practice of incorporating the equity premium into the cost 
calculations ignores the fact that the premium is the market price for the extra risk assumed by 
choosing equities over risk free investments. The result is that the potential for a pension asset 
shortfall is increased by the proportion of equity assets in the pension fund. Despite this, in Ontario, 
the proportion of pension assets invested in equities has grown steadily, and at the end of 2008 
stood at 60 percent (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2009, 12-13), although the 
proportion declined slightly to 55 percent in 2009 (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2010, 
25-6). 
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Davis continues that another critique of funding pension obligations through equity investments is 
that the volatility of such investments is a mismatch for the predictably increasing liability of a 
pension benefit. Because equity investment prices do not follow a predictable path, there is a real, 
albeit low, probability that they will generate a very large price decline just at the time when they 
must be sold to pay benefits (Bodie 1996, 90-1). A task force of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries 
to review the standards for pension funding in actuarial practice similarly concluded 
that 10 percent should be added to the contribution amount if the pension fund contained 50 percent 
equities, in order to account for the potential of an “unacceptable deterioration in the 
plan’s funded status” because of the high degree of asset-liability mismatch (Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries 2003, 9-10).
273
 
  
(iii) Rates On High-Quality Bonds:274 
 There are at least three justifications for using high-quality bond rates. First, it represents a 
compromise between traditional actuarial practice and the “risk free” arguments of the financial 
economists. High-quality bonds are not truly risk-free, but they do tend to have a low probability of 
default. Second, the implied interest rates that insurers build into their pricing when they offer to 
take on pension obligations are generally close to high-quality bond rates. Third, it is a convenient 
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 Supra, See note 267. 
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 Bond rating firms, such as Standard & Poor's, use different designations consisting of upper- and lower-
case letters 'A' and 'B' to identify a bond's credit quality rating. 'AAA' and 'AA' (high credit quality) and 'A' and 
'BBB' (medium credit quality) are considered investment grade. Credit ratings for bonds below these 
designations ('BB', 'B', 'CCC', etc.) are considered low credit quality, and are commonly referred to as "junk 
bonds". (Investopedia).Online: < www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentgrade >. 
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political compromise between the arguments of different groups that favor risk-free rates or rates 
closer to long-term investment returns.
275
  
3. Nature of Discount Rates used in Actuarial Valuations of DB Plans in 2012
276
 
The Standards of Practice of the actuarial profession in Canada stipulates that the discount rate to be 
used in actuarial valuations (for funding purposes) should be the best estimate of future portfolio 
returns.
277
 As a result, the discount rates used in the actuarial valuations of DB plans include an 
estimate of the future equity premiums expected to be earned on any equity assets included in the 
pension fund portfolio. This focus on estimating future equity premiums exposes plans to a high 
probability that the resulting measure of the accrued liability and current service costs may prove 
inadequate, as there is a 50% probability that actual emerging investment returns will be less than 
the actuary’s discount rate assumption. 
A. Current Best Estimate of Future Investment Returns  
 
Estimates of future investment returns are typically developed by using a building block approach 
or calculated using a stochastic model. The Canadian Institute of Actuaries published an 
Educational Note in December 2010 (Determination of Best Estimate Discount Rates for Going 
Concern Valuations).
278
 This Educational Note guides the actuary to one approach for developing 
the estimated future return on a pension plan’s asset portfolio as follows:  
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 International Actuarial Association, A Note on Financial Economics, 2008. Online: < 
www.actuaries.org/CTTEES.../A_Note_on_Financial_Economics.pdf >. 
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 Alberta Government, Discount Rate History and Analysis, 2014. 
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 Canadian Institute of Actuaries, Standards of Practice (2008) at 3002. Online: < 
www.actuaries.ca/SOP_Doc/Complete/SOP_e_Complete.pdf >. 
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 Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “Determination of Best Estimate Discount Rates for Going Concern 
Funding Valuations” Educational Note,  2010. 
 115 
 
1. Develop estimates of the long term risk premium applicable to each asset class.  
2. Determine the weighted average of the risk premiums based on the expected long term asset 
allocation policy.  
3. Add the weighted average risk premium to the prevailing yield on long-term Government of 
Canada bonds.  
4. Add an increment for the diversification and rebalancing effect, and  
5. Deduct estimated investment expenses, reflecting only passive investment management costs.  
The result is an estimate of the expected long term return on the pension plan assets. 
 
Equity risk premiums are typically estimated from a long term history of equity returns measured 
relative to bills or bonds. The most comprehensive database of historical returns has been 
developed by three academics from the London Business School.
279
 The most recent version of the 
database is published in the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2013. This database 
includes 113 years of annual returns on bills, bonds and equities across 25 countries.  To develop a 
current best estimate of expected future returns on a conventional asset portfolio, an asset allocation 
policy (40% fixed income and 60% equities) may be postulated consisting of:  
1. Long Government of Canada bonds 40%  
2. Canadian equities 20%  
3. US equities 20%  
4. Global equities 20%  
Dimson (2013) reports geometric average
280
 equity risk premiums (relative to bonds) over the 
period 1900 to 2012:  
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  Elroy Dimson et.al, The Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook (London: London Business 
School, 2013). 
280
 The main benefit to using the geometric mean is that the actual amounts invested do not need to be 
known; the calculation focuses entirely on the return figures themselves and presents an "apples-to-apples" 
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1. Canadian equities 3.4%  
2. US equities 4.2%  
3. Global equities (ex US) 3.0%  
4. Average 3.5%  
The yield to maturity on long term Government of Canada bonds at December 31, 2013 was 3.24%. 
Hence, the expected return on the postulated portfolio is 40% of 3.24% (bonds) plus 60% of 6.74% 
(3.24% (return on bonds) + 3.5% (average equity risk premium over bonds)) =5.3%. Adding a 
diversification additive of 0.4% and deducting 0.25% for investment expenses gives a best estimate 
of future investment returns of 5.45%.
281
  
B. Academic Forecasts of Future Investment Returns282  
 
Two recent academic studies by Elroy Dimson and Alain Guay respectively, focus on estimates of 
future investment returns on diversified investment portfolios. Both studies argue that the discount 
rates used in the actuarial valuations of defined benefit pension plans are too optimistic. Dimson 
projects real global equity returns in the range of 3% to 3.5%. In the Canadian context with a best 
estimate inflation rate of about 2%, Dimson’s projection is for a nominal annual return on global 
equities of 5.5%, at best. His equity projection implies an estimated 4.75% return on a pension 
invested 60% in global equities and 40% in long Government of Canada bonds invested at 3.24%. 
Dimson observes that the high equity returns of the last half of the 20th Century were not normal, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
comparison when looking at two investment options. (Investopedia). Online: < 
www.investopedia.com/terms/g/geometricmean.asp >. 
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 Note that a best estimate of future bond returns is set equal to the prevailing yield to maturity. If bond 
yields increase, capital losses on the bond allocation of the postulated portfolio will be realized and the 5.45% 
estimate of future investment returns will not be realized. This analysis does not reflect any possible 
outperformance of the investment manager due to active management, nor does it reflect any additional 
active management fees. (Supra, see note 271). 
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 Ibid. 
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nor were the high bond returns of the last 30 years. The long run averages documented by Dimson 
over 113 years “provide a more realistic guide to the future”.  
Guay, a professor at the University of Montreal and Lawrence Allaire Jean, a senior operations 
specialist at Deutsche Bank, also conducted a study of expected long term investment returns in the 
Canadian context. They used prevailing dividend yields and economic growth assumptions to 
predict future equity returns. Back testing of this prospective forecasting approach revealed a 55 
percent correlation with realized returns (as compared to a negative 63 percent correlation for 
extrapolation from historical data).
283
 They predicted long-term returns (over 30 years) of 2.5% on 
long term bonds and 6.9% for Canadian stocks. A stochastic asset model was then used to project 
the total portfolio returns for a pension fund invested 50% in Canadian equities and 50% in 
Canadian long bonds. The geometric return over 30 years on this portfolio was 4.77%. The 
stochastic modelling permitted analysis of the distribution of possible future returns around the 
mean forecast. There was a 25% probability that the 30 year geometric returns would be less than 
3.67% and a 10% probability that the return would be less than 2.75%.  
C. Academic Views on Conventional Actuarial Valuations Based on Best Estimates of 
Future Returns 
284
 
As discussed above, both Dimson and Guay observed that the discount rates used in conventional 
defined benefit valuations are too optimistic. Dimson noted that “For Canada and the UK, the real 
implied real equity return is greatly above the level we deem plausible.” Guay concurred, stating 
“Compared to our forecasts, current Canadian actuarial assumptions tend to be too optimistic to 
achieve sustainability for DB pension plans; it is imperative as a first step to be transparent about 
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 Elroy Dimson, “The low-return world” The Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook (London: 
London Business School, 2013). 
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 Richard Guay, “A Reality Check for Pension Funds and Retirement Savings”, Long-Term Returns: C. D. 
Howe Institute, Commentary No.395, 2013. 
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some of the very high costs. Once these costs are revealed, employers (and employees) can then 
proceed to perform the adequate adjustments on the cost side as well as on the accumulated deficit 
side to ensure sustainability.” Guay estimated that public sector pension liabilities would be 
increased by about 25% if the benefits were discounted at the 4.77% indicated by his study.  
Malcolm Hamilton noted that while contribution rate stability is a worthwhile objective for a 
funding strategy, it is not an achievable one for mature pension plans with significant equity 
holdings because any viable funding strategy will force contribution rates to move in a wide range 
(i.e. contributions will vary significantly with changes in equity returns). Furthermore he stated that 
DB equity investments introduce intergenerational inequity, transferring current funding risks 
(through underfunding) to future generations: 
By building the equity risk premium into the valuation assumptions, albeit reduced by some poorly 
defined margin for adverse deviation,
285
 actuaries allow the first generation of plan participants to 
enjoy the equity risk premia that are expected to be earned in the future as compensation for risks 
borne by future generations.
286
 
 
In other words, if the first generation’s pension contributions (based on artificially high estimates of 
future equity returns) are insufficient to pay their pensions upon retirement, the second generation’s 
contributions will necessarily increase to fund the resulting future deficits. 
 
4. Formulae for Discounting Assets and Liabilities  
The mathematical formula for this present value calculation is as follows: 
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 Provision for Adverse Deviation (PfAD) that is appropriate for the plan‘s risks and consistent with the 
Plan‘s risk management process. A margin of 50 basis points is common and may result in a PfAD of 8% of 
plan liability for a fully funded plan with a typical maturity profile. (Canadian Institute of Actuaries, Task Force 
on the Determination of Provisions for Adverse Deviations in Going Concern Valuations, Provisions for 
Adverse Deviations in Going Concern Actuarial Valuations of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, January 2013.. 
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 Malcolm Hamilton, Members Paper: Rethinking the Funding of Mature Pension Plans, The Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries, 2007. 
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Present Value Calculation 
The DB present value formula is the core formula which accounts for the time value of money. 
The present value (PV) formula of assets in any given year has four variables, each of which can be 
solved for: 
 
1. PV is the value at year= 0 
2. FV is the value at year = year n 
3. i is the discount rate, or the interest rate at which the assets will be compounded each year 
4. n is the number of years after year 0  
The cumulative present value of future cash flows in all years can be calculated by summing 
the contributions of FVt, the value of cash flows in each year.   
 
A. Assets 
Note that the discount rate (i) is in the denominator of the formula and therefore as the discount rate 
increases, the present capital value of pension assets decreases. For example, using a discount rate 
of 5% per annum, $1000 worth of assets at the end of 1 year would require the sponsor to fund at 
the level of $952. A 1% increase in the discount rate to 6% would decrease the sponsor’s funding 
requirements to $942, illustrating the importance of actuarial discretion in determining a plan’s 
discount rates.
287
   
B. Liabilities 
A defined benefit pension plan’s liabilities are the cost of current and future promises to its  
members. The actuary makes assumptions with regard to economic (salaries, inflation etc.) and 
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demographic (age, mortality etc.) factors in order to project a plan’s liabilities in future years. The 
actuary then estimates the discount rate to determine the current value of the plan`s liabilities. 
Similar to assets, the higher the discount rate, the lower the current value of a plan’s liabilities (i.e. 
the mathematical formula used for the present value calculation is the same as the one used for the 
present value asset calculation).  
The discount rate for liabilities is often lower than discount rate used for assets because actuaries’ 
projections of  investment returns are often based on high risk equities (to try to generate higher 
returns than “risk free “ investments such as bonds), whereas liabilities are dependent upon more 
predictable, steadily increasing economic (i.e. salary increases) and demographic (i.e. longevity) 
factors. The current value of the liabilities is compared to the current value of the assets to 
determine whether or not a plan has a deficit or a surplus.  An asset to liability ratio of 1 or more 
means the plan is fully funded. Alternatively, a ratio of less than 1 means the plan has a deficit and 
that additional employer contributions are required. 
288
 
C. Introduction of 3 Year Average Solvency Funding Ratios 
In 2009 the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) formally adopted a new methodology 
for the determination of minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans in order to 
mitigate the pro-cyclicality of the prior funding regime. Amendments to the funding rules adopted a 
new standard for establishing minimum funding requirements on a solvency basis that used average 
(rather than current) solvency ratios to determine minimum funding requirements. The average 
solvency position of the plan for funding purposes is now defined as the average of the solvency 
ratios over three years, i.e. the current and previous two years. The three solvency ratios used in the 
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determination of the average must be based on the market value of plan assets as of the dates they 
were initially calculated.  Past deficiencies must be consolidated annually for the purpose of 
establishing solvency special payments. 
289
 
This new approach reduces the effects of short-term fluctuations in the value of plan assets and 
liabilities on solvency funding requirements, spreading them over three years instead of one. 
Although initial increases in special payments are less than under the old solvency funding rules, 
payments tend to be higher in later periods. Similarly, when a pension plan’s funding position 
improves as a result of strong investment returns, solvency special payments tend to decline more 
gradually as a result of averaging. This new approach also mitigates the “pro-cyclicality” of the old 
funding rules, reducing the level of required contributions in any given year. The amortization 
periods for solvency deficiencies remain at five years.
290
 
In 2009 the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) introduced the following temporary solvency relief 
measures for single employer defined benefit pension plans:
291
 
The administrator of an eligible plan may elect any or all of the following solvency funding 
relief options:  
1. Defer new special payments (going concern and solvency) determined in the solvency relief 
report for up to one year;  
2. Consolidate pre-existing solvency special payments into a new five-year schedule; and  
3. With the consent of the members and former members, extend funding of any new solvency 
deficiency in the solvency relief report for up to five additional years…. 
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Federal Department of Finance: “Regulatory Impact Statement”, 2010. Online: < www.fin.gc.ca >.  
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 In periods of substantial market downturns, such as was experienced in 2008, the use of the average 
solvency ratio method with a five year amortization period would serve to dampen the effect of a market 
downturn on funding requirements without the potential adverse impact on benefit security of a significantly 
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While the average solvency ratio would be used for minimum funding purposes, the current solvency ratio 
would still be the relevant measure for all the other purposes under the Act and the Regulations, including, 
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 Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO):” 2009 Solvency Funding Relief Measures”, 2009. 
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Note that although average solvency funding ratios are not prescribed (as in the federal PBSA), 
solvency payments may be amortized over an additional five to ten more years, thereby reducing 
the immediate impact of a substantial market downturn on a sponsor’s funding requirements. These 
temporary solvency relief measures were extended in 2012.
292
 Both the federal PBSA and Ontario 
PBA solvency valuation amendments were obviously designed to help sustain the single employer 
DB plans in times of large funding deficits. 
5. Proposed New Valuation Methods 
Barry Gros of the C.D. Howe Institute discusses the need for better balance in the funding of single 
employer DB plans (SEPPs):
293
  
 
Ontario’s two-part funding system consists of going-concern and solvency-funding 
rules. Conceived with good intentions in the 1980s, the solvency-funding 
requirements are an ongoing frustration for plan sponsors. Ontario has issued 
temporary easements to these requirements twice in the past 10 years, a sign that 
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these rules are insufficient to secure pension plan promises during difficult economic 
times. As well, contractual inflation indexing need not be included in the pension 
liability calculations for solvency purposes, further weakening the credibility of 
Ontario’s solvency requirements. 
Furthermore, current solvency funding rules require large additional contributions 
when economic times are bad, creating the potential for trapped surpluses when 
times improve because of the onerous rules for removing surplus funds. Solvency 
valuations have a valid purpose in assessing the financial well-being of a plan, but 
they need not drive funding. An important observation in the Alberta/BC JEPP 
Report (2008) is that the test for determining plan deficits and potential remedies are 
two separate issues. 
 
In short, Gros points out that the vast majority of DB plans are not terminating and 
consequently, there is no need to require deficit funding on an onerous short term solvency 
(wind-up) basis. Alternatives to this two-part system of funding have recently been 
proposed through New Brunswick’s new shared-risk plan and Quebec’s D’Amours Report 
(2013), which proposed an “enhanced funding method. 294 Current funding issues are, to 
some extent, a result of trying to support benefits that were implemented in an era when 
costs were substantially lower than they are today, raising the  question of whether the 
funding problems that pension plans have recently encountered are truly a funding 
requirement issue or a benefit issue.  Gros notes that there are still fundamental issues with 
current funding rules that need to be addressed and proposes the following remedial 
measures:
295
 
1. Replace both the going-concern and solvency-valuation requirements with a 
new single valuation methodology, based on going-concern principles but 
made stronger with the addition of key components – key components would 
be a valuation discount rate that excludes full pre-recognition of any equity 
premium that may or may not arise along with shorter deficit amortization 
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periods (e.g., eight years rather than the existing 15). This is similar to the 
enhanced funding method suggested in the Quebec Expert pension study 
(D’Amours 2013). Solvency-based testing should still be maintained for 
contribution holidays, though. 
 
2. Introduce a margin reserve account for special payments and “excess” 
service cost payments – Better symmetry could be established in the funding 
equation by segregating contributions meant to shore up short-term deficits 
and margins built into the service cost. Recent BC legislation goes in the 
right direction by establishing a reserve account for solvency amortization 
payments that could be returned to the employer regardless of the wording in 
the plan document. A further step would include both going-concern special 
payments (where there is no solvency funding) and margins in the service 
cost in order to reduce the possibility of future trapped surpluses. 
 
3. For defined benefit single employer pension plans,296 funding and surplus 
utilization are the primary areas of concern. Current funding models could 
benefit from replacing the combined going-concern and solvency valuation 
model with a stronger going concern valuation model and creating a new 
margin reserve account to prevent special payments made during poor 
financial times (as well as margins incorporated in service cost payments) 
turning into trapped surplus when times improve. 
 
 
6. Financial Economics Re: Discount Rates 
Financial economics is a subset of microeconomics and is primarily devoted to studies of capital 
markets. One particular subject of interest to financial economists is how markets determine current 
values (prices) of future cash flows. Two familiar examples are shares of stock, which generate 
future dividends and /or earnings growth, and bonds, which generate future interest and principal 
payments. Stocks and bonds trade on open markets, making it easy to determine their current 
market value. However, pension liabilities do not trade on open markets, making it more difficult to 
determine their values. Therefore, financial economists use openly traded items which are close in 
nature to the untraded pension liabilities in order to assess their value. For example, a $100 five-
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year zero coupon bond currently trading at $90 can be used to determine the discount rate of 
pension liabilities that are due five years hence.
297
   
As discussed earlier, pension actuaries determine current values of future cash flows using various 
methods and assumptions about discount rates which are often different from the way in which 
capital markets value similar cash flows. These actuarial discounting methods have always been 
contested by financial economists, who argue that when pension assets are determined on a basis 
other than fair market value, prices are distorted, creating a misallocation of resources. In other 
words, contrary to the teachings of financial economics, the actuarial pension model anticipates 
expected outcomes without reflecting the price of risk (i.e. the risk of a decline in the value of 
pension investments such as stocks). It then camouflages the risky distribution of outcomes through 
various smoothing and amortization applications. The challenge posed by financial economists to 
pension actuaries is summarized in the following questions: 
1. Why do actuaries use different interest rates to discount future cash flows than capital market 
values?  
2. Is it appropriate for the actuarial profession to have different actuaries in different practices 
producing different rates to discount similar cash flows? 
3. Is it possible to create a common language and transparent framework for describing and 
determining discount rates and possibly reduce the diversity of current actuarial practice?  
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Section 2-Legal Framework Governing Discount Rates  
1. Overview 
Strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in the final quarter of 2013 capped a 
dramatic year of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Canadian equities 
returned 7.3 per cent in the fourth quarter which brought the average 2013 return to 13.0 per cent. 
Long-term Government of Canada bond yields, a key factor in calculating the liabilities of pension 
plans, ended the year at 3.2 per cent, up almost 1% (from 2.3 per cent at the beginning of the year), 
thereby reducing the current value of DB liabilities. Mercer
298
 estimates that a one percentage point 
increase in long-term interest (discount) rates reduces liabilities by 10 to 15 per cent.
299
Moreover, 
Mercer’s pension “health” index reached its highest level in 12 years at the end of 2013.300 It 
revealed that almost 40% of pension plans were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% at 
the beginning of the year. What’s more, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60% 
at the beginning of 2013. AON Hewitt
301
 also reported that the median solvency funded ratio in its 
pension universe of 275 public, semi-public and private plans rose to 93.4% at the end of 2013, up 
nearly 25 percentage points from the beginning of the year.
302
 
Despite these dramatic improvements in discount rates, it is highly unlikely there will be any 
resurgence in DB plans in Canada.  Sponsors have decided that DB plans have exposed them to too 
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much funding risk over the past 15 “stomach-churning” years of market turbulence.303 Professor 
Keith Ambachtsheer, a veteran pension expert and director emeritus of the Rotman International 
Centre for Pension Management (ICPM) does not anticipate any resurgence of defined benefit 
pensions; rather, he expects more “de-risking” through means such as liability transfers to insurance 
companies. He believes that corporations are “done with defined benefit plans.”304Barbara Shecter 
of the Financial Post weighed in on the status of DB plans:  
As companies with defined benefit pension plans struggled to fund their obligations in 
recent years, many opted to stop offering the guaranteed retirement benefits to new 
employees. Others considered ways to trim their exposure by reducing benefits or paying 
upfront to hive off obligations. Such de-risking strategies can be costly, particularly in a low 
interest rate environment, and often aren’t designed to pull pension plans out of a current 
funding deficit position. A stronger funding position could make de-risking more 
palatable.
305
 
The fixed discount rates on high-quality long term government or corporate bonds are generally 
used by actuaries to determine a plan’s expected risk-free (guaranteed) returns in the future.306  
Today’s low discount rates have placed additional funding burdens on DB plans by requiring 
sponsors to increase levels of investment capital  in order to generate the same revenue that higher 
rates would have yielded in the 1990s.
307
 However, Michel Kelly Gagnon, president and director 
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Canadian defined benefit (DB) pension plans' solvency continued to improve significantly in the fourth 
quarter of 2013 and ended the year in a much stronger position than at the same point in 2012, according to 
the latest survey by Aon Hewitt, the global human resource solutions business of Aon plc (NYSE:AON). The 
major contributors to increased solvency were improved equity market returns, with help from higher long-
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general of the Economic Institute of Montreal argues that low rates in 2012 did not truly reflect 
expected risk-free returns, but rather, reflected the monetary policy measures taken by the Bank of 
Canada to counter slow economic conditions:
308
 
The main cause of these solvency deficits is that long-term interest rates are exceptionally 
low. For example, since 2000, rates have decreased from 6% to 2.5% on long-term federal 
government bonds and from 4% to 0.3% on real return bonds used in indexed pension plans. 
This reduces investment returns, but the benefits are not accordingly adjusted…This is 
another unfortunate consequence of our current monetary policy. It creates a major problem 
for many Canadian companies that have those types of pension plans. Air Canada, Resolute 
Forest Products, Canadian Pacific, Bell Canada, Canada Post, Canadian National, are but a 
few of the companies impacted. The practical consequence of all of this is that Canadian 
companies suffer a substantial drain on their cash flows since they have to make important 
"deficit payments" that sometimes represent up to 30% of their total payroll. This is money 
that is not available to make investments, give pay raises or hire new employees. 
 
Let's take for example the case of Resolute Forest Products (the former AbitibiBowater). 
Their Canadian pension plans have performed well, in relative terms, generating a 5.4% 
investment return in 2011. However, the company's solvency deficit has steadily increased 
to $1.9 billion simply as a result of the precipitous decline in the yield on government bonds 
in Canada. Its retirees could lose 30% of their revenues if the company were to cease its 
operations. Air Canada is another example, with a $4.4-billion pension solvency deficit.
309
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
term interest rates, which rose by 91 basis points over the year, and sponsor contributions toward solvency 
funding requirements. Interest rates on long-term bonds remained low, compared to earlier years, but the 
benchmark Government of Canada yield increased from 2.37% to 3.28% during 2013. 
(Online: < www.newswire.ca/.../aon-hewitt-survey-reports >.) 
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When faced with this issue, Canadian authorities say that they apply those funding rules in 
order to protect retirees. This is indeed a laudable goal. However, putting important 
Canadian companies at a major competitive disadvantage with their American counterparts, 
harming their cash flow and, in some case, pushing them closer to bankruptcy, won't protect 
anyone in the end. 
Many other countries have eased the funding burden of DB plans by legislating higher discount 
rates. In June 2012 Denmark and Sweden took direct approaches, setting floors or specific 
minimum values for discount rates applicable to certain pension obligations. A less contrived 
approach would be to use actual market rates, averaged over several years, as the discount rate. The 
U.S. recently took this step as Congress passed legislation in July 2012 allowing corporations to use 
a discount rate based on high-quality bond yields averaged over the past 25 years, instead of over 
the past two years.
310
 It is estimated that this change will increase discount rates by up to 200 basis 
points (2%), significantly reducing the amount U.S. corporations need to contribute to their pension 
funds. For instance, David Zion of Credit Suisse estimated that only a 100 basis point increase in 
the discount rate would cause UPS’s required contribution to drop from $1.6 billion to $470 million 
in 2013. 
311
 
UK regulators have yet to follow the lead of their American counterparts, but British companies 
have made their case. The Confederation of British Industry, a group representing over 200,000 
businesses, has called for a smoothing (averaging) of interest rates “over a number of years.” 
However, an averaging period of 5 to 10 years might better reflect more “normal” conditions. The 
25-year averaging period enacted by the U.S. Congress is undoubtedly excessive considering that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
its contract negotiations in 2012. The carrier said it also contributed $225-million to the plan over the last 
year. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../air-canada-pension-deficit->. 
310
 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP), Public Law 112-141-July 6, 2012, 126 Stat 847-
850, Sec 40211. Subtitle B- Pension Provisions, Part 1- Pension Funding Stabilization. 
311
 David Zion, Credit Suisse: “How Do You Spell Pension Funding Relief?” 2012. Online: < 
www.doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docView?sourceid...id >. 
 130 
 
interest rates in 1988 are unlikely to have any predictive value for discount rates from 2015 to 
2025.
312
 Allowing actuaries to use these artificially high discount rates will undoubtedly result in 
excessive underfunding and insolvencies down the road, as assets will be insufficient to pay plan 
liabilities.  
In projecting pension obligations in Canada, discount rates reflecting future market conditions 
would obviously be more representative than using past interest rates as per American legislation. 
For example, short term obligations payable in the next 2 or 3 years could be represented by risk 
free bond rates which reflect the current low interest rates conditions, while discount rates further 
down the road could possibly be determined by calculating the forward interest rate on risk-free 
assets, such as 10 or 20 year government Treasuries. According to Robert Pozen of Harvard 
Business School, this forward rate, adjusted for the historic spread between Treasuries and the 
relevant long term bond yields might be a reasonable reflection of expected risk-free returns in the 
future. He states: 
In short, low interest rates make the obligations of pension plans more daunting because 
plan trustees cannot rely on expectations of strong investment returns. But policymakers 
must be careful when considering what the “correct” discount rate should be. What if 
today’s historically low interest rates are not some aberration that will quickly disappear? If 
so, reducing employer contributions by increasing the estimated discount rate will only 
delay, rather than prevent, underfunded defined benefit pension plans.
313
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Section 3-Public Policy Options for Discount Rates  
1. Overview 
The fact that DB pensions have been in a slow and persistent decline for two decades in Canada is 
evidence that the current regulatory structure is not working.
314
 William Robson, President of the 
C.D. Howe Institute, comments on the dysfunctional nature of the regulatory structure governing 
private sector single employer DB plans:
315
 
The problems of employer-sponsored defined-benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada raise 
two issues: the need for short-run measures to limit the damage; and the need for new 
pension models to prevent their recurring. The DB sector’s immediate preoccupations are 
the result of changes in the economic environment — in particular, a decline in long-term 
interest rates — that caused their balance sheets to deteriorate, and of changes in accounting 
standards to more market-based methods that revealed the underfunded state of these plans 
in stark form. The immediate policy challenge is to ensure the recovery and/or restructuring 
of sick plans, and the continued health of sound ones. Extra time and financial scope to 
work off deficits are good, but current limits on contributions to plans should rise or 
disappear, while legislation to establish clear title to surpluses for sponsors who must cover 
deficits is badly needed. In the longer run, policy should sustain and encourage a thriving 
occupational pension sector that helps individuals save for old age and helps finance the 
investment that underpins economic growth. But DB plans were in decline long before the 
recent crisis, and evidence is mounting that the classic single-employer DB plan has fatal 
agency problems — evident particularly in the tendency for these plans to mismatch assets 
and liabilities in ways that exposed them to risks far larger than sponsors or participants 
understood.  
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Robson argues that rather than seeking to prop up the classic DB system, Canadians would do 
better to seek alternatives. Existing RRSPs and money-purchase (DC) plans tend to impose high 
decision-making and administrative costs on individuals. A better route would be to promote the 
development of plans with good features from both models. They could: 
1. Be predominantly money purchase, but with a small and affordable minimum benefit; 
2. Pool investment risk across a large number of individuals at reasonable administrative 
cost; 
3. Gear contribution rates to a target payout; and 
4. Steer individuals’ portfolios toward an asset mix that would insulate them from 
fluctuating annuity prices as they approach retirement. 
Robson concludes that “even as Canadians seek to deal with the short-run problems of traditional DB 
plans.... they need to develop new models that offer attractive ways to pool resources and save for 
retirement, while mitigating not only financial risk and longevity risk, but agency risk as well.
316 
The relationship between risk and pension promises is measured using discount rates.  Professor Ron 
Davis notes that at the heart of this issue is whether or not the cost of a defined-benefit pension plan 
that has little or no risk, is one that plan members are willing to fund. He discusses Love, Smith, and 
Wilcox’s (2007) proposed theoretical model of employment bargaining that suggests employees 
demand sponsors to avoid risk by investing solely in fixed-income assets. However, such “risk-free” 
investments would undoubtedly mean employees would face higher plan contributions. Alternatively, 
employees could demand more in cash compensation for bearing the risk of a pension plan funded 
solely by equities, considering that sponsors would face lower contributions as a result of the higher 
discount rates generated solely through equity investments. Financial economists refer to this 
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compensation concept as “pricing the risk.” 317 [The model assumes that employees have complete 
information concerning the risks and cannot diversify their risks]. Davis discusses this type of risk: 
Ambachtsheer calculates that the cost of funding pension benefits with default-free, fixed-
income assets would be about 25 percent of employees’ compensation (2007, 66); Hamilton 
(2009) puts the cost at almost 24 percent. Using some equity to fund the benefits, 
Ambachtsheer estimates it would cost between 10 and 15 percent of employees’ cash 
compensation (2007, 66-7), while Hamilton calculates the range as between 7.5 percent and 
15 percent (2009). Either way, using fixed income discount rates would cause a steep 
decline in employees’ take-home pay. Would employees be prepared to forgo that much of 
their cash compensation to reduce the risk in their pension fund? Alternatively, if current 
contribution levels were maintained, would plan members wish to dramatically reduce the 
default risk in the pension plan by accepting reduced benefits in return for risk reduction or 
increase the portion of their compensation allocated to the pension fund as contributions? 
What kind of mechanism would be needed to communicate the existing risk and ascertain 
the wishes of employees, and how would potential conflicts over benefit reduction versus 
increased contributions be managed between active employees and retirees? 
318
 
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions (OECP) was given one of the broadest mandates: to 
“examine the legislation that governs the funding of defined-benefit plans in Ontario, the rules 
relating to pension deficits and surpluses, and other issues relating to the security, viability and 
sustainability of the pension system in Ontario.” 319Among the OECP’s recommendations was to 
consider the creation of “target-benefit” plans, in which the contributions would be fixed, based on 
best estimates of the amounts necessary to fund the target benefits. In the event that market discount 
rates are lower than those forecasted (resulting in contribution shortfalls), present and future target 
benefits could be adjusted downward in lieu of increased employer contributions.
320
 The sponsoring 
employer’s obligation would be restricted to fixed contributions, thereby transferring the full 
investment risk onto plan members and retirees (unless, of course the sponsoring employer 
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voluntarily agreed to increase contributions in response to a funding shortfall). 
321
 Professor Ron 
Davis discusses target benefit plans in Canada: 
Target plans differ from the current defined-benefit regimes in that employer insolvency is 
not required before pension benefits are reduced to reflect shortfalls in assets. This type of 
pension arrangement has existed for decades in Canada as multi-employer pension plans 
(MEPPs), which, as of 2006, provided pension benefits for more than one-fourth of all 
pension plan members in Canada (Shilton, 2007). In these plans, more than one employer 
contributes (usually under a collective bargaining agreement with a trade union) fixed 
contributions to a defined-benefit or defined-contribution plan. Legislation in many 
jurisdictions in Canada permit the reduction of defined benefits (as a last option) when the 
pension fund’s assets are less than the cost of its promised benefits. Another feature of 
MEPPs that distinguishes them from single-employer DB pension plans is their governance 
structure. MEPPs are governed by a body in which plan members have significant 
representation, in many instances, making up one-half of the governing body (Shilton, 2007). 
Similar to single employer DB plans, actuarial estimates of discount rates are required to 
determine target plan funding levels.  
Private sector single employer target benefit plans are currently not permitted under the Ontario 
PBA or the federal PBSA. However, in 2014 the federal government proposed a target benefit plan 
(TBP) framework be incorporated into the PBSA, allowing single employer DB plans to convert to 
TBPs.
322
 Ontario announced in its 2014 budget that it will also develop a framework for single-
employer, target-benefit pension plans to provide employers and employees with an additional, 
more flexible retirement savings option. Clare Pitcher discusses the significance of employee 
participation in target benefit plans:
323
 
Governance for these new TBPs will be critically important. Given that the risk is borne by 
the members, at a minimum, the employees must have a 50%—possibly even 100%—share 
of the governance. Jointly governed TBPs will likely become the norm, with basic current 
service cost (i.e., not including any deficit funding requirement) sharing anywhere from 100% 
employer/0% employee to 50/50. In this new world of operating a MEPP/TBP in a non-
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union situation, the traditional role of the union representatives acting as trustees will be met 
by member association or employee-elected representatives to a pension committee or board 
of trustees. 
Finally, assuming that the necessary legislative and regulatory changes are made, we will 
have a plan design—the TBP design—which effectively works for both employers and 
employees in the private sector. This sets the stage for increasing the pie of registered 
pension plan coverage. With an effective vehicle that meets the two major stakeholders’ 
requirements, pension plan coverage could be further enhanced by making a registered 
pension plan a mandatory requirement for all employers (or at least those meeting a certain 
size threshold, such as a minimum of 15 employees). 
Opening up access to private pension plans via the TBP for the remaining 60% of Canadian 
workers will cost nothing to the government or taxpayers, as there is no Pension Benefits 
Guarantee Fund safety net. In fact, the ultimate beneficiary —along with the newly covered 
employees themselves—will be future taxpayers, as the potential need for government 
social assistance down the road will be reduced significantly. 
What’s needed now is to take this “new” plan design from the point of conception to the 
actual birth of the new TBP for use in the single- as well as multi-employer environment—
and in the non-union as well as union environment—thereby increasing the pie and 
broadening pension plan coverage across the province and the country. 
2. Public Policy on Discount Rates in the U.K., the Netherlands and the U.S. 
U.K 
The UK Pensions Regulator adopted the opposite approach of most actuaries by invoking a low 
discount rate (i.e. higher contributions) when employers face financial difficulties and a high 
discount rate (i.e. lower contributions) when they are financially strong. This conservative 
regulatory regime should, in theory, promote full funding of financially troubled plans. However, it 
begs the question of whether or not a sponsoring employer experiencing financial difficulties will 
be able to make the higher contributions necessary using a lower discount rate.
324  
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Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the old rules mandated pension funds to discount liabilities at a constant rate of 
4 percent rate and to report assets at actuarially adjusted values. The new rules require pension 
funds to use fair market values
325
for both assets and liabilities. Use of the euro swap yield curve is 
compulsory.
326
 
U.S. 
Corporate pension plans in the U.S. historically determined the current value of their liabilities by 
using the rate of return on corporate bonds; otherwise known as the discount rate.  However, as 
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historically low bond rates over the past several years forced higher funding contributions, U.S. 
corporations lobbied Congress to change the discount rate.  Pension discount rates were recently 
amended in the U.S. Highway Bill 
327
which was signed into law by President Obama in 2012. As 
stated above, under this new legislation pension plans are able to use a rate based on the average of 
the past 25 years instead of discounting long-term liabilities using a rate based on the average of the 
past two years. This is expected to increase the discount rate used to determine DB liabilities by 
more than two percentage points, increasing the current discount rate from the 4 percent range to 
roughly 6 percent, resulting in further underfunding. This policy will place the burden of the 
funding shortfall on both current and future generations, as many of these plans will undoubtedly 
face insolvency down the road. As Jason Fitchner states “That's not good funding policy, no matter 
what the short-term fiscal gains are for companies and government coffers.”328Appendix 4 on page 
286 further discusses discount rates in the U.K., the Netherlands and the United States. 
3. Establishment of an Independent External Actuarial Oversight Board 
I argue that the best remedy to the systemic underfunding of private sector single employer defined 
benefit plans is the establishment of an actuarial oversight board comparable to the Canadian Public 
Accountability Board (CPAB) established in 2003 to regulate auditors. The issues surrounding the 
professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those that faced the auditing 
profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s (Gunz, McCutcheon and 
Reynolds 2009)
329
. Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving them susceptible to the 
conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on the one hand, and serving the 
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needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective may be to justify ways of 
spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent review of the U.S. 
actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another actuary to provide 
actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the actuary’s work product” 
(CRUSAP Task Force 2006)
330
.  
 
I propose that the Canadian Board’s mandate would be similar to the U.K. Actuarial Public 
Oversight Board (POB) established in 2005 “to promote more effective scrutiny and monitoring, to 
ensure that actuarial information is produced in accordance with the relevant technical and ethical 
standards, and to examine the current framework of self-regulation by the actuarial profession” with 
respect to potential issues such as:
331
 
 Professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited in range, and perceived as 
influenced by commercial interests. 
 An absence of proactive monitoring of members' compliance with professional standards. 
 A profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and slow to modernize. 
An independent actuarial oversight board could conduct detailed studies on how to best to govern 
actuaries’ discretion, addressing issues such as the current conflict of interest that surrounds 
actuaries as agents of employers. Such a board could conduct research on how to establish a 
common framework for estimating discount rates, promoting a common understanding amongst 
actuaries of how to improve the consistency of their estimates. In cases where there may be very 
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good reasons for actuaries using different discount rates in similar circumstances, a common 
framework for communicating such anomalies could be provided. 
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 examined the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuaries’ discretion, 
revealing that public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability 
of DB plans by permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates. For example, a 2% 
increase in the discount rate reduces an employer’s steady state pension contribution rate by a 
whopping 30-40%. Unfortunately, this policy has resulted in DB plan underfunding and 
insolvencies. The chapter concluded that mandating fixed rates (effectively eliminating actuaries’ 
discretion) would greatly increase the cost of funding DB plans, making them unaffordable for 
many employers. (Note that the argument being made in this thesis is that actuaries’ discretion is 
too broad; not that it should be curtailed completely). It proposed the establishment of an external 
oversight board to develop a common framework to improve the consistency of actuaries’ estimates 
of discount rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
 
CHAPTER 5 
IMPACT OF THE GOVERNANCE OF ACTUARIAL METHODS ON THE 
UNDERFUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS  
  
Overview 
Chapter 4 examined the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuaries’ discretion.  It 
revealed that public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability of 
DB plans by permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates to reduce employer 
funding requirements (For example, a 2% increase in the discount rate reduces an employer’s 
steady state pension contribution rate by a whopping 30-40%). The chapter concluded that 
mandating actuaries to use fixed discount rates would not be a viable legal remedy to DB plan 
underfunding, instead proposing the establishment of an independent external oversight board to 
develop a common framework to improve the consistency of discount rate estimates.  
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the funding of defined 
benefit pension plans. It examines asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the role of 
the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push under funding problems 
down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concludes by proposing the establishment an 
independent external oversight board to monitor the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods.  
1. Actuarial Assumptions 
In order to project the cost of a DB plan’s retirement benefits (liabilities), assumptions must be 
made regarding the timing of retirement and the probability of an individual remaining in the plan. 
Assumptions must also be made regarding the probabilities of the triggering events (e.g., 
disablement, death) in order to project utilization of ancillary benefits and other benefits payable 
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upon termination of employment. In addition, benefits payable to surviving spouses and domestic 
partners upon death of the participant in active service require assumptions regarding marital / 
domestic partner status during employment and spouse / domestic partner ages.  Examples of other 
actuarial assumptions are:
332
 
1. Assumptions regarding future salary increases must be made to determine the cost of 
benefits based on pay. 
2. Assumptions regarding post-retirement mortality rates must be made if benefits are 
payable in annuity form.  
3. In order to take into account a plan’s provisions regarding calculation of lump sum 
payments (if any), it may be necessary to make special interest rate and mortality 
assumptions as well as assumptions of what proportion of participants take lump sums and 
under what circumstances.  
4. Assumptions must be made regarding the discount rates used to convert a pension plan’s 
future income (returns on assets) and expenses (liabilities) into current year dollars for the 
actuarial valuation date.     
In other words, actuaries must project when and how pension benefits will be paid in the future. 
Specific examples of questions actuaries must answer are:
333
 
1. Considering today’s 70-year old retirees are promised payments for the rest of their (and 
perhaps their spouse’s) lifetime, “How long will they live?” and “How many years might 
their spouse survive them by?” 
 
2. Considering today’s 30 year-old active participants will earn benefits, terminate 
employment at a certain age, and receive payments for the rest of their lifetimes, “How long 
will 30-year olds work for their employer before their employment is terminated?” 
 
3. “How might a 30 year olds pay increase over time?” “When will he/she start to receive their 
retirement benefits?” “How long will he/she live after retirement?” 
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The actuary is required to use “methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted 
actuarial practice.”334 Actuarial assumptions, plan participant data and the benefit formula described 
in the pension plan text are all used to project future plan benefits. These assumptions can be 
categorized into two main categories: economic and demographic.  
A. Economic Assumptions
335
 
Economic assumptions are required to project the amount of benefits that will be payable to 
pensioners. They address the issue of how market forces will affect the cost of a plan. Some of the 
economic assumptions made by actuaries in valuing retirement benefits include: 
1. Interest rate for discounting future cash flows 
2. Rate of price inflation 
3. Rate of increase in salaries 
4. Rate of increase in pension payments 
5. Rate of increase in pension benefits for deferred pensioners 
6. Rate of increase in dividends/interest income from assets. 
 
Economic assumptions are a necessity in DB plan funding in order to predict the amount and timing 
of future cash flows. Their impact on asset and liability estimates is discussed in Appendix 5 on 
page 294.  
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335
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 B. Demographic Assumptions 
Demographic assumptions are about the participant group make-up and expected behaviour and life 
expectancy. They address the issue of how participant behavior will affect the cost of the plan and 
are required to project when benefits will be payable. Actuaries use rates (probabilities) to model 
the uncertainty of participant behavior. For example, because some participants will retire early, 
some will retire at age 65, and others will work to age 70, an actuary could make the assumption 
that each individual has some probability of retiring early, at 65, and also working to 70. Sometimes 
assumptions are the same for many plans (e.g., mortality rates) and sometimes assumptions are very 
specific to a given employer’s workforce (e.g., rates of terminating employment before 
retirement).
336
 Some typical demographic assumptions are:  
A. Withdrawal or termination assumptions address how long participants will continue to 
work for a specific employer. 
B. Mortality assumptions obviously address how long people will live. 
C. Retirement assumptions obviously address when participants retire and begin receiving 
benefits. 
D. Disability assumptions obviously address when participants become disabled and are no 
longer able to work. 
2. Pension Funding  
A. Pre-Funding 
Ari Kaplan notes that a pension plan must be “pre-funded” to ensure that funds are invested to 
meet plan obligations decades down the road. He states:  
This feature is “central to the regulatory scheme” established by the federal Pension 
Benefits Standards Act (the PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (the PBA.)  This 
pre-funding arrangement is what qualitatively distinguishes pension plans from other 
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forms of retirement compensation arrangements. The objective of “going-concern” and 
“solvency” funding is to ensure that contributions associated with defined benefit pension 
benefits are paid regularly and throughout the working life of the employee. These funds 
must be invested prudently to ensure the necessary funds will exist upon retirement to pay 
the pension and ancillary benefits promised in the plan text. The purpose of funding 
standards is to enhance the security of DB pension benefits by mandating minimum 
funding levels and regulating the timing of payments into pension funds.
337
 
The federal PBSA and the Ontario PBA funding rules exist to protect employees’ pension interests 
which are contingent on the liquidity of the employer at the time the pension is payable. The Court 
in Collins v. Pension Commission of Ontario (1986)
338
 asked, rhetorically:  
Who is more interested in the solvency of a pension plan than its members, who are either 
depending upon it as a source of income in their retirement years, or looking forward to the 
day when they will, or must? 
Statutory funding requirements apply almost exclusively to defined benefit pension plans, since a 
defined contribution (DC) pension plan is, in essence, fully funded once the employer’s normal 
contributions to the pension fund are remitted. In a defined benefit plan, the amount of an 
employer’s normal contribution is largely determined according to assumptions made by the plan 
actuary. These assumptions, as previously discussed, account for the demographics of the plan as 
well as economic and personnel factors, such as salary increases and expected investment returns.  
 In 2013 there were an estimated 10,000 and 6,000 private sector single employer DB and DC plans 
in Canada with an estimated 1.5 million and 900,000 members, respectively.
339
 DB assets were 
worth approximately $500 billion while DC assets represented an estimated $50 billion.
340
 The 
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overall funding position of DB plans deteriorated significantly between 2004 and 2008, with the 
vast majority (92%) of private pension plans being in a deficit position as at December 31, 2008. 
The average funding ratio decreased from 112% to 77% over the same period on a ‘without 
indexation’ basis and from 71% to 57% on a ‘with indexation’ basis.341 The aggregate funding 
shortfall exceeded $350 billion.
342
 
During the six month period from September 2008 to February 2009
343
 (after the North American 
stock market collapse), the typical DB pension plan lost approximately 20% of its assets’ value, 
measured on a market value basis. According to estimates performed by the consulting firm Mercer, 
71% and 92% of Canadian private occupational defined benefit pension plans were in a solvency 
deficit position at end of 2007 and 2008 respectively. Furthermore, almost 40% of defined benefit 
plans had solvency ratios under 70%, while over 70% of them had solvency ratios under 80% by 
2008 year end.
344
 
A typical pension fund in 2010 was funded at a level of approximately 80% (i.e. plan assets covered 
only 80% of plan liabilities), meaning that a plan needed to generate an investment return of about 
10% per annum over the next 5 years to eliminate such a liability. A plan funded at 70% required 
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eight years of double digit investment to remedy the deficit. Considering that the long-term best 
estimate of future returns for a balanced fund was reasonably estimated at around 6.5 % per annum 
(net of investment and administrative expenses), it seemed highly unlikely that improved 
investment returns could be relied on to correct the DB deficit situation in Canada.
345
  
Almost half of DB pensions were less than 80% funded in 2012. However, as discussed previously, 
2013 turned out to be a banner year for defined benefit pension plan sponsors as stock markets 
soared, long-term interest rates rose sharply, and the Canadian dollar weakened (increasing exports), 
resulting in the best level of improvement in the health of Canadian pension plans in more than a 
decade. Long-term Government of Canada bond yields, a key factor in calculating the liabilities of 
pension plans, ended the year at 3.2 per cent, up from 2.3 per cent at the beginning of the year. 
Mercer estimated that a one percentage point increase in long-term interest rates would reduce the 
liabilities of most pension plans by 10 per cent to 15 per cent. Only 6% of DB plans were less than 
80% funded in 2013. 
The Mercer pension health index, which tracks the funded status of a hypothetical defined benefit 
pension plan, started 2013 at 82 per cent, stood at 98 per cent on Sept. 30 and 106% on December 
31, the highest level since June 2001. Mercer estimated that almost 40 per cent of pension plans 
were fully funded at the end of 2013, compared with six per cent at the beginning of the year.
346
 
However, despite their improved funding status, DB plans are unlikely to reverse their declining 
membership numbers under the current funding model. Dave Ovsey of the Financial Post comments 
on the status of defined benefit plans in 2013: 
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But the damage has been done. After more than a decade of attempting to manage massive 
pension deficits, many DB plan sponsors are on a one-way track toward ridding themselves 
of pension risk. For most, this will mean executing a variety of de-risking tactics with the 
eventual goal of shifting toward pure defined contributions plans. For others — namely 
those who are up against the collective-bargaining power of trade unions — the alternative 
might be a DB-DC hybrid that will create a two-tiered system within the ranks of one 
organization. Still others will do away with a pension option altogether, preferring to offer 
(if anything at all) a group RRSP or something comparable.
347
 
B. Minimum Funding 
An employer establishing a pension plan for Canadian employees must fund the plan at a pace 
which, at a minimum, meets the requirements of the pension standard legislation applicable to its 
pension plan. The minimum funding requirements are determined from an actuarial valuation which 
must be carried out at least every three years. Annual actuarial valuations are generally required if 
triennial solvency (asset/liability) ratios are less than specific levels (i.e. around 90% in most 
jurisdictions).
348
 
The actuarial valuation involves comparing the value of plan assets with the value of the benefits 
(liabilities) that the plan is expected to pay in the future. The ratio of the value of plan assets to the 
value of plan liabilities is often referred to as the funding ratio or funding level. For example, a plan 
with assets worth $80 million and liabilities valued at $100 million will be said to have a funding 
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ratio or level of 80%. The minimum federal PBSA and Ontario PBA funding levels are calculated 
as follows:     
Minimum Funding =Normal costs +Unfunded Actuarial Liabilities (Actuarial Losses) 
The “normal cost” is the current cost of servicing or funding the pension benefits in a particular 
year, as determined by the plan actuary.  
The “unfunded actuarial liability” (or “special payment”) is a required contribution by an employer 
to liquidate any going-concern unfunded liability or any solvency deficiency. It consists of 2 main 
parts: 
1. Actuarial gains or losses-A pension plan has actuarial gains or losses each year because 
the actual events during the year (“experience”) do not exactly match the long-term actuarial 
projections made on the previous valuation date.  Gains or losses on plan assets occur 
because the actual investment returns were higher or lower than anticipated by the actuary. 
Gains or losses on actuarial liabilities can occur because long-term assumptions (e.g., 
mortality, salary increases, termination, retirement, etc.) were not met.  
2. Prior service liability – Prior service liability arises if the plan improves benefits for 
service already earned. It can arise when the plan is established (if participants are given 
credit for time served with the employer before the establishment of the plan) or when the 
plan is amended.  
Unfunded liabilities may be amortized by the employer over prescribed periods of time set by 
legislation.
349
    
C. The Role of the Pension Actuary 
Each pension plan must have an “administrator” who bears ultimate responsibility for the plan. This 
administrator (either the plan sponsor or a board of trustees) appoints the actuary and other 
professionals who are required for the smooth operation of the plan. Basically, the actuary acts as a 
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pension consultant to the administrator. The actuary is expected to prepare a valuation report using 
assumptions and methods which provide some contribution flexibility for the employer, but which 
also ensures that the pension fund will protect the future interests of the plan members. It is 
important to note that although the actuary can recommend certain actions to the administrator, he 
or she cannot compel the administrator to act.
350
  
The DB plan actuary conducts going concern and solvency tests as prescribed by the Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries and pension regulators (federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI) and Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) to ensure that the 
contribution rate is not less than that required by the Minimum Funding Ratio (MFR). Professor 
Ron Davis discusses actuarial funding: 
The difficulties inherent in pension funding can be illuminated by calculating the amount of 
money necessary to fund a benefit of $100 per month for the rest of a worker’s life after age 
65. It would be necessary to estimate the worker’s longevity after age 65 to determine the 
returns on any amount invested. The return on investment would vary with the type of 
investment or asset held and with the investment fees incurred.  The calculation would be 
further complicated by pension benefit formulae which are based on a percentage of the 
worker’s final salary or career average earnings. These earnings must be projected by the 
actuary using hypotheses about future earnings.
351
  
Although the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and provincial 
Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) regulate pension funding risk, there is always 
an element of discretion in actuarial valuations. Ron Davis describes the impact of actuarial 
discretion on funding estimates:  
Clearly, an actuary is in the business of forecasting. Even more clearly, given the number of 
variables involved, that forecast is primarily a product of the exercise of professional 
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judgment and discretion. Therefore, there is almost invariably a difference between the 
actual rates of earnings, retirement, and life expectancy experienced by the pension plan and 
the estimates of those rates provided by the plan’s actuary when calculating the cost or the 
funded status of the plan. This exercise of professional discretion is the first source of 
insolvency risk for the pension plan’s members. Unless the actuary uses relatively 
conservative assumptions, the plan’s members face the risk that minute variations in actual 
experience will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the 
plan sponsor will not be able to make them due to its insolvent status or the size of the 
payments will drive the plan sponsor into insolvency proceedings.
352
  
D. The Role of Asset Allocation Policy In Funding Risks  
 
A small increase or decrease in investment returns can play with havoc with actuarial estimates over 
time. Professor Ron Davis discusses the impact of equity investments on pension funding:  
For example, to pay a benefit of $100 per month for life starting in ten years, suppose the 
actuary estimates that it will take a total of $60,000, based on average life expectancy. The 
actuary then estimates how much must be contributed today to earn a total of $60,000 in ten 
years, based on the anticipated rate of return, and including the effect of compound interest 
from investing the pension contributions over that period. In making the calculation, the 
actuary takes into account the type of investments the plan makes by using a rate of earnings 
that includes an “equity premium” intended to reflect the common understanding that, over 
the long run, the return on equity investments will be greater than that generated by “risk-
free”353 fixed-income investments such as bonds. Thus, the greater the proportion of equities 
in the pension fund’s assets, the lower will be the initial pension contribution needed in the 
normal cost calculation the actuary performs.
354
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Davis continues that a report prepared by actuary Malcolm Hamilton estimates that a pension plan 
that seeks to replace 50 percent of preretirement income by investing in fixed-income government 
bonds requires a contribution rate of 23.8 percent of salary (Hamilton 2009). Hamilton notes: 
Most of today’s retirement plans, defined benefit and defined contribution alike, try to make 
good pensions affordable by investing 50% to 70% of the fund in risky assets thought to 
offer higher rates of return in the long term, albeit with commensurately higher risks. The 
objective is typically to increase the rate of return on the pension fund by about 2% net of 
fees and to use some combination of risk management, patience, fluctuating contribution 
rates (defined contribution plans), fluctuating benefits (defined benefit plans) or both 
(hybrid pension plans) to deliver an acceptable compromise between affordability and 
stability. Increasing the expected rate of return by 2% reduces the steady state contribution 
rate by about 40%. (Hamilton 2009) 
 
In other words, by investing pension assets in high risk equities, the actuarial estimate of investment 
returns will be higher than if the assets were invested in lower fixed rate bonds, thereby increasing 
projected pension income and reducing the level of employer contributions required to fund pension 
liabilities.  Davis continues: 
Critics of this practice focus on the bias toward equity investment created by the “equity 
premium,” arguing that there is no justification rooted in financial economics principles or 
research for using differing costs for a fixed obligation based on what form of investment 
one makes (see, for example, Bader and Gold 2003; Exley, Mehta, and Smith 2004; and 
Sutcliffe 2005). In their view, the practice of incorporating the equity investment premium 
into a pension’s cost calculations ignores the fact that the premium is the market price for 
the extra risk assumed by choosing equities over risk free investments. The result is that the 
potential for a pension asset shortfall is also increased by the proportion of equity assets in 
the pension fund. Despite this, in Ontario, the proportion of pension assets invested in 
equities has grown steadily, and at the end of 2008 stood at 60 percent (Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario 2009, 12-13), although the proportion declined slightly to 55 
percent in 2009 (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2010, 25-6).
355
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The funding of pension obligations through equity investments is also problematic because the 
volatility of such investments means their value moves up and down in an unpredictable manner, 
making it difficult for actuaries to project their value in any given funding period. In contrast, 
liabilities are generally steadily increasing in pension plans as employees’ years of service increase. 
This often results in underfunding due to a mismatch between a plan’s annual asset and liability 
values.
356
 Doug Andrews of Aon consulting discusses the merits of using equity risk premiums:
357
 
Within the last five years, there has been increasing attention directed to the choice of the 
investment return assumption. Proponents of the financial economics approach to 
assumption-setting have argued that defined benefit pension promises are similar to the 
issuance of a bond from the plan to the members. To ensure security of the promised 
benefits, the plan should value the liabilities with expected bond-like returns. Let us accept 
this logic, assume that liability values have been estimated using a bond-like interest rate, 
and turn to the asset component of the funded ratio. If there were assets equal in value to the 
liability estimate, and if those assets were invested to earn the assumed bond-like return, 
today’s liabilities would remain fully funded (ignoring any deviations from other 
assumptions). As a starting point in understanding future potential contribution requirements, 
sponsors and administrators should ask, ‘what are contributions expected to be if a 100 per 
cent bond investment philosophy is used?’ 
From this starting point, it is logical to ask, “Can the assets be invested to earn more than the 
expected bond-like returns?” Traditional wisdom is yes. Because there is additional risk 
assumed by an equity investor relative to a bond investor, (because the equity investor has a 
lower order entitlement to a company’s revenue), there must be an equity risk premium 
(ERP). In other words, if an investor could choose to invest in the equity or the debt of a 
company, the investor would only choose to invest in the equity if the investor expected to 
receive a higher return for receiving less security. If we accept this argument (and there are 
some who would object), what is the expected ERP? This is an important question for the 
sponsor and administrator to consider if they pursue an investment policy including equities 
(which is by far the most common investment approach).  
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So what is an appropriate ERP? There is a range of answers. Aon Consulting gathers 
information from more than 25 of Canada’s major institutional investment management 
firms, twice yearly, regarding their forecasts of returns on the major financial market indices 
for various time horizons, ranging from one to 10 years. The managers do not explicitly 
forecast the ERP. However, by comparing their forecasts of expected returns on the equity 
indices compared to the bond index, one observes a positive ERP which is implicit in their 
forecasts….Over a 10-year horizon, the implicit ERP is 2.2 per cent to four per cent. 
Conversations with investment managers suggest that a range for the long-term ERP of two 
per cent to four per cent is commonly quoted. 
Andrew notes that an examination of Canadian economic statistics compiled by the Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries indicates that the implied ERP for the 50-year period ending December 31, 
2003, is approximately 3.2 per cent, comfortably in the range suggested above. However, as we 
examine these statistics for shorter periods, such as 10 years, we note a much lower ERP in the 
more recent 10 year periods. For the 10-year period ending 2003, the ERP was approximately 0.1 
per cent.  Robert D. Arnott and Peter L. Bernstein have carried out research and written several 
papers regarding ERP. Although their research focuses on the U.S. financial markets, Arnott has 
suggested that similar results could be expected in Canada. The U.S. longer term history (50 years) 
shows an ERP of approximately five per cent. Their analysis suggests that expected real stock 
returns over the 10 year period ending 2012 will be 2.5 per cent. Bernstein writes, “the primary 
reason that the actualized equity risk premium has been so enormous in the years since 1954 is that 
the bond market went through repeated inflationary episodes that took bond investors by surprise.”  
A similar explanation may apply to the CIA data cited previously. Few investors expect inflationary 
episodes in the next 10 years. Where one believes the ERP will fall (in the range from four per cent 
to negative 0.8 per cent), it will significantly affect asset mix decisions. Bernstein suggests portfolio 
policies of “50/50 [equities and bonds] or no policy numbers at all, purely an opportunistic strategy 
based on no fixed opinions – at least until equity valuations change enough to reveal which asset 
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(stocks or bonds) will be the better performer in the long run”. In conclusion, Andrews suggests the 
following approach for sponsors and administrators considering an asset allocation policy:
358
 
1. Understand the value of liabilities using bond-like rates. 
2. In making asset-liability projections, use as a starting point a 100 per cent bond allocation. 
The characteristics of the bond portfolio should ideally match the characteristics of the 
liabilities as closely as possible, particularly in areas such as duration, inflation sensitivity, 
and cash flows. 
3. When considering other asset allocations, understand the implicit ERP.  
4. Test a variety of ERP assumptions to understand the potential variability of results and the 
impact on financial position. 
5. If you are not satisfied with the results, do further analyses considering alternative asset 
classes. 
In 2003 a task force of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries was established to review the standards 
for pension funding in actuarial practice. It concluded that 10 percent should be added to the 
employee/employer contribution amount if a pension fund invested 50 percent or more in equities, 
in order to account for the potential of an “unacceptable deterioration in the plan’s funded status” 
because of the high degree of risk of an asset-liability mismatch. (Canadian Institute of Actuaries 
2003, 9-10). However, this recommendation has not been legislated to date.
359
 
The potential for equity investments to contribute to the rapid deterioration of plan funding has 
been recognized in at least one jurisdiction in Canada. In the province of Quebec a pension plan 
must provide for adverse returns on equity investments by holding additional funds in reserve, over 
and above the amount required to pay for the plan’s outstanding liabilities. Section 128 of the 
Supplemental Pension Plans Act
360
 states:  
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At the date of the actuarial valuation to which the pension plan is subject, a reserve must be 
established equal to the lesser of the following amounts: 
(1) The amount of the actuarial gains determined in the valuation. 
(2) The amount of the provision for adverse deviation calculated in accordance with the 
regulations. 
 
The amount of the actuarial gains corresponds to the amount by which the plan’s assets exceed the 
plan’s liabilities. 361This reserve fund is based on the ratio of fixed-income assets to the total assets 
of the pension fund (Regulation Respecting Supplemental Pension Plans, s. 60.04).
362
 Since the 
implementation of the reserve requirement, the number of private DB pension plans declined from 
2010 to 2012, while the number of members rose from 2011 to 2012.
363
 The verdict is still out on 
the effectiveness of these plans based on such limited data. 
The Quebec government proposed a new strategy in 2013 to begin resolving the 26 billion dollar 
deficit of the province’s private sector DB pension plans, covering approximately one million 
members (half of them already retired). Quebec Labour Minister Agnes Maltais stated: 
Defined-benefit pension plans are in danger. … These are the best pension plans available to 
workers, and we need to protect them. We have no choice. We have to settle this problem. 
The status quo is no longer possible. 
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Ms. Maltais said she will table two bills in 2014, one to set the conditions for workers and 
employers to negotiate how to resolve their companies’ pension deficits, and another to define the 
financial terms to ensure the solvency of defined-benefit plans. The Quebec government’s proposal 
to ease the financial troubles of private DB pension plans gave workers and employers until 
December, 2014, to negotiate a solution for their company. If talks fail, they will have another six 
months with the help of a conciliator. If they reject the conciliator’s report, the province’s labour 
relations board will determine a final agreement. 
The government will also make it mandatory for workers and employers each to bear half of the 
costs of pensions in the future. Rules will also be changed to provide more flexible and less costly 
ways for companies to replenish the capital in their pension plans to prevent insolvency and protect 
benefits in closings or bankruptcies. The province is hoping these changes will encourage 
companies to stay with defined benefit plans rather than adopting pensions with fewer benefits. 
The government plans to hold consultations in 2014 with labour organizations, employer 
associations, retirees and a coalition of student and young unionized workers on the proposed 
private pension plan changes. Labour groups also applauded the initiative but criticized the 50/50 
cost-sharing and the plan to give more powers to the labour relations board.
364
 
The legislative measures introduced to achieve full funding in Quebec have caught the attention of 
actuaries and lawyers in other Canadian jurisdictions advising provinces on pension reform. Dan 
Ovsey of the Financial Post comments:  
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Outside of New Brunswick,
365
 Alberta and B.C. appear to be the most progressive on this 
front and are seen as the mostly likely to be first to enact the needed legislation. Ontario is 
on a similar track but has been in a holding pattern for the past year. Meanwhile, Quebec 
has seen the implementation of target-benefit plans but these have been limited to the pulp 
and paper sector. Curiously, Ontario’s prospective pension-legislation reform would restrict 
target-benefit plans to unionized workplaces…366 
Professor Keith Ambachtsheer argues that investing in equities directly challenges the risk bearing 
model that underlies Canada’s pension funding regulation:  
The greater the asset shortfall, and/or the greater the liability/asset mismatch, the riskier the 
pension contract becomes. It follows directly from this conclusion that funding policy and 
investment policy in [defined-benefit] plans are intimately linked. Both have a direct 
impact on the riskiness of pension contracts. Further, more risk exposure from 
one source can be offset by less risk exposure from the other, and vice-versa” (2007, 
208). 
In short, the risk that is currently carried on pension fund balance sheets in Canada has not 
been clearly articulated in defined-benefit pension plans. As a result, most plan members 
naively believe that the current regulatory arrangements are designed to guarantee full 
funding under the current formula for contribution rates (Ambachtsheer 2007, 11).  This 
belief is simply false.
367
 
Ambachtsheer notes that accepting that this guarantee, in fact, does not exist is thus the starting 
point for a discussion about what changes should be implemented. Options could include improving 
pension regulation, addressing the risks through the insolvency law regime, and implementing some 
form of pension benefit insurance. However, there will be no incentive to start a dialogue about 
reform unless all involved agree that the current system does not offer a guarantee to those 
involved.
368
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E. Impact of Adopting Mark to Market Valuation Principles  
Scot Blythe of Benefits Canada discusses why actuarial pension valuations for publicly traded 
companies are now being reported on a mark to market basis in Canada:
369
 
In the pension fund world, accounting rules sometimes attract more attention than actuarial 
valuations. That’s because, at least among DB pension plans in the private sector, funding 
results are applied to the bottom line—but only in an approximate fashion. 
Let’s say the plan’s valuation assumes an 8% return on assets. Markets go down? No matter: 
amortize that loss over a reasonable number of years. A company looks healthy and can 
even include pension gains on its income statement—even if the pension fund has 
performed dismally when it comes to meeting its long-term actuarial liabilities. 
We saw this scenario play out in the auto sector during the Great Recession, when some 
companies—weighed down, in part, by future pension and benefits obligations—went 
through a forced-march bankruptcy as optimistic assumptions on asset returns disguised 
how dreadful the balance sheet really was. The balance sheet (a company’s assets and 
liabilities) is often less visible than its income statement [a company’s annual profit and loss 
(P&L) summary]. And that annual P&L summary can gloss over long-term liabilities, since 
only a portion is recognized (or amortized) each year. 
The change in accounting rules, which came into effect for Canada on Jan. 1, 2011, will not affect 
how pension plans are funded, as the current pension funding regulations remain in effect. Hvroje 
Lakota of Mercer Canada noted that “At the end of the day, the objective of funding is benefit 
security. Accounting has nothing to do with that. Pension accounting is figuring out how an 
organization should recognize the cost of its benefits plan in its financial statements. But it may 
have an impact on how pension funds invest, since what was always there in the footnotes to 
earnings statements will become more transparent.”370 
The move to mark to market means two things under International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). First, it eliminates the “smoothing” of investment gains and losses; essentially, waiting for 
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markets to pick up and trend toward their expected value. Second, it transfers gains and losses from 
the income statement to the balance sheet, where they are recognized as an impact on retained 
earnings and, ultimately, on shareholder equity.
371
 
Prior to 2011, most Canadian publicly traded companies were required to follow the rules of the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook Section 3461 (CICA 3461) for purposes of 
reflecting their pension plans in their corporate financial statements. CICA 3461 encouraged, or at 
least did not discourage, assuming DB pension risk. Canadian pension accounting standards were 
viewed as one of the barriers to employers reducing their pension risk. These barriers included the 
ability to defer and amortize experience gains and losses, the inclusion of expected additional 
returns from risky assets in the expected return on assets (EROA) calculation, and the ability to use 
a smoothed value of assets to calculate the EROA. The adoption of International Accounting 
Standards Section 19 (IAS 19), which “mark pension plans to market” in the employer’s financial 
statements, means that these barriers to de-risking should eventually be removed.
372
 IAS 19 
eliminates the following barriers to de-risking: 
1. IAS 19 requires that the fair value of plan assets be used to calculate the EROA and the use 
of a smoothed value of plan assets going forward is no longer permitted. 
                                                             
371 Ibid. 
372
 At its November 2011 meeting, the AcSB considered factors for and against the development of a stand-
alone fair value measurement standard for private enterprises and decided not to proceed with the project at 
that time. The AcSB concluded that the need for such a standard is less acute for Part II of the Handbook 
than it was for IFRSs, given the different focus of financial statement users in this sector and the current view 
that the existing guidance in Part II for determining the fair value of an item is satisfactory. The AcSB further 
concluded that any decision to develop a Part II standard based on IFRS 13 should be made only after that 
IFRS has been in place for a time and experience has been gained with its application. The AcSB will review 
this experience and reconsider the need for a corresponding standard for private enterprises at a later 
date.The AcSB and the Private Enterprise Advisory Committee noted that private enterprises that need more 
guidance on fair value measurement than that currently included in Part II may (but are not required to) refer 
to IFRS 13 as an “other source of GAAP.”(Deloitte, Center for Corporate Governance Canada, “Financial 
Instruments”.  (Online:< www.corpgov.deloitte.com/site/CanEng/financial-reporting >.) 
 160 
 
2. IAS19 requires employers to recognize gains and losses immediately on their corporate 
balance sheet (through other comprehensive income), better reflecting financial risk as plans 
are “marked to market” on the balance sheet. (However, as of 2011employers adopting IAS 
19 still had the option of continuing to defer and amortize experience gains and losses).
373
 
On Jan. 1, 2013 the following revisions to IAS 19 further reduced barriers to de-risking which have 
been historically embedded in public companies’ pension accounting standards: 
1. Revised IAS19 required the immediate recognition on the balance sheet of all 
changes to pension plan surpluses or deficits (i.e., deferral and amortization of 
experience gains and losses will no longer be permitted). 
2. The annual pension cost must be calculated assuming that the annual expected rate 
of return on pension plan assets is equal to the liability discount rate, which is based 
on high quality corporate bond yields (i.e., the pension cost reflected in the 
employer’s profit and loss statement will no longer anticipate incremental returns 
from risky assets). Any incremental investment returns due to the investment in risky 
assets that actually emerge over time will be recognized on the corporate balance 
sheet (through other comprehensive income) once the incremental returns are 
actually earned.
374
 
F. Actuarial Standards of Practice 
The federal PBSA states: 
(3) The employer shall file with the Superintendent any information required by or under the 
regulations at any intervals or times that the Superintendent directs. 
 (3.1) Except as otherwise specified by the Superintendent, 
(a) the actuarial reports must be prepared in accordance with the standards of practice 
adopted by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries;  
 
The Ontario PBA states:  
16. (1) An actuary preparing a report under section 70 of the Act or under section 3, 13 or 14 
shall use methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted actuarial practice and 
with the requirements of the Act and this Regulation. O. Reg. 144/00, s. 11; O. Reg. 178/12, s. 16 
(1). 
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(4.1) A person preparing a report under subsection (1) or (2) shall use actuarial cost methods 
and assumptions, 
(a) that include a benefit allocation method or a cost allocation method; and  
(b) that are consistent with section 3000 of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of 
Practice, available to the public from the Canadian Institute of Actuaries at Suite 800, 
150 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 1P1 or electronically on its website. O. Reg. 
116/09, s. 2. 
 
In other words, both the PBSA and the PBA defer to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) for 
their actuarial funding standards. All DB pension reports and calculations must be prepared by a 
Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (a self-regulating, professional body) in accordance 
with its standards of accepted actuarial practice. On January 1, 2011 the CIA changed its standards 
to improve the transparency of actuarial valuations. These updates affect how actuaries determine 
assumptions, apply actuarial methods and prepare their reports for all funding actuarial valuations. 
Phillip Morse of Benefits Canada discusses the details of the new standards: 
The new CIA standards require that the actuary’s work should take account of the 
circumstances of the work, including whether the work pertains to advice on the funded 
status of the plan, advice on the funding of the plan, any applicable laws, the policies of any 
regulators with jurisdiction on the work of the actuary, and the terms of the engagement 
between the actuary and the plan administrator. In its most simplified form, the actuary 
needs to know how the work will be used. This new standards create a greater need for the 
plan administrator and actuary to make the terms of the actuary’s engagement more 
transparent.
375
  
 
 
Solvency and hypothetical windup valuation reports are impacted as follows:
376
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1. The report must now contain a reconciliation of the gains and losses for the plan on a 
solvency or hypothetical windup basis for the period since the prior valuation, unless such 
reconciliation was reported on a going concern basis. 
2. The report must disclose the hypothetical windup position under the scenario following plan 
windup which maximizes the RPP’s benefits/liabilities on windup; 
3. The actuary must determine an “incremental cost,” a prescribed calculation showing the 
estimated change in solvency or hypothetical windup liability between the valuation date 
and the expected ensuing valuation date; and 
4. Required disclosure of the sensitivity of solvency or hypothetical windup valuation results, 
through determination of the impact that a 1% decrease in the discount rates would have. 
5. Going concern valuation assumptions are to be best-estimate assumptions, no longer 
requiring margins for conservatism, except as required by law or by the engagement. 
6. The actuary may no longer assume additional potential returns from active investment 
management unless the actuary can support, based on relevant data, that such incremental 
returns will be “consistently and reliably earned over the long term” 
7. Required disclosure of the sensitivity of going concern valuation results, through 
determination of the impact that a 1% decrease in the discount rate would have. 
8. Changes in the actuarial cost method or asset smoothing method must now be accompanied 
by an explanation of the rationale for and the impact of the change. 
G. Actuarial Discretion 
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions focused on the issue of actuarial discretion and its 
impact on the transparency of valuations, especially in connection with going concern valuations 
(solvency parameters are mostly legislated) discussed in Chapter 3. The following 
recommendations were made by the Commission to improve funding transparency:
377
 
1. The Superintendent should work with the Canadian Institute of Actuaries to ensure that 
actuarial standards and practices continue to evolve in the direction of greater transparency 
and more structured discretion. For example, actuarial valuations should reveal whether the 
sponsor intends to take a contribution holiday. [Note that whether or not a sponsor takes a 
contribution holiday (a reduction or suspension of normal cost payments) is currently 
undetectable in an actuarial valuation, as it is not factored into the contribution schedule. 
The rules currently require a valuation to identify surplus in a plan, which would permit it to 
take a contribution holiday; however, the rules do not require disclosure of whether that 
holiday has actually been factored into the proposed three-year schedule of contributions.] 
2. The Superintendent should have the power to require that plans cease using assumptions 
that are unreasonable or that depart materially from accepted actuarial practice, and to order 
an independent valuation or peer review of a report, at the expense of the plan, if there are 
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grounds to believe that the actuarial valuation misrepresents a material factor in its funding. 
[This recommendation has been adopted by both the PBSA and the PBA].  
3. Smoothing Calculations  
Overview 
Professor Ron Davis notes that a technique called smoothing has been incorporated into actuarial 
practice in Canada to insulate employers from sharp fluctuations in the values of DB pension assets 
and liabilities, and the resulting plan contributions required to meet funding obligations. However, 
smoothing methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined by actuarial 
practice. Consequently, the potential exists for smoothing to be used to opportunistically hide 
funding problems. More importantly, smoothing can detract from a clear understanding of a plan’s 
funded position if it is not fully explained in a valuation report so pension members are capable of 
understanding the true risk inherent in their pension contract.
378
    
Smoothing is essential to DB plans because it helps stabilize member and employer contribution 
rates. It is one of the reasons that DB plans were not compelled to drastically increase contributions 
after the huge investment losses on the stock market in 2008. Smoothing enables sponsors to make 
payments over a number of years rather than in the current year (which would be required under 
normal funding circumstances). An example of smoothing is outlined below: 
Suppose in a given set of years DB plan investments earned an annual return in of 30% in 
Year 1, then lost 10 percent in Year 2, then repeated this pattern for several more years. It 
would be tempting to increase or decrease…. plan contributions in reaction to a single-year 
performance. However, actuaries employ smoothing methods so that the gains and losses in 
a single year are evened out over a number of years. This steadies the contribution rates 
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required by the fund, allowing better planning by both employers and employees. It also 
allows investment managers to create better long-term funding plans.
379
 
 
A.  PBSA  
The federal government recently implemented an extension of smoothing techniques to apply to the 
calculation of solvency deficiencies (funding shortfalls) in defined benefit pension plans.
380
  
Professor Ron Davis discusses the PBSA’s new smoothing techniques:381 
 
Prior to July 1, 2010, actuaries calculated the solvency status of a plan every three years by 
comparing the value of the assets in the pension fund to that of its liabilities on the date of 
valuation. A ratio of .8, for example, means that the value of assets is 80% of the liabilities 
and, if a plan is terminated with that ratio, members and retirees could expect a 20% 
reduction in their benefits. Employers were formerly required to make special payments 
sufficient to raise the solvency ratio to 1 over the following 5 years, based on the funded 
status of the plan determined via a triennial actuarial valuation.       
 
Amendments have recently been legislated under the federal PBSA allowing actuaries to 
“average” solvency deficiency ratios over the previous three years in the calculation of a 
plan’s minimum funding requirements (Pension Benefits Standards Act Regulations, 1985, 
9(8)). Furthermore, solvency valuations must now be conducted every year in plans under 
federal jurisdiction. In other words, the special payments required if there is solvency 
deficiency (funding shortfall) is determined by the average of the current solvency ratio and 
that of the previous two years. This change could lead to a plan never being fully funded, as 
the average-of-ratios calculation might generate special payments that never quite 
extinguish the existing liability. For example, if the ratios for three years are 1, .9 and .8, the 
average ratio would be .9 and special payments would be calculated to raise the ratio to 1 
over the next five years. The following year, the ratios for three years could be .9, .8 and .82, 
while the average ratio would be .84, and, again, special payments would be calculated to 
raise the ratio to 1 over the next five years, and so on.  
Davis notes that this reform of pension funding rules is based on the implicit assumption that the 
volatility of equity values is not a random event; rather, equity values will revert to some ever 
increasing average value over time. The federal Department of Finance stated in a news release that 
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this new solvency funding standard “will mitigate the effects of short-term fluctuations in the value 
of plan assets and liabilities on solvency funding requirements.” 382 In other words, a reduction in 
the level of payments required to extinguish a pension fund shortfall is permitted because it is only 
an “aberration,” or temporary departure from the “true” or “normal” value of the equity investment, 
which will correct itself with the passage of time. However, critics claim that there is no empirical 
or theoretical evidence to justify such an assumption (see, Bader and Gold 2003, 9; Sutcliffe 2005, 
64-7).  University of Texas Law School Professor Henry Hu recently stated: 
… whether equity returns follow an ever-increasing trajectory with only temporary 
aberrations or are truly random and whether investing over longer time horizons allows an 
investor to capture the “average” returns are hotly contested in both financial economics and 
the investment industry (2000, 823-36).The problem occurs not when individuals or 
investment managers defer to these beliefs in their investment decisions, but when 
governments and regulators promote a particular belief, either expressly or implicitly.
383
 
There continues to be much debate over whether these new federal solvency rules (which 
effectively reduce current employer DB contributions) are based on fact or fiction. Only time will 
tell. 
Strengthening Federal Funding Rules 
A number of other provisions were also enacted in 2010 to strengthen federal pension funding rules. 
Sponsors can no longer amend their pension plan to increase benefits if the funded ratio of the plan 
is, or would fall, below a prescribed ratio (Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, 10.1). 
Furthermore, the amount of surplus that a pension fund may hold without facing penalties under 
income tax regulation was increased from 10 percent to 25 percent in order to address the volatility 
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of asset values and increase the security of members’ pension benefits (Income Tax Act, 147.2(2) 
(d)). Finally, employers are no longer permitted to suspend making normal cost contributions (i.e. 
taking contribution holidays) until the funding ratio of the plan reaches 105 percent (Pension 
Benefits Standards Act Regulations, 1985, 9(5)).
384
 
B. OSFI 
 
Pursuant to subsections 9(2) and 12(3.1) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 (“PBSA”) the 
federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions has specified that the following 
regulations will apply to the valuation of assets used in respect of solvency valuations for actuarial 
reports with effective dates from November 1, 2008:
385
  
Paragraph (a) of the definition of “solvency deficiency” contained in section 9 of the 
Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985 (“PBSR”) refers to the valuation of assets for 
actuarial valuations of federally-registered pension plans. The PBSR permits the use of a 
value of plan assets determined on the basis of a value related to the market value by means 
of a method using market values over a period of not more than five years to stabilize short-
term fluctuations, often referred to as an asset smoothing method. An asset valuation 
method, defined as either the market value or an asset smoothing method, must be used 
consistently for a period of at least three years in actuarial reports covering this period.  
If an asset smoothing method is used, the resulting asset value must not exceed 110% of the 
market value of plan assets at the same date. (Specification with respect to the Solvency 
Funding Relief Regulations, 2009) With respect to actuarial reports with effective dates 
from November 1, 2008 to October 31, 2009 that were prepared in accordance with and for 
the purposes of the Solvency Funding Relief Regulation, 2009 (2009 Regulations), the 
following may be used in lieu of the valuation of assets specified under the PBSR General 
Specification, provided that the conditions and restrictions set out herein are met. For this 
purpose, the asset value resulting from the use of an asset smoothing method must not 
exceed 115% of the market value of plan assets at the same date. However, the actuarial 
report must disclose the special payments that would be required for the period covered by 
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the report if the asset value was limited under the PBSR General Specification, as well as 
the special payments required on the basis of the 2009 Regulations Specification. 
In essence, these new regulations restrict an actuary’s’ ability to smooth asset values in any given 
valuation year by limiting both the number of years over which smoothing can occur (5) and  the 
percentage increase in  the plan’s asset value due to smoothing (10).  
Strengthening Provincial Funding Rules 
The provinces have also legislated solvency funding relief for sponsors of provincially regulated 
defined benefit pension plans. The most common relief was the amortization of funding deficits 
over a 10 year period, instead of the usual 5 years.  This will significantly reduce the required 
employer contributions in the short term.  
FSCO 
The Financial Services Commission of Ontario enforces the following principles in regulating   
asset smoothing methods used in solvency valuations in Ontario
386
.    
1. The method should be consistent with the current actuarial practice in Canada, i.e., the 
guidelines on asset smoothing methods as set out in the Educational Note issued by the 
Canadian Institute of Actuaries.  
2. The method should have the effect of stabilizing the short-term fluctuations in the market 
value of the plan assets.  
3. The method should be appropriate for the circumstances of the plan;  
4. Once an asset smoothing method is adopted for a valuation, it must be applied consistently 
in future valuations unless otherwise justified by the circumstances of the plan (e.g. where 
the plan is merged with another plan); and  
5. The report should describe the method in sufficient detail so as to enable another actuary to 
follow the development of the smoothed asset value.  
6. FSCO’s current policy is that it does not intend to impose a limit on the deviation between 
the smoothed asset value and the actual market value. However, it states   
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“The actuary who prepares a report should apply his or her professional judgment as to 
whether it is appropriate to impose a limit in light of the circumstances of the plan.” (In 
other words, the limits on smoothing are left to the discretion of the actuary.) 
Is Smoothing a Legitimate Funding Tool? 
Smoothing assets and liabilities clearly has no impact on the total value of a DB plan’s liabilities, 
which are a function of economic (i.e. inflation) and demographic (i.e. longevity) factors (i.e. 
inflation). However, smoothing may impact the value of assets required to fund liabilities, 
depending on the rate of return on deferred contributions compared to the rate of return on assets in 
the year the liability was originally incurred. In other words, a sponsor will ultimately have to meet 
his or her plan’s total liabilities, regardless of whether or not deferred contributions are higher or 
lower than if the liability was totally funded in the year it was incurred (i.e. no smoothing).
387
 The 
key argument in favour of smoothing is that it provides greater certainty to the sponsor in terms of 
planning contributions because large funding swings in any given year are spread over a number of 
years. 
In a situation where funding deteriorates over time due to economic and demographic factors (e.g. 
structurally lower asset returns, lower bond yields, improved longevity, aging workforce), 
smoothing simply delays the recognition of this trend. In other words, a smoothed discount rate 
reduces the transparency of the pure “marked-to-market” funded position at a particular point in 
time and may slow down the recovery of funding levels. This is not problematic where the sponsor 
is healthy and can eventually catch up with higher contributions. However, in the case of a weak 
sponsor, delaying bad news will inevitably cause members to run elevated sponsor credit risk and 
by the time the deterioration is fully recognized, it may be too late for trustees to take preventative 
steps. In the event the sponsor does eventually fail, the final deficit may be much higher than it 
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would have been, had an unsmoothed approach been used with more proactive risk management 
along the way. Equally, smoothing will delay recognition of a steadily improving funded position 
due to secular factors (i.e. much stronger than expected equity returns, unexpectedly high bond 
yields etc.).  
Proponents of smoothing argue that short term fluctuations in markets are just noise which adds no 
value and at worst distorts pension fund decision making which should be long- term. The reality is 
that it is impossible to know, other than with the benefit of hindsight, whether an improvement or 
deterioration in funding is short term noise or part of a long-term trend. It would obviously be 
preferable to have all DB plans fully funded based on market derived assets and liability valuations. 
However, if the smoothing of funding requirements ultimately gives sponsors more time to meet 
their liabilities in difficult economic times, it is certainly an option that merits consideration in lieu 
of certain insolvency.
388
 Cardano Inc., a U.K. risk management consulting company, comments on 
smoothing: 
One of the arguments commonly used to support smoothing is that financial markets are 
volatile and potentially prone to ‘over shooting’ on both the up and down sides. A smoothed 
approach, it is argued, gives a more realistic reflection of the pension fund’s long-term 
health, which surely does not fluctuate on a day to day basis? We believe that the weight of 
academic and empirical evidence firmly supports the ‘market value’ approach over the 
‘smoothed value’ approach. There are many good reviews of the academic literature and we 
do not intend to cover these arguments in this document. 
However, we do want to point out that probably the single most important differentiator 
between well and poorly funded DB schemes in the UK today is the speed and enthusiasm 
with which they understood mark to market valuation of the liabilities and adjusted their 
investment strategies accordingly. Those pension funds that embraced mark to market 
liability valuation understood that they were running interest rate and inflation risks and 
generally took steps to manage these risks. On the other hand, those trustees who objected to 
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mark to market valuations were also slow to accept that they are running interest rate and 
inflation risk and generally did very little about it. The slow adopters suffered far greater 
deterioration in their funding position over the last decade than their more technically 
advanced peers. 
We believe that it makes sense for pension funds to hedge the vast majority of their interest 
rate and inflation risk under most circumstances. An unhedged interest rate (or inflation) 
position only makes sense if one believes that interest rates (or breakeven inflation) will rise 
(fall) by more than what is already priced in by markets. We believe that it is difficult for 
anyone, let alone pension fund trustees, to form a consistently superior view on these 
complicated macro-economic variables than the market. By taking less interest rate and 
inflation risk, pension funds potentially have the ability to take more risk elsewhere in their 
portfolio, in areas where there is a stronger economic rationale for being rewarded. 
Cardano concludes that the reality is that market volatility does not have to result in volatile funding 
ratios and deficits. By using tried and tested risk management techniques, pension funds can 
navigate their way through volatile financial markets and control the impact that market volatility 
has on their funding ratio and deficits. However, because risk management uses market tools, it 
requires mark to market valuation to operate effectively.  Risk management is made much more 
difficult and is, in fact, disincentivised if assets and liabilities are smoothed…. 389 In short, the more 
smoothing, the less risk management. 
4. Establishment of an Independent External Oversight Board 
An independent external actuarial oversight board could be established “to promote more effective 
scrutiny and monitoring to ensure that actuarial information is produced in accordance with the 
relevant technical and ethical standards, and also to examine the current framework of self-
regulation by the actuarial profession” with respect to potential issues such as:390 
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 Professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited in range, and perceived as 
influenced by commercial interests. 
 An absence of proactive monitoring of members' compliance with professional standards. 
 A profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and slow to modernize 
In particular, an oversight board could monitor the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods 
by mandating that:
391
  
1. actuaries make effective use of models to complement the use of spreadsheets, the application of   
which can vary widely from one actuary to another, with due recognition of the power and 
limitations of the models used. 
 
2. actuaries are directed to the needs of users and measures are taken to ensure that the reliability 
    and usefulness of estimates are proportionate to the benefit they provide. (i.e. actuaries are not 
    unduly constrained by financial and other restrictions). 
 
3. actuaries incorporate checks on the reliability and usefulness of data with full and clear 
   documentation, ensuring that the results are capable of being checked and reproduced by 
   other actuaries. 
 
4. actuaries incorporate robust criteria for: 
 
- selecting assumptions which incorporate findings from theoretical and empirical 
  research based on past experience and current market information; 
- ensuring consistent treatment in the model of different measures such as assets 
  and liabilities; 
- recognizing and exploring risk and uncertainty; and 
- analysing model outputs against expectations. 
 
5. there is effective and continuing review within and outside the profession of the 
   methods used, so as to encourage innovative, transparent and consistent approaches. 
 
6. actuaries meet technical standards which are principles-based and outcomes-focused and 
    which promote the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods 
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Conclusion 
Chapter 5 discussed the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the underfunding of 
defined benefit pension plans. It examined asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the 
role of the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push DB funding 
problems down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concluded by proposing that an 
independent external oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and usefulness of 
actuarial methods in Canada.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE OF ACTUARIAL SURPLUS ON DEFINED BENEFIT 
PENSION PLAN FUNDING 
 
Overview 
Chapter 5 discussed the impact of the governance (by legislators, regulators (Ontario PBA and 
federal PBSA), and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries) of actuarial methods on the underfunding 
of defined benefit pension plans, revealing that governance of these methods has only served to 
push DB funding problems the road, in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concluded by 
proposing that an independent oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and 
usefulness of actuarial methods in Canada.  
Chapter 6 examines the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding 
that Canadian courts’ surplus policy (from the “Dominion Stores” case in 1986 to Manitoba 
Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting 
underfunding and insolvencies.  
Pension Lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that no issue in recent history has been more divisive and 
polarized in the governance of defined benefit pension plan funding than actuarial surplus, 
continuing that surplus ownership, use and distribution have dominated the pension landscape both 
judicially and politically.
392
 As discussed in Chapter 5, asymmetry (i.e. employers are responsible 
for funding deficits but have limited access to surplus) has been a major barrier to the funding of 
DB plans.
393
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The funded status of a defined benefit pension plan is in a constant state of flux due to its 
dependence on a number of variables. For example, rising investment returns increase a plan’s 
funded status while falling returns lower it.
394
 During the 1980s and 1990s (in times of high 
investment returns) much of the pension funding debate centered around which parties had legal 
rights to pension surpluses (also coined “actuarial errors”). The 1994 Supreme Court of Canada 
landmark decision Schmidt v. Air Products ([1994] 2 S.C.R. 611) referred to the distinction 
between “actual” surplus and “actuarial” surplus, stating that during the ongoing operation of a 
pension plan, a surplus is simply an actuarial number, only becoming actual or certain upon the 
wind-up of a plan. Since the 2000 stock market collapse, the pension debate has shifted to pension 
deficits. The court in Schmidt characterized deficits as follows: 
An on-going pension plan may have an actuarial deficit that will go up and down as 
actuarial assumptions, economic conditions, and the experience of the pension plan change 
whereas an actuarial deficit becomes “actual” or certain only upon wind-up of the pension 
plan.  In other words, it is only upon wind-up that the extent of the underfunding and the 
impact on plan members is determined. 
395
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Courts have been applying classic trust principles to actuarial surplus ownership issues since 
Schmidt (1994),
396
 making it extremely difficult for both employers and employees to freely access 
surplus in an ongoing plan. In Schmidt, the Court decided that pension trusts are classic trusts, and 
not trusts for purpose.
397
 (Classic trusts hold funds for the benefit of specified persons and not for a 
general purpose like building a hospital in which the trust expires once the hospital is built). The 
1994 Schmidt decision was to have profound implications for actuarial surplus cases, some of 
which were not likely foreseen by the court. In deciding that pension trusts were analogous to 
classic trusts, the Court mandated that the law of trusts, which developed over hundreds of years in 
Britain, would apply to all pension trusts in Canada.
398
 
The plan documents that legally create both the plan and its pension fund should establish the 
authority for ownership of any surpluses that may occur in defined benefit plans. However, research 
by Normand Gendron of Benefits Canada revealed that many originating documents drafted in the 
1940s, ’50s and ’60s did not anticipate the litigious environment that has developed in Canada over 
the past several decades and as such, did not preserve the employer’s right to surplus ownership 
indefinitely, while other documents contain language indicating that surplus assets are for the 
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exclusive benefit of the plan members.
399
 These historical documents giving members rights to 
surpluses have discouraged sponsors from maintaining surpluses, promoting minimum funding. 
Sponsors and members, respectively, make the following arguments regarding surplus 
ownership:
400
  
Plan sponsor’s argument – We support the risk of funding shortfalls through deficiency 
amortization payments. We should therefore benefit from any surplus (the positive side of that risk).  
Plan member’s argument – Employer contributions are really deferred wages. All funds in the 
pension plan, therefore, belong to us.  
In 2008 Gendron proposed the following legislative and regulatory amendments to address these 
surplus ownership issues:
401
 
1) The government should introduce legislation to ensure that pension plans are interpreted 
under contract law as opposed to trust law. Under contract law, a general power of 
amendment would allow an employer to amend the plan in respect of surplus ownership. 
Since surplus ownership would not be governed by classic trust law principles, surplus 
ownership would not be established at the time that the trust was originally established. 
402
 
2) Pension plan regulation should be clear on surplus ownership and how it will be 
determined. Some new potential provisions include:  
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A. Allowing the use of a side fund for deficiency contributions. Money in the side fund 
could be used for contribution holidays if no longer needed to cover liabilities.  
B. Establishing a “banker’s rule” arrangement whereby a sponsor could recuperate 
deficiency payments made to the fund when the fund returns to a surplus position (with 
or without a safety margin being required).  
C. In the absence of clear rules, providing for an arbitration mechanism that would allow 
each party to present its arguments. (IMPLEMENTED IN ONTARIO’S PBA) 
3) A safety margin should be held in the fund before any contribution holidays are taken or 
benefit improvements adopted. This would benefit both sponsors and members, as the plan 
could sustain greater fluctuations in asset values without incurring deficiency payments 
while the members would benefit from greater benefit security. (IMPLEMENTED 
FEDERALLY (PBSA) AND IN ONTARIO (PBA)) 
4) The maximum surplus allowed by the Canada Revenue Agency should be increased to 
allow for the buildup of greater margins. (IMPLEMENTED-INCREASED FROM 10% TO 
25%) 
In short, plan sponsors want the greatest possible predictability and flexibility to manage their costs 
while members want benefit security. It is obvious that greater security can be achieved through 
higher contributions; in other words, funding with a margin. However, court decisions restricting 
use and ownership of surplus have made plan sponsors wary about funding above the minimum 
actuarial requirements, increasing the volatility of pension costs and reducing benefits security.
403
 
This chapter will focus on the impact of the governance of “actual” and “actuarial” surplus on 
defined benefit pension plan funding. It is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the major 
legal concepts associated with actuarial surplus. Section 2 reviews the major court rulings on actual 
and actuarial surplus, while Section 3 discusses the policy issues relevant to actuarial surplus. 
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Section 1-Major Surplus Issues 
1. Introduction 
 
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) defines surplus as: 
The excess of value of assets of a pension fund related to a pension plan over the value of 
the liabilities under the pension plan, both calculated in the prescribed manner.
404
  
A pension plan is not able to disclose a surplus without the assistance of an actuary. This is because 
it is the actuary who calculates and values the plan’s liabilities and assets and, until the actuary 
prepares a plan valuation report, it will not be known whether the plan has a surplus or, for that 
matter, an unfunded liability or a solvency deficiency. In this respect, a surplus cannot exist until it 
is disclosed in a valuation report. Such a report must be prepared at least triennially and may, at the 
request of the administrator, employer or regulator, be prepared on a more frequent basis.  
Pension Lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that a surplus can only exist, if at all, in a pension fund related to 
a defined benefit pension plan: 
A defined contribution plan can never have a surplus; all monies, after deduction of taxes and 
expenses, must be paid out to the pensioners. In a defined benefit plan, pensions are calculated 
by reference to a specific formula set out in the plan text. An actuarial valuation report discloses 
the total value of the aggregate defined benefit liabilities; that is, the present value of the 
pensions promised to be paid in the future. Surplus assets arise at any given point in time when 
the value of the assets in the pension fund exceed what is necessary to discharge all present and 
future defined benefit liabilities. Surplus is sometimes characterized as those assets in the 
pension fund over and above the assets required fund required to discharge the so-called 
pension promise. The promise refers to the pension benefits calculated under the plan’s defined 
benefit formula. 
405
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2. Actual and Actuarial Surplus in Canada 
In 1919 an amendment to the Income Tax Act allowed employee contributions to employer 
sponsored pension plans to be claimed as a tax deduction.
406
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Department of National Revenue maintained its “Blue Book” (later Information Bulletin No. 14) 
which set out conditions for pension plan registration. One of the requirements was that employer 
contributions had to be irrevocable.
407
 Kaplan notes that there were a number of different ways that 
employers were able to structure their pension plans to comply with this rule: 
The most common and popular funding models proved to be by way of either investment 
annuity contracts with insurance companies or trust agreements with institutional custodial 
trustees. These models were perceived to provide the requisite degree of “irrevocability” of 
contribution to entitle the employer to obtain tax relief on its pension contributions. Between 
these two models the pension trust proved to be a preferred and efficient choice by 
employers, not least of all because of the commercial realities in the custodial marketplace 
at the time. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the irrevocability requirements were relaxed until finally, in 1981, 
the Canadian Revenue Agency expressly changed its registration requirements to provide that 
future defined benefit pension plans must contain a provision permitting all surplus to be refunded 
to the employer on termination of the plan.
408
 Therefore, the debate over surplus ownership upon 
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plan termination is only relevant in DB pension plans registered prior to 1981. The Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act (PBA) and the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) provided little, if any 
direction on surplus ownership until the late 1980s, focusing mainly on procedure, specifically on 
the employer’s procedure for applying to the pension regulator to withdraw surplus. Due process 
and notice to employees are prominent in these regulatory schemes.
409
   
As mentioned above, high profile litigation over surplus ownership, withdrawal, and usage in 
Canada commenced in the mid-1980s and climaxed in the 2000s. High interest rates in the early 
1980s lowered plan liabilities (which are bond-like in nature) and increased asset values, triggering 
large surpluses. The surplus ownership issue gained significant media coverage through legal 
disputes involving high-profile institutions including Dominion Stores, Bank of British Columbia 
and the National Hockey League, among others.  
Poor economic conditions in the early 1990s triggered mass lay-offs, plant shutdowns, and 
corporate restructuring, resulting in the premature termination of many company pension plans. 
Consequently, groups of terminated employees and employers (or their creditors) engaged in legal 
disputes over the ownership of plan surplus.
410
       
As discussed above, it wasn’t until 1994 in the landmark ruling Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada 
Ltd.
411
 that the Supreme Court of Canada prescribed a principled framework of analysis for 
determining, on a case by case basis, the ownership of surplus on the wind-up of pre-1981 plans. 
The Court also set out the applicable interpretive principles for determining when an employer has 
the right to use the actuarial surplus to take a so-called “contribution holiday” in an ongoing 
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pension plan. However, Schmidt did not resolve the scope of an employer’s right to use actuarial 
surplus in an ongoing plan for purposes other than contribution holidays (for example, to pay 
administrative expenses out of the pension fund, merge two or more pension funds that are in a state 
of surplus or deficit, or convert a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan). Judicial 
consideration of these issues took place in the post-Schmidt Supreme Court of Canada cases 
Monsanto Canada Inc. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), Buschau v. Rogers 
Cablesystems Inc. (2006), Canada (Kerry Inc.) v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) 
(2009), Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company (2010), and Manitoba Telecom (2014). 
3. Surplus Use and Allocation 
Professor Ron Davis distinguishes between two different concepts of surplus pension assets, those 
in an ongoing plan and those in a terminated plan:  
In the case of an ongoing plan, the surplus assets are an estimate that, if all of the variables 
concerning future economic trends used by a pension plan actuary in forecasting the future 
costs of future benefits behave as predicted, not all of the assets in the plan will be needed to 
pay those future benefits. Of course, a change in any variable will affect this forecast, and a 
subsequent forecast may find that there is no surplus, or that the plan is actually in a deficit 
position.  
The second concept of surplus refers to the calculation made when the pension plan is 
terminated. Since there will be no future accrual of benefits, there is no need to forecast 
future pension costs or investment performance, the calculation of the surplus is not an 
estimate and the existence of the surplus is not contingent on future economic performance. 
The distinction between these two concepts of surplus is important in assessing the 
circumstances in which there is a dispute over the use or ownership of surplus assets. 
Except in circumstances in which a plan is terminated, partially terminated or proposed to 
be terminated, the disputes concerning the use of actuarial surplus involve the first concept; 
that is, surplus assets in an ongoing plan. These include extraction of surplus by an 
employer from an ongoing plan; funding contribution holidays, funding benefit 
improvements, funding deficits in other pension funds sponsored by the employer and 
funding new types of pension benefits. In the event a plan is terminated, the issue is who is 
entitled to share in the actuarial surplus available for distribution and whether or not the plan 
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members and pensioners can terminate a pension plan in order to obtain a distribution of the 
surplus in the plan.
412
 
Davis notes that the problems of competing claims concerning the legitimate use of excess assets in 
a pension fund are complex and multi-layered, involving conflicting views of the implications of 
the defined benefit pension “bargain,” the allocation of the burdens of the significant risks in such a 
bargain, and the proper distribution of the increases in income that can result from an increase in 
certain risks. Competing claims in an ongoing plan include: 
1. The plan sponsor’s interests in the continuation of a valuable human resource 
management benefit plan on a cost effective basis.  
2. The plan members interests in receiving the full benefit of past employer contributions as 
part of their compensation for past services rendered.  
3. The need to provide reasonable assurance that accrued benefits will continue to be fully 
funded, and the concerns of tax authorities about excessive contributions to tax-exempt 
funds.  
Davis continues that both regulation and judicial pronouncements have played a role in balancing 
employer and employee claims, with the emphasis varying by jurisdiction. The use of the trust as a 
funding medium has not played a significant role in questions about surplus use in ongoing plans 
except for the use of surplus in one plan to fund benefits accrued in another. Rather, regulatory 
requirements are central to resolving these issues. For example, in Ontario, any extraction of 
surplus by an employer from an ongoing plan must meet minimum standards with respect to the 
funding left in the plan following the withdrawal, and receive the unanimous consent of the plan 
members, pensioners and beneficiaries.
413
 
Professor Davis concludes that the use of actuarial surplus in ongoing plans to fund employer 
contribution holidays, either in respect of the original members of the plan or for new employees, 
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whether hired directly or acquired by the employer through mergers with other entities, is permitted 
in all jurisdictions. Also permitted is the use of actuarial surplus from a defined benefit plan to fund 
employer contribution holidays in a defined contribution pension plans, provided the DB and DC 
benefits are being delivered as part of the same plan (i.e. hybrid benefits). Davis discusses the 
policy implications of these permissive surplus regulations: 
Courts have interpreted broad amending powers in a trust instrument and pension plan as 
including the power to make amendments to accomplish these goals. This interpretation is 
based primarily on the courts’ views about the private pension system as a voluntary system 
in which an employer may terminate participation at any time and in which the choice of the 
benefits to be provided is left to the employer. Although recognizing the interests of 
employees in receiving the full benefit of past contributions, the courts have held that the 
retention of control by the employer over prospective benefit design and the utilization of 
surplus assets to fund benefits does not involve a trespass on the reasonable expectations of 
plan members in a defined benefit pension plan and recognizes legitimate employer interests 
in controlling its costs and utilizing the plan as a human resource asset for all of its 
employees.
414
 
Different considerations apply when the issue concerns the allocation of surplus assets on plan 
termination, as an employer’s interests in the continuation of the plan for its benefit are no longer an 
issue, nor are the interests in controlling its costs and benefit design. These issues are addressed in 
the next section of this chapter.
415
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4. Actuarial vs. Actual Surplus-Legal and Policy Issues 
Kaplan notes that actuarial and actual surplus, more than anything else, frame the competing legal 
and policy viewpoints expressed by employers and employees regarding the use and ownership of 
surplus in defined benefit pension plans.
416
 He discusses employers’ viewpoint on actuarial surplus: 
An actuarial surplus in an ongoing DB plan is sometimes said to exist “only on paper” 
because it is a notional sum that results from actuarial assumptions and calculations. 
Employer advocates point to this attribute of surplus to support the proposition that 
employees have no legal entitlement to actuarial surplus in an ongoing plan. In other words, 
any employee rights to surplus arise only when the actuarial surplus becomes an actual 
surplus, which crystallizes upon termination of the plan.  In support of this proposition, 
employers point to the legal principle that affirms that an employer’s right to take 
contribution holidays from an actuarial surplus does not, in and of itself, represent an 
“encroachment upon the [pension] trust nor a reduction of accrued benefits” under the 
plan.
417
 Under this predominantly employer-sponsored view of actuarial surplus, there is a 
crucial qualitative and legal distinction between actuarial and actual surplus. An actuarial 
surplus does not truly exist because it is not definite and, therefore, employees can have no 
legal interest or expectation in an employer’s use of that surplus while the plan is ongoing. It 
is only when a pension plan is wound up, if ever, that any existing surplus must be 
distributed. Only at this time (from the employers’ viewpoint), do employees have a vested 
right to challenge the ownership or use of that surplus and claim a share of the proceeds.
418
 
Employee advocates acknowledge that while actuarial surplus is of necessity an estimate, 
employers frequently place a real financial value on it in ongoing plans by: 
1.  Disclosing its existence in solvency and going-concern valuations. 
2. Taking contribution holidays.  
3. Agreeing to transfer pension assets including surplus during purchase and sale transactions. 
 
4. Withdrawing surplus from the ongoing plan itself.419   
In 2003 Markle v. Toronto (City) held: 
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…the actuarial surplus in this case constitutes part of the trust fund held for the employees. 
The fact that the employees entitlement to those funds may not crystallize until the Plan is 
terminated, at which point an actuarial surplus (if one exists) becomes an actual surplus, 
does not change the fact that the actuarial surplus is part of the trust fund and that as such it 
may only be dealt with during the life of the trust and in a manner that is consistent with the 
principles of trust law or relevant statutory provisions.
420
 
In other words, under this predominantly employee supported view of surplus, the court held that 
there was no qualitative difference between an actuarial and actual surplus. Any surplus, whether 
characterized as actuarial or actual, is part of the total assets of the pension fund and under trust law, 
the surplus exists solely for the benefit of the employees who are equitable and ultimate 
beneficiaries of that surplus.  Under this theory, the only material legal distinction between an 
actuarial surplus and actual surplus is that, subject to the plan terms, employees do not have an 
immediate right to compel a cash distribution of that surplus while it is an actuarial surplus, as they 
do when it crystallizes into an actual surplus.
421
    
Section 2-Major Court Cases and Legislative Amendments on Surplus 
A. Court Cases 
1. Collins (1986)-Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) 
In the 1986 case Collins and Pension Commissioner of Ontario,
422
otherwise known as the 
“Dominion Stores Case,” the issue at hand was whether or not an employer could access actuarial 
surplus for its own benefit without a surplus sharing agreement.  The court’s decision was “no.”  
The employer (i.e. Conrad Black) withdrew $56 million from the pension fund without consulting 
plan members. Conrad Black considered the actuarial surplus his own rightful property. The 
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Ontario Court of Appeal ruled against Black and ordered him to return half of the surplus to the 
pension fund. According to the court, while the most recent language in the plan documents 
suggested that the employer had ownership of the actuarial surplus, the original intention was to 
keep the surplus in the plan in order to increase members’ benefits. The decision resulted in 
employers being unable to access actuarial surplus in Ontario without entering into a surplus 
sharing agreement with their employees.
423
  
2. Schmidt (1994)-S.C.C. 
The 1994 case Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd.
424
 is a landmark case in Canadian pension 
law. The main issue was whether or not surplus belonged to employers or employees upon plan 
wind-up. The court held that pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the 
surplus upon wind-up unless the pension text says otherwise. 
In Schmidt, the employer merged two defined benefit pension plans and used actuarial surplus that 
had accumulated in the two prior plans to take contribution holidays. The employer claimed that it 
was entitled to the surplus when the merged plan was terminated. The plan members commenced an 
action, arguing that they were entitled to the surplus and that the employer had to pay back the 
surplus it had used to fund its contribution holidays.
425
 
After a series of appeals, the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which established the 
legal framework for analyzing pension plans that continues to be applied today. More significantly, 
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the Court held that a pension plan funded pursuant to a trust is a classic trust and, as such, is subject 
to all common law trust principles.
426
 
Based on these principles, the Court found that surplus is always included in the trust unless the 
original trust agreement says it is not. The employer will only be entitled to it in the following 
circumstances: 
(i) The employer was made a beneficiary of the trust from the outset; 
(ii) The employer reserved a power to revoke the trust when it was established; or 
(iii) The doctrine of the resulting trust is applicable.
427
 
                                                             
426
 Classic trust principles, however, do not translate neatly into the pension context. They were developed in 
the context of testamentary estates (wills) where the trust product was left by a settlor who was deceased. 
The trust was “fixed” and, except for gains or losses realized through investment, it did not change over time. 
All of the beneficiaries were entitled to a specific benefit – whether that be a specific portion or part of the 
trust or the residue of the trust after all of the specific benefits had been provided. The beneficiaries were 
typically set at the time the trust was created, and could not be changed by the settlor from time to time. 
Pension trusts are fundamentally different from classic trusts in a number of ways. A classic trust is a form of 
gift involving the transfer of property to a trustee for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. A pension trust, 
on the other hand, is primarily a funding vehicle to provide security for future pension obligations. A pension 
trust is fluid in nature – new beneficiaries join the pension plan and current beneficiaries leave on a regular 
basis – and are closely intertwined with employment. Unlike a classic trust situation, the trustee of a pension 
fund typically has very little discretion in the investment or administration of the trust fund; rather, 
investments and payment of benefits are performed at the direction of the plan administrator and/or 
investment managers.  
The result of applying traditional trust law principles to pension plans has been, in a word, unsatisfactory. 
Allowing a series of archaic rules not designed with pension plans in mind to take precedence over 
contractual arrangements between employers and employees adds an unnecessary complexity and 
uncertainty into what is intended to be a contractual (employment) relationship, capable of being changed 
from time to time. It also means that the DB pension promise is being overridden by extraneous factors. (The 
Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM), Back from the Brink: Securing the Future of 
Canadian Defined Benefit Pension Plans at 10, 2005. Online: < www.acpm.com/ACPM/ >.) 
427
 A resulting trust is a trust implied by law (as determined by a court) that a person who holds title or 
possession was intended by agreement (implied by the circumstances) with the intended owner to hold the 
property for the intended owner. Thus, the holder is considered a trustee of a resulting trust for the proper 
owner as beneficiary. Although a legal fiction, the resulting trust forces the holder to honor the intention and 
prevents unjust enrichment. Example: Mahalia leaves $100,000 with her friend, Albert, while she is on a trip 
to Europe, asking him "to buy the old Barsallo place if it comes on the market." Albert buys the property, but 
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At the same time, the Court held that, in the absence of provincial legislation stating otherwise, a 
pension plan may explicitly or implicitly permit an employer to take a contribution holiday or may 
explicitly or implicitly prohibit this practice:  
When permission is not explicitly given in the plan, it may be implied from the wording of 
the employer’s contribution obligation. Any provision which places the responsibility for 
the calculation of the amount needed to fund promised benefits in the hands of an actuary 
should be taken to incorporate accepted actuarial practice as to how that calculation is made. 
That practice currently includes the application of calculated surplus funds to the 
determination of overall current service cost. It is a practice that is in keeping with the 
nature of a defined benefits plan, and one, which is, encouraged by the tax authorities.
428
     
The Court ruled that contribution holidays and other uses of surplus in an ongoing plan are not a 
revocation of trust, because in an ongoing plan, actuarial surplus exists only on paper. This 
compromise resulted in stringent restrictions on employer entitlement to surplus on windup but 
gave employers more latitude when dealing with surplus in the context of an ongoing plan. 
Canadian courts have struggled to implement this compromise in subsequent cases. In short, what 
was supposed to end all surplus ownership disputes, instead fuelled another 20 years of litigation. 
This post-Schmidt litigation centered primarily on how to apply classic trust law principles to 
pension plans (which are not well suited to many pension common law principles), considering 
pensions are also subject to pension standards legislation and are a component of the employment 
law (contractual) relationship between employee and employer.
429
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
has title put in his own name, which the court will find is held in a resulting trust for Mahalia. (The Free 
Dictionary, Online: < www. legal- dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Resulting+Trust >.) 
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Application of Schmidt Principles in Court Cases
430
 
The following decisions applied the contribution holiday principles set out in Schmidt. They found 
that the pension plan text permitted the taking of contribution holidays because the wording in the 
plan did not mandate a specific employer contribution formula, but made the employer’s 
contribution subject to the advice and discretion of an actuary.  
 Schmidt v. Air Products
431
  
The Company shall contribute from time to time, but not less frequently than annually, such 
amounts as are not less than those certified by the Actuary as necessary to provide the retirement 
benefits accruing to Members during the current year pursuant to the Plan…  
 Askin v. Ontario Hospital Association
432
 
Each Contributing Member Hospital shall make contributions to the Plan as determined by the 
Actuary from time to time.  
 Maurer v. McMaster University
433
  
The University shall pay into the Fund each year the amount required to fully fund the current 
service cost of the Plan, as determined by the Actuary, after allowing the Members required 
contributions.  
Kerry (Canada) Inc.
434
 
The Company shall contribute from time to time but not less frequently than annually such amounts 
as are not less than certified by the Actuary as necessary to provide the retirement income accruing 
to members during the current year pursuant to the Plan… 
Correspondingly, a number of decisions found that pension plan texts implicitly or explicitly 
prohibited the taking of contribution holidays because the plans mandated an exact employer 
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contribution formula and did not make the employer’s contributions subject to the advice of an 
actuary. 
Ontario Hydro
435
   
The Corporation shall contribute towards the cost of the benefits…the amount of the difference 
between the amount of the contributions of the employees and the amount of the cost of the benefits 
as determined by actuarial calculations. 
Trent University
436
 
…the University shall deposit each year into the Fund the balance of the cost of benefits earned that 
year, after allowing for Members’ Required Contributions.  
Hockin v. Bank of British Columbia
437
 
The employer shall contribute the balance of the cost required to provide benefits under the plan. 
Note that the pension text in each of these cases mandated that the employer make contributions 
each fiscal year, thereby prohibiting contribution holidays.  
 
3. Monsanto (2004)-S.C.C.
438
 
The issue in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Superintendent of Financial Services was whether or not 
employees affected by the partial windup of their DB plan were entitled to a pro-rata share of the 
actuarial surplus. The Court ruled in the affirmative.  
In 1997 and 1998, Monsanto laid off 146 employees and took steps to partially wind up its pension 
plan. At the time of the partial wind-up, the plan contained an actuarial surplus of over $19 million. 
The pro-rata share of the surplus relating to the portion of the plan that was being wound up was 
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just over $3 million. The Superintendent of Financial Services refused to approve Monsanto's 
partial wind up report on the basis that it did not provide for the distribution of the pro-rata portion 
of the surplus on the partial wind-up as required by section 70(6) of the Ontario Pension Benefits 
Act at that time, which provided:  
70(6) On the partial wind up of a pension plan, members, former members and other 
persons entitled to benefits under the pension plan shall have rights and benefits that are not 
less than the rights and benefits they would have on a full wind up of the pension plan on 
the effective date of the partial wind up.  
However, a majority of the Financial Services Tribunal ordered the Superintendent to approve the 
report. It held that section 70(6) of the Act provided no more than a right to participate in surplus 
distribution when (if ever) the pension plan fully winds up.  
The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision and the Court of Appeal dismissed 
Monsanto's appeal. Monsanto then took the case to the Supreme Court of Canada. It argued that it 
had no obligation to distribute surplus to employees on a partial wind-up; rather, it maintained, 
section 70(6) merely gave affected employees a vested right to participate in any full wind-up in the 
future.
439
 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Looking at the plain language of section 70(6), 
the legislative scheme and the object of the Act, the Court concluded that employees affected by a 
partial wind-up are entitled to their share of the surplus at the time of the partial wind up. The Court 
concluded:  
Section 70(6) requires the distribution of a proportional share of actuarial surplus when a 
defined benefit pension plan is partially wound up. The ordinary and grammatical meaning 
of s. 70(6) indicates that the assessment of rights and benefits is to be conducted as if the 
pension plan was winding up in full on the effective date of partial wind-up. The realization 
of rights and benefits, including the distribution of surplus assets, then occurs for the part of 
the plan actually being wound up. Therefore, the affected members, if entitled, may receive 
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their pro rata share of the surplus existing in the fund on a partial wind-up, as if the plan was 
being fully wound up on that day. The members affected by a partial wind-up are thus 
accorded the rights and benefits that are not less than the group would have if there were a 
full wind-up on the date of partial wind-up.
440
     
In essence, the Supreme Court of Canada held that for partial wind ups, a pro rata share of any 
existing actuarial surplus must be distributed to terminated employees. However, the decision was 
not clear about whether the distribution should be in proportion to liabilities or assets.  
The Monsanto decision almost certainly impacted the future funding of defined benefit pension 
plans because it took away employers’ incentive to maintain a surplus. Consider a plan that was in 
surplus years ago that is in deficit position today. In the event of a partial wind-up at the time of a 
surplus say, 10 years ago, the sponsor would have been required to distribute some of the actuarial 
surplus to those former members affected by the partial wind-up, thereby reducing plan assets and 
increasing the level of the plan’s current deficit. The Ontario PBA and federal PBSA have since 
retracted the distribution of surplus to employees upon partial plan wind-up. 
4. Buschau (2006)-S.C.C.
441
 
The issue in the 2006 case Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. was whether or not trust law 
could be applied to permit members to unilaterally terminate their pension plan and take the 
actuarial surplus. The Court’s decision was ‘no.”442 
The recent trend in the case law to apply traditional trust law principles to pension trusts without 
regard to the regulatory context in which such trusts were created and maintained was halted, or at 
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least significantly curtailed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Buschau.  In Buschau, the Court 
specifically stated that its prior decision in Schmidt v. Air Products Canada Ltd. 
443
 does not mean 
that all trust law principles are applicable to a pension trust. Rather, regard must be had to the 
context and purpose of pension plans, the terms of the particular plan documents and the specific 
legislation governing the pension plan. 
McSweeney notes that the Buschau v. Rogers Communications case is perhaps the most notorious 
of the pension surplus cases in Canada, as plan members attempted to take ownership of their DB 
plan’s actuarial surplus by invoking a very old trust law principle called the Rule in Saunders v. 
Vautier. The Rule in Saunders v. Vautier, from an 1841 English case, states that notwithstanding 
what the wishes were of the person who set up the trust, if all of the beneficiaries want to, they can 
vary the terms of the trust or terminate the trust, and use the trust funds as they see fit. The pension 
plan members in Buschau wanted to use this rule (after attempting to get all of the pension plan 
members to agree to wind up the plan) to distribute the surplus amongst themselves. McSweeney 
comments on the application of trust law in Buschau:
444
 
While the Court of Appeal found that the members hadn’t managed to obtain the necessary 
consents from all the plan’s beneficiaries, it nevertheless held that this old trust law 
principle could in fact apply to modern pension trusts. The Court of Appeal was clearly 
uncomfortable with the idea, but felt bound by the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in 
Schmidt which, as noted above, held that pension trusts were classic trusts, and not some 
special kind of trust. If they are indeed classic trusts, then all trust law rules are applicable, 
including Saunders v. Vautier. Plan sponsors found this very surprising, since up until then 
the assumption was that plan terminations were in the control of the employer, which could 
decide if and when to terminate the pension plan. It was unheard of for plan members to 
have the unilateral right to terminate their own pension plan.  
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The Supreme Court, when deciding the appeal of the Buschau decision in 2006, introduced 
into the pension area what many plan sponsors felt was a badly needed dose of common 
sense. The Supreme Court first went back to its decision in Schmidt and the seminal finding 
in that case that pension trusts were “true” or “classic” trusts. In Schmidt, the Court held that 
“when a pension fund is impressed with a trust, the trust is subject to all applicable trust law 
principles.” In its decision in Buschau, it added to the Schmidt decision by saying “It is thus 
necessary to determine which trust law principles are applicable before considering how 
they apply.” It is unlikely that the Supreme Court in 1994 had intended that the word 
“applicable” would carry so much weight. However, in Buschau it became central. 
In essence, the Court held that it is necessary to look at the statutory and regulatory framework for 
pension plans, and not just look at them as trusts existing in a legislative void. In some instances 
where the statute contains rules and guidelines in a given area, trust law principles are simply not 
applicable and cannot be used to circumvent the statutory process. In those circumstances where 
pension legislation contains detailed rules regarding when a pension plan can be terminated, the 
Supreme Court held that the members could not apply an old trust law concept to unilaterally force 
a wind-up of their pension plan to access the actuarial surplus. In other words, the Court ruled that 
the legislation trumped the trust agreement with respect to the application of Saunders v. Vautier.
445
 
Subsequent to Buschau, plan sponsors wondered whether the case signalled a trend towards more 
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practical and common-sense interpretations on actuarial surplus, or whether the case was simply an 
anomaly.
446
  
5. Kerry (2009)
447
-S.C.C.  
The issues in Nolan v. Kerry were whether or not a sponsor could use actuarial surplus to pay the 
plan’s administration expenses and also, whether or not the Ontario food products company 
violated trust law when it moved surplus cash from its DB plan (closed to new employees) to a new 
DC plan (opened for new employees)? The Court ruled “yes” and “no” respectively.  
The Kerry case involved a DB plan established in the 1950s funded through a trust. The plan was 
amended in the 1970s to permit plan expenses to be paid from the fund, and again in 2000 to 
introduce a DC component for new employees, using the DB surplus to fund DC contribution 
holidays. The plan members complained about the payment of expenses from the trust and also 
about the employer taking of contribution holidays in the new DC plan using the old DB plan’s 
funds. On appeal from the Financial Services Tribunal, the case made its way to the Ontario 
Divisional Court.  
The Divisional Court made some rather startling findings, again on the basis that the pension trust 
was a classic trust established generally for the benefit of the plan members. It held that in creating 
a new DC component in the plan, the sponsor created two pension plans, with two pension funds 
and two classes of members. It also held that because the historical trust language in the DB 
component said that funds must be used for the “exclusive benefit” of members, the employer could 
not use it for any other groups, including the members in the DC component. In other words,  
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adding a new DC component to a an old DB pension plan and treating the pension fund as a single 
fund was rejected by the court on the basis that only the originally defined group of trust 
beneficiaries could benefit from the DB actuarial surplus.
448
  
The sponsors appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal which held that an employer 
could stop paying pension plan expenses in the DC plan and take the money from the original DB 
if the plan text itself did not specifically forbid it. The Court also ruled that Kerry would not have 
to refund any money it took from the DB fund to pay for contribution holidays taken in the DC 
plan. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed, saying there was nothing in the plan preventing the 
company from transferring funds from one part of the plan to the other. The Court cited the 
leading case of Schmidt v. Air Products, which held that an employer may take contribution 
holidays if permitted by the terms of the plan. In the event that the plan is silent on the issue, the 
right to take a contribution holiday is not objectionable so long as actuaries continue to accept the 
application of existing surplus to current service costs as a standard practice. 
The Court continued that nothing prevented the Company from taking a contribution holiday where 
the actuary certified that no further contributions were necessary to provide the required retirement 
income to members. It also stated that the creation of two different pension components (i.e., a DB 
and a DC component) does not necessarily result in two distinct pension plans and trusts. In 
addition, where surplus in the DB portion is used to fund DC contributions under the same trust, 
there is no violation of the “exclusive benefit for employees” trust provision, providing that it is not 
otherwise prohibited by the plan and trust documents.
449
 Justice Rothstein ruled that “the plan 
documents do not preclude combining the two components in one plan and nothing in these 
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documents or trust law prevents the use of the actuarial surplus for the contribution holidays.” The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision also stated Kerry was not obligated to pay pension expenses 
out of pocket because those expenses were incurred for the benefit of pension plan members. The 
Court held:   
The payment of plan expenses is necessary to ensure the plan's continued integrity and 
existence, and the existence of the plan is a benefit to the employees. It is therefore to the 
exclusive benefit of the employees that expenses for the continued existence of the plan 
are paid out of the fund. 
 
6.Burke (2010)-S.C.C.
450
 
The issue in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company was whether or not transferred employees had access 
to the surplus in their original DB plan when a successor plan was established for them in their new 
company. The Court ruled “no.” 
The 2005 lower court decision in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company followed in the same vein as 
the earlier pension surplus cases relying on the characterization of pension trusts as classic trusts in 
Schmidt, meaning all trust rules were applicable.  
In 1987 the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) sold its Northern Stores Division to the North West 
Company. The HBC pension plan was in surplus at the time. Employees who were transferred to 
the new company had their accrued pension benefits and assets of equal value transferred into their 
new employer’s pension plan. However, no surplus was transferred into the new plan. The 
transferred members sued, claiming that their share of the surplus should have been transferred into 
their new pension plan.  
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The basis for the members’ claim was that from time to time HBC had improved benefits for 
pensioners, using the surplus in its pension plan. Transferring members to the buyer’s pension plan 
without their share of the surplus, they argued, meant that their share of the surplus would 
ultimately be used to improve other members’ benefits in the original plan, rather than their own 
benefits.  In order to understand why this case caused plan sponsors such concern, it is very 
important to note the following facts: 
451
 
1. The affected members conceded that HBC had no contractual obligation to make future 
benefit improvements for pensioners.  
2. The court held that HBC had the legal right to use surplus in its pension plan to pay 
administrative expenses and to take contribution holidays. That is, it could simply have used 
the entire surplus and members would have had no recourse.  
3. The amount of assets transferred by HBC into the buyer’s pension plan was negotiated at 
“arms” length and permitted by pension statute. There was no legal requirement to transfer 
any surplus.  
The lower court held that “the employees had some expectation that improvements would be made” 
to their pensions and that they had been deprived of “the possibility of improvement to the new 
plan.”  In short, the failure to transfer surplus “represented a breach of trust on the part of HBC.” 
Therefore, relying on the fact that the HBC pension trust was a “classic trust,” the court held that a 
mere expectation had to be protected, and ordered that surplus be transferred out of the HBC plan 
into the buyer’s plan. 452 
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However, in 2008 the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision. The first 
important finding of the Court of Appeal was that the expectation of certain beneficiaries is not a 
“legitimate basis for creating legal rights and obligations at odds with the provisions of the plan 
documentation.” This is a common-sense result based on the fact that HBC had a duty to ensure that 
the transferred employees’ defined benefits were adequately funded, not that an actuarial surplus be 
funded. In other words, HBC’s fiduciary duties as plan administrator did not obligate it under the  
duty of even-handedness
453
 to confer benefits upon a class of employees who had no rights under 
the Plan. The Court ruled that neither the retained nor the transferred employees had an equitable 
interest in the ongoing plan’s actuarial plan surplus. Waters comments on the application of the 
duty of even-handedness in Burke:
454
 
The duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of the pension plan 
documentation. It does not operate in a vacuum. The duty of even-handedness requires that 
where there are two or more classes of beneficiaries, each class receives exactly what the 
terms of the documentation confer. In its role as pension plan administrator, HBC was a 
fiduciary and had fiduciary obligations. However, just because HBC has fiduciary duties as 
plan administrator does not obligate it under any purported duty of even-handedness to 
confer benefits upon one class of employees to which they have no right under the plan. It 
was the obligation of HBC to carry out the terms of the pension plan documents and to 
ensure that in the administration of the plan they do not give an advantage or impose a 
burden when that advantage or burden is not found in the terms of the plan documents. 
Neither the retained nor the transferred employees had an equitable interest in the plan 
surplus. Accordingly there is no duty of even-handedness applicable to the surplus. HBC’s 
legal obligations with respect to its employees, including the fiduciary duties that it owed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Regulations. In other words, Section 80 of the Ontario PBA legislation (mandating the transfer of DB pension 
surplus to the transferred employees’ new DB plan) trumps the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2010 decision in 
Burke. 
453
There are four fundamental duties of a trustee that inform all aspects of trust management and 
administration, including the investment of trust property. They include the duty of loyalty, duty of care, duty 
not to delegate and the duty of even-handedness. Under the duty of even –handedness, each beneficiary is 
to receive exactly what they are entitled to, no more and no less. No beneficiary receives preferential 
treatment. Pursuant to this rule, when investing trust property, the trustee must always strive for impartiality 
between the conflicting interests of income and capital beneficiaries. (Elaine Blades, The Quintessential 
Fiduciary, 2011. Online: < www.advisor.ca/tax/estate-planning/the-quintessential-fiduciary-64189 >. 
454
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the transferred employees, were satisfied by protecting their defined benefits. Based on the 
plan documentation, HBC did not have a fiduciary obligation to transfer a portion of the 
actuarial surplus (Waters at p. 966). 
Professor Ron Davis notes that although recognizing the interests of employees in receiving the full 
benefit of past contributions, the courts have held that the retention of control by the employer over 
prospective benefit design and the utilization of surplus assets to fund benefits in ongoing plans  
does not involve a trespass on the reasonable expectations of plan members in a defined benefit 
pension plan and recognizes legitimate employer interests in controlling its costs and utilizing the 
plan as a human resource asset for all of its employees.
455
 
McSweeney notes that the application of even handedness is itself rooted in traditional trust law 
concepts, it is a departure from the lower court’s reasoning which, according to the Court of Appeal, 
seemed to be rooted more in “basic notions of fairness” than in any firm legal concept.  The Court 
addressed the lower court’s “fairness” concern that failing to transfer surplus would benefit only the 
members retained in the original plan, holding that since there was no termination of the pension 
plan, and thus no "crystallization" of surplus, the “actuarial” surplus was properly retained in the 
original plan to be accessed for improvement of benefits or contribution holidays. The transferred 
employees had benefited equally from the surplus up to the date of the transfer.  
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision regarding the transfer 
of surplus. It held that it was necessary to examine all previous and current HBC plan documents 
(as per Schmidt) to determine whether the transferred employees had an “equitable interest” in the 
plan’s surplus. Noting that the “exclusive benefit” language in the HBC trust agreement was 
restricted to “promised” benefits and did not give employees entitlement to surplus, the Supreme 
Court of Canada concluded that no such equitable interest in surplus existed. The SCC made it clear 
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that its decision was specific to the wording and context of the HBC pension plan documents, which 
did not grant a specific right to surplus to plan members. However, it is noteworthy that on the issue 
of whether a transfer of surplus is required when the plan language entitles employees to surplus, 
the court stated “that is best left to another case in which the issue arises.” 456 
In particular, Justice Rothstein rejected the affected employees’ argument that HBC had a duty to 
“hold an even hand” between transferring and non-transferring employees in its allocation and use 
of surplus. He noted that such duty is fiduciary in nature, and while HBC has a fiduciary duty in its 
role as plan administrator, that role required only that the company protect the members’ defined 
benefits. Its actions in regard to surplus were held not to be fiduciary in nature, and therefore not to 
be subject to the duty of even-handedness. Gary Nachsen of Benefits Canada comments: 
This analysis reflects the well-known “two hats” doctrine of pension law, even if it does not 
expressly use that terminology. That is, the same corporation may act administrator of a 
pension plan for certain purposes and will be considered as a fiduciary for those purposes, 
while it may act as sponsoring employer for other purposes and it will not be considered as a 
fiduciary for those other purposes. It would appear that the Supreme Court has implicitly 
blessed the two hats doctrine and, in doing so, has offered some novel thoughts on how that 
doctrine should be applied.
457
 
 
7. Sutherland (2011) ONCA
458
 
The issue in Sutherland v. Hudson’s Bay Co. was whether or not surplus funds from the original 
Simpson’s DB plan could be used to pay for employer contributions to the defined contribution 
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pensions of Zellers and Kmart employees (subsidiaries of HBC, the company which had taken over 
the ownership of Simpsons). The Ontario Court of Appeal’s answer was “no.” 459 
In 1971 Simpsons Ltd. established a defined benefit pension plan for its employees. In 
1994 and 1998, HBC, as the successor to Simpsons under the pension plan, amended the plan by 
adding a defined contribution section to the plan and introduced employees of its wholly owned 
subsidiaries (Zellers and Kmart) to the plan, which was also renamed. Between January 1, 1994, 
and December 31, 2006, approximately $111 million of surplus assets in the HBC plan was applied 
to pay employer annual defined contribution costs for Zellers and Kmart employees. Simpson’s 
retirees who were members of the Simpsons pension plan (the plaintiffs) commenced a class action 
against HBC, alleging, inter alia, that HBC improperly used surplus funds that had accrued in the 
trust fund for the Simpsons pension plan to pay for the employer contributions to the defined 
contribution pensions of Zellers and Kmart employees.
460
 
In 2011 the majority of the Court of Appeal held that Plan members were entitled to plan surplus 
assets based on principles from the 1994 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schmidt v. 
Air Products of Canada Ltd. The language of the original trust agreement and the Plan text, 
including “exclusive benefit” language, demonstrated the intention to establish a trust for the 
benefit of the members, including the surplus. However, the plan text said that HBC could amend 
the Plan, meaning it had the power to revoke the trust. The Court ruled that the original trust 
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agreement, not the Plan text, “trumped.” Level Chan of Stewart McKelvey Lawyers commented on 
the Sutherland case:  
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay 
Co., although the language in the Plan text was similar. The Supreme Court found in Burke 
that employees who were transferred when HBC sold its Northern Stores division did not 
have an interest in the surplus while the Plan was ongoing. HBC was therefore not required 
to transfer any share of the surplus when the employees were transferred. The Court of 
Appeal in Sutherland distinguished the language in the different plan documents. The 
original plan documentation in Burke limited members’ entitlements to the promised 
pension benefits and therefore excluded entitlement to surplus assets. There was no 
“exclusive benefit” language in the originating documents, unlike the Simpsons Plan. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision re-affirms the principles from Schmidt, and the 
application of trust principles to pension plans. The same principles were applied by the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Smith v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Burke and Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. suggested 
a more flexible application of trust law principles to pension plans and recognized the 
interests of employers and plan sponsors in pension plans. In denying leave to appeal, the 
Supreme Court has therefore confirmed the same framework from Schmidt continues to 
apply and that the differences with its decision in Burke are the result of key differences in 
the language of plan documents. The cases re-affirm the importance of carefully considering 
plan language and the history of how that language has changed to determine plan member 
entitlements.
461
 
 
Since the Dominion Stores case (Collins and Pension Commissioner of Ontario-ONCA) in 1986, 
wherein Conrad Black absconded his company’s pension surplus of 50 million dollars, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has implemented a policy of protecting DB plan surpluses (in ongoing plans) from 
being removed by both employers and employees. The S.C.C.’s policy began in 1994 in Schmidt 
(surpluses generally belong to employees on plan termination and are subject to all trust principles; 
however, employers using actuarial surplus to fund ongoing plans is not a revocation of the trust).  
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The courts have been consistent in implementing pension surplus policy since Schmidt, from 
Buschau (statute trumps trust law) to Kerry (surplus can be transferred by employer from original 
DB plan to a new DC component of the same plan) to Burke (transferred employees have no access 
to surplus) to Sutherland (S.C.C. agreed with ONCA that all surplus remains in the original 
members’ DB plan).  It is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Court of Appeal 
have applied trust law, legislation and plan text based on the circumstances of each case in order to 
protect actuarial surpluses. I argue, therefore, that the decisions in Burke (plan text trumps law of 
trusts) and Sutherland (law of trusts trumps plan text) are not so much the result of “key differences 
in the language of plan documents” as Chan suggests, but rather, the result of the Supreme Court’s 
application of trust law, legislation and plan text (based on the circumstances of each case) to 
implement its policy of protecting actuarial surpluses for use in DB plan funding.  
8. Manitoba Telecom (2014) (SCC)
462
 
The issue at hand in Telecommunications Employees Association of Manitoba Inc. v. Manitoba 
Telecom Services Inc. was whether or not Manitoba Telecom company’s employees were entitled 
to their public DB plan’s “actuarial surplus” when it was transferred into a private plan (note that 
“surplus” only exists when a plan is wound up).The Supreme Court of Canada’s answer was “yes”. 
 
Crown MTS was privatized in 1997, resulting in approximately 7,000 employees and retirees of 
Crown MTS and its subsidiaries having their assets and pension rights transferred to a new pension 
plan. The plan members’ initial contribution to the new fund was an “actuarial surplus” of $43 
million dollars (i.e. an amount transferred from the old plan solely attributable to the members) on 
the implementation date of the new plan. This contribution was not matched by MTS. Rather, MTS 
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used the Initial Surplus to take contribution holidays, reducing its contributions to the new plan. In 
other words, only MTS benefitted from the actuarial surplus. 
 
In the old plan the government as employer did not contribute to the plan fund.  Rather, the 
government paid its share of the benefits on a “pay-as-you-go” basis, meaning that instead of 
matching employee contributions at the time they were paid into the pension fund, the government 
instead paid half of the benefits owed to retirees at the time they became due. The effect of this 
arrangement was that the Old Plan’s pension fund, referred to as the Civil Service Superannuation 
Fund (“CSSF”), contained only employee contributions and “interest” based on the returns on the 
fund’s assets.  Those funds were used to pay for 50 percent of the plan’s liabilities to its plan 
members, with the other 50 percent being paid for by the government on an ongoing basis.
463
 
 
During the privatization process, the Plan Members received several assurances from Crown MTS 
and the government that any surplus that existed in the old plan would not be used to reduce MTS’ 
costs of and share of contributions in the new pension plan. Pursuant to the statute that governed the 
privatization of Crown MTS, the Manitoba Telephone System Reorganization and Consequential 
Amendments Act (the “Reorganization Act”), all of the old plan’s assets attributable to the plan 
members, including the actuarial surplus were transferred to the new pension plan. Section 15(2)(a) 
of the Reorganization Act states that MTS is required to establish “a new plan which shall provide 
for benefits which on the implementation date are equivalent in value to the pension benefits to 
which employees have or may be entitled to under [the old plan].”  
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The Supreme Court considered a number of cases in which the applicable legislation and plan texts 
do not give plan members the right to an actuarial surplus in a typical defined benefit pension plan 
(see Buschau, Kerry above).  However, the Court noted that entitlement to an actuarial surplus must 
always be decided based on the governing legislation and that in this case the governing legislation 
led to a different conclusion regarding the treatment of the actuarial surplus.  In Manitoba Telecom 
the applicable legislation required the establishment of a new plan providing benefits on its 
implementation date, equivalent in value to the benefits provided under the prior plan. In other 
words, the actuarial surplus that existed at the time of the transfer of assets from the prior plan must 
be taken into account when determining whether the new plan fulfilled this requirement. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the 2010 order of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench 
that the Initial Surplus plus interest (140 million dollars) be used to enhance members’ pension 
benefits and that the parties negotiate the related implementation process. Justice Rothstein stated:  
 
The New Plan can only be held to comply with the requirements of s. 15(2)(a) 
if the Initial Surplus is used for the exclusive benefit of the plan members, or if plan 
members received some other compensatory benefits of equivalent value. Therefore, the 
outcome of the privatization of Crown MTS is found to violate section 15(2)(a) of the 
Reorganization Act.
464
  
 
In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the applicable legislation trumped the 
application of trust law. 
 
B. Amendments to the Federal Income Tax Act (ITA), the Ontario PBA and the Federal 
PBSA Regulations on Surplus 
 
 
Regulatory amendments to the Federal Income Tax Act (ITA), the Ontario PBA and the Federal 
PBSA on Surplus were introduced from 2010 to 2012. These amendments allowed employers to 
maintain larger surpluses in their DB plans. However, as discussed above, the real underfunding 
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problem is not related to the amount of surplus, but rather, inability of employers to access surplus. 
Consequently, these amendments did virtually nothing to alleviate the underfunding problem. See 
Appendix 6 on page 299 for details.  
Section 3-Pension Surplus Policy in Canada 
Schmidt implemented the policy that pension trusts as classic trusts, imposing severe restrictions on 
removing surplus from ongoing plans. In Buschau, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) further 
developed the policy established in Schmidt that pension plans funded pursuant to trust agreements 
are classic trusts and, as such, are subject to all common law trust principles. The Court in Buschau 
recognized that DB pension plans are regulated by a unique set of legal principles in federal and 
provincial jurisdictions that cannot and should not automatically be overridden by traditional 
common law trust principles. Accordingly, the SCC ruled that plan members could not use trust 
principles to effect the termination of the pension trust to access actuarial surplus and that the 
legislative scheme established the appropriate process for dealing with this issue.
465
 The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Buschau held that its prior decision in Schmidt v. Air Products Canada 
Ltd.
466
did not mean that all trust law principles were applicable to a pension trust. Rather, it ruled 
that regard must be also be had to the context and purpose of pension plans, the terms of the 
particular plan documents and the specific legislation governing the pension plan. Pension surplus 
policy in Canada is summarized below: 
1. Collins (1986)-Employer cannot access actuarial surplus without surplus sharing agreement 
with employees. 
2. Schmidt (1994)-Pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the surplus upon 
wind-up unless the pension plan text says otherwise. 
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3. Monsanto (2004)-A pro-rata share of actuarial surplus must be distributed to employees on 
partial wind-up (Trumped in 2012 by Ontario PBA legislation). 
4. Buschau (2006)-Plan members cannot effect termination of a pension trust using general trust 
principles in order to access actuarial surplus (i.e. plans are not simply trusts existing in a 
legislative void-statutory and regulatory frameworks must both be considered to access 
actuarial surplus). LEGISLATION TRUMPS LAW OF TRUSTS 
5. Kerry (2009) - Nothing in trust law prevents sponsors from taking contribution holidays or 
paying expenses using actuarial surplus, even if the plan has both DB and DC components. 
6. Burke (2010)-As per the trust agreement, transferred employees have no access to actuarial 
surplus (i.e. plan documentation can displace classic trust principles). PLAN TEXT TRUMPS 
LAW OF TRUSTS 
7. Sutherland (2011) - Plan assets were impressed with a trust in favour of the plan members, 
and therefore they were entitled to any surplus assets. LAW OF TRUSTS TRUMPS PLAN 
TEXT 
8. Manitoba Telecom (2014) – Plan members are entitled to actuarial surplus if mandated by 
legislation. LEGISLATION TRUMPS LAW OF TRUSTS 
Actuarial Surplus Policy Recommendations 
The Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) has recommended the creation of pension security trusts 
(PSTs). Under its proposal, these trusts would only be funded by employers and would be separate 
from regular defined benefit pension funds. Any additional contributions over and above those 
arising from going concern valuations would be placed in a PST, including any amounts required to 
fund solvency deficiencies. Funds in the PST would be released back to the employer if actuarial 
solvency valuations showed that any excess amounts were no longer needed. Amounts contributed 
to the PST would be tax deductible, while amounts released back would be taxable.
467
  
Steve Bonnar proposes taking this idea a step further by only allowing sponsors access to actuarial 
surplus in excess of an established margin that would vary in accordance with the asset/liability 
mismatch of their DB plan’s investment policy. At one extreme, that of a fully immunized 
investment policy, the funding target would be 100% of the solvency liability. For a typical asset 
mix, the funding target might be 110% of the solvency liability. In the case of an extremely 
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aggressive asset mix, the funding target might approach 125% of the solvency liability. These are 
meant to be examples only, but should reasonably represent the expected range of margins that 
might be appropriate. This type of surplus regime would promote more stable funding policies by 
giving sponsors incentives to better fund DB plans beyond minimum levels.
468
  
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 examined the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding 
that courts’ surplus policy (from the Dominion Stores case in 1986 to Manitoba Telecom in 2014) 
has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting underfunding and insolvencies.  
Professor Ron Davis notes that the exercise of an actuary’s professional judgment and discretion is 
the first source of insolvency risk for a pension plan’s members. Therefore, unless the actuary uses 
conservative assumptions, the plan members face the risk that minute variations in actual 
experience will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the plan 
sponsor will not be able to make them due to its insolvent status, or the size of the payments will 
drive the plan sponsor into insolvency proceedings.  In short, by giving employers very limited 
access to surplus while making them wholly responsible for deficits (Schmidt), actuaries (as agents 
of employers) are often pressured by employers to project higher than market estimates of 
investment returns (thereby reducing plan contributions and surpluses).
469
 In other words, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s application of trust law to DB plan surpluses (Schmidt) has 
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compromised the role of the actuary to make objective funding estimates. The Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries states:
470
 
Objectivity is the ability to work without regard to any personal considerations and without regard 
to any influence from, interest in or relationship with another party, such as a client or employer, 
which would affect one’s professional judgment. There will always be an actual or perceived 
challenge to an actuary’s objectivity where a client represents a significant percentage of the 
actuary’s firm’s business, or the actuary’s firm wishes to expand its business with the client, since 
the actuary and the firm have a self-interest in preserving and increasing the revenue derived from 
the client. That challenge may be even more difficult to manage where the firm provides multiple 
services to the client. Nonetheless, the actuary must manage the challenge. 
 
The obvious remedy to this conflict of interest position is to mandate that a third party (such as an   
independent external actuarial oversight board) mandate that pension regulators appoint and pay 
(through fees levied on employers) DB valuation actuaries. This would give plan members 
assurance that their plans’ funding valuations would be more objective and reliable. However, 
implementing such a policy would almost certainly increase employers’ funding requirements, 
making DB plans unaffordable for many sponsors in these times of low investment returns.  
Another possible legal remedy would be to allow sponsors access to actuarial surplus in excess of 
an established margin (determined by an independent external actuarial oversight board) that would 
vary in accordance with the asset/liability mismatch of their DB plan’s investment policy. At one 
extreme (that of a fully immunized investment policy) the funding target would be 100% of the 
solvency liability. For a typical asset mix, the funding target might be 110% of the solvency 
liability. In the case of an extremely aggressive asset mix, the funding target might approach 125% 
of the solvency liability. These funding targets are only meant to be examples, but should 
reasonably represent a range of appropriate margins. This type of surplus regime would 
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undoubtedly promote more stable funding policies, providing DB pension sponsors with more 
incentive to fund their plans beyond minimum levels. 
No issue in recent history has been more divisive and polarized in the governance of defined benefit 
pension plan funding than surplus. Surplus issues will almost certainly continue to dominate the DB 
pension funding landscape in Canada as long as the policy of asymmetry continues to give 
employers very limited access to actuarial surplus while making them wholly responsible for 
deficits.  
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CHAPTER 7 
TARGET BENEFIT PLANS 
Overview 
Chapter 6 examined the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding 
that courts’ surplus policy (from the Dominion Stores case in 1986 to Manitoba Telecom in 2014) 
has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting underfunding and insolvency. 
Chapter 7 discusses the merits of “target benefit plans” (TBPs) as a legal remedy to underfunding.  
TBPs can be an attractive legal remedy to both members and employers. Members receive many of 
the same benefits as if they had participated in a traditional DB plan, including pooling of 
investment and longevity risk, but the employer no longer bears all of the funding risks associated 
with DB benefits (this funding risk is seen as a key motivating force behind the decline in DB plans 
in the private sector). The actuarial valuation of a TBP determines the ability to fund promised 
benefits, with no concept of actuarial "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. In other words, 
funding is fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding policy 
including: 
1. Benefit/funding test conducted by actuaries on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection 
valuation. 
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing conducted by actuaries to estimate the probability that the 
plan benefits are sustainable. 
  
3. A moderate approach when setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks. 
The ideal would be to achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained.  
 
4. Benefit affordability testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past 
versus future benefits, application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that 
strike the balance between being conservative without being unduly risk averse.  
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It is important to note that target benefit plans are not being proposed as a panacea to replace fully 
funded single employer defined benefit pension plans already meeting sponsors’ and members’ 
retirement goals. However, TBPs do offer both funding and benefit certainty in the wake of 
underfunded and/or underperforming DB pension promises.  
A. The Failed Promise of the Classic Single Employer Defined Benefit Plan 
Actuary Malcolm Hamilton of the C.D. Howe Institute argues that although legislation, regulation, 
plan design and poor governance are often cited as important contributors to the decline of defined 
benefit plans, they are not the root causes. He argues that as important as it is to improve in these 
areas, no amount of improvement will return the DB plan to the position of prominence it once 
enjoyed or cause the next generation of companies to establish new DB plans: 
471
 
The goal was to deliver safe, adequate, affordable pensions—to insulate plan members from 
risk in an uncertain world. This was to be accomplished by investing DB pension funds in 
securities that while risky and volatile in the short term, were thought to generate high, 
reliable returns in the long run. The argument for DB plans is similar to the case for 
investing retirement savings in common stock, as articulated in Jeremy Siegel’s 1994 classic 
book, Stocks for the Long Run. Over long periods of time (25 years or longer), equities will 
usually outperform safe investments such as bonds, treasury bills and GICs. Those with long 
investment horizons can turn this to their advantage by investing heavily in equities and 
patiently waiting for the superior returns to materialize. However, as individual retirement 
savers grow old and retire, their investment horizons contract and their ability to bear risk 
diminishes. Thus, while it makes sense for young investors to emphasize equities in their 
retirement portfolios, they are well advised to de-risk as they age. 
The DB experiment failed because the economic foundation on which it was built proved 
faulty. The concept, while plausible, did not work as advertised. It did not work because 
equities can, in unusual circumstances, underperform safe investments for decades. It did 
not work because, in the private sector, neither pension plans nor their sponsors can be 
relied on to continue perpetually as going concerns. It did not work because shareholders, 
aided by investment analysts and accountants, came to realize that the pension risks they 
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were bearing without compensation were real, large and expensive. Most importantly, it did 
not work because DB plans, even plans that continue perpetually as going concerns, are not 
forever young. They, and the organizations that sponsor them, do not grow old in the same 
manner as people do, but they age nonetheless. The symptoms of pension plan aging are 
well known to those who have experienced them. The pension fund grows large relative to 
payrolls and corporate profits. The ratio of retired to active members increases, first to 0.5, 
then, for some plans, to more than 1.0. The proportion of the pension fund held for those 
who are at or near retirement moves well past 50%. The operating cash flow (the excess of 
contributions over benefit payments) becomes decidedly negative (i.e., the pension plan 
pays $2 or $3 in benefits for each $1 of regular contribution). The process is gradual but 
irreversible and, as it proceeds, DB plans become less able to tolerate and bear investment 
risk. 
Hamilton’s point on the symptoms of aging is illustrated in the Ontario Teacher’s Plan (OTP), the 
largest DB plan in Ontario with $140 billion in assets. A 1970s actuarial report predicted that 
OTP’s members would live an average of 20 years after retirement. However, OTP retirees are now 
living an average of 32 years post- retirement, resulting in their numbers (129,000) rapidly catching 
up to the number of active members (182,000). 
472
  
B. What Exactly Are Target Benefit Plans? 
Barry Gros of Aon Hewitt
473
 notes that target benefit (TB) plans are not simply the “flavour of the 
day.” Rather, they are one viable alternative for mitigating pension plan risk—and mitigating risk is 
crucial to providing sustainable retirement income. Further, he states that the TB concept follows 
the same principles as those required to effectively manage any pension arrangement on a 
sustainable basis. In other word, a sustainable pension plan is one that can consistently deliver, both 
in favourable and adverse circumstances, an appropriate range of benefits within an acceptable 
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range of costs over the long term. The whole point of sustainability is to avoid severe corrections to 
contributions and benefits. Gros discusses the advantages of TB plans over traditional DB plans:
474
 
The TB approach involves fixed contributions, or a fixed range of contributions, similar to a 
DC plan, which are not expected to vary over time. Benefits are then based on what the plan 
is projected to be able to afford. In this way, contributions and benefits are directly linked in 
a way that doesn’t currently exist in traditional DB and DC plans. Furthermore, TB plans 
never have a deficit per se as the plan liabilities can never exceed the plan assets. Any 
identifiable surpluses not used to improve benefits are treated as reserves, providing a buffer 
against future adverse experience. No excess assets would ever revert back to the plan 
sponsors as their commitment to the plan is the fixed funding rate; once contributions have 
been made, the sponsors no longer have any direct interest in the plan fund. Key elements of 
a TB plan include: 
1. Fixed employer and/or member contributions. These fixed contributions can also exist 
within an acceptable, narrow predefined range. 
2. Target DB plan formula, but without the same degree of risk. This means less emphasis 
on (1) options where members can select against the plan, as with traditional subsidized 
early retirement or spousal benefits and (2) benefits that are both hard to cost and have 
greater volatility, such as indexing. The promise can also be constructed as a minimum 
guaranteed benefit and a target benefit that will be delivered if the plan can afford it. 
3. Margins built into the costing of the benefit options used in setting and testing the 
sustainability of benefit levels. 
4. Benefit variability based on affordability with pre-set reserve levels and a predetermined 
order of benefit adjustments (both improvements and cutbacks). 
5. Full integration of benefit, funding and investment policies. 
In short, target benefit (TB) pension plans are a type of hybrid plan containing both DB and DC 
characteristics. However, traditional hybrid plans in Canada consist of two separate DB and DC 
plans, whereas the target benefit approach leverages the best aspects of DB and DC plans. TB plans 
have fixed contributions, a targeted defined benefit level, and a benefits/funding policy that 
prescribes the methods for varying benefits based on affordability, with pre-set reserve levels and a 
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pre-determined order of benefit adjustments. A key principle of target-benefit plans is a greater 
ability to share risks through rebalancing the benefit/funding equation depending on economic 
conditions. This is one of the few ways that intergenerational equity can be managed.
475
 Actuary 
Malcolm Hamilton discusses target benefit plans: 
The current DB plan tells members that they will get a specific benefit and that the sponsor 
will guarantee it. But the guarantee is just not sustainable…. Target benefit plans remove 
that guarantee and instead have a specific benefit goal for each member that the plan 
sponsor tries to deliver. If the pension fund performs as expected, members get the target 
benefit. If the experience is better or worse than expected, benefits are adjusted up or down 
in a gradual and reasonable way. The message is quite straightforward….The plan will try to 
deliver the target benefit but reserves the right to pay more or less depending on the 
circumstances. I think employees can live with that, and it makes pension plans much more 
resilient.
476
 
However, Hugh Wright of McInnis Cooper notes that the implementation of target benefit plans 
gives rise to important questions such as:
477
 
1. How will active members, retirees and unions be involved in plan governance?  
2. What level of transparency for members and retirees should be required? 
3. Is intergenerational equity a concern? If so, how is it to be achieved and at what cost? 
4. What benefit design features may support the success of a target benefit plan? 
5. What is the required funding level to support the targeted benefit? 
6. Under what circumstances may benefits be reduced, a key provision of such plans?  
7. Should the rules be prescriptive, as in New Brunswick, or will the parties be able to take into 
account their particular circumstances?  
8. On conversion of a defined benefit plan, what is the treatment of existing benefits and any 
employer covenant related to those benefits? 
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As mentioned above, most Canadian jurisdictions do not currently permit single employer target 
benefit plans.
478
 In each of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario, target benefit 
provisions have been introduced into the legislation. However, only in Alberta has the legislation 
been brought into force with accompanying regulations. Pension lawyer Jana Steele discusses the 
current legal landscape of target benefit pension plans in Canada:
479
 
In Canada, TBPs are not new in the multi-employer environment. However, pension 
standards legislation has not traditionally permitted single-employer plans to provide target 
benefits. Alberta, B.C., Nova Scotia, Ontario and P.E.I. have introduced legislation 
recognizing TBPs…. Quebec introduced a “member-funded” TBP in 2007 with fixed 
employer contributions for workplaces with collective agreements or employee associations. 
The legislation in Ontario, P.E.I. and Nova Scotia sets an employer’s contribution obligation 
to a fixed amount as indicated in a collective agreement— therefore restricting TBPs to 
unionized workplaces. Alberta
480
 and B.C. legislation does not include this limitation. 
New Brunswick introduced a model known as a shared risk plan (SRP) in 2012.
481
This 
design contains elements of the target benefit design, such as a DB-type formula, fixed 
contributions (subject to adjustments in accordance with the funding policy) and the 
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possibility of benefit adjustments. However, the province’s model also incorporates 
sophisticated risk management requirements to help ensure that the targeted benefits will be 
provided. Regulations require that SRPs have a primary risk management goal of ensuring 
that there is at least a 97.5% probability that base benefits will not be reduced over a 20-year 
period. There are also enhanced disclosure requirements for SRPs as well as strict 
governance and funding requirements tailored to these plans. 
Ari Kaplan, a pension lawyer representing New Brunswick retirees, is blunt about the impact of the 
new TBP legislation on them: 
It’s no different than the government passing legislation allowing it to remove money out of an 
older person’s account. It expropriates their money. It’s money they earned. It was deferred wages. 
It was part of their hourly wage…This is not a gratuitous gift from the employer.482 
However, Keith Ambachtsheer, Director Emeritus of the Rotman International Centre for Pension 
Management, counters that retirees are also at risk of losing money in defined benefit plans when 
their employers declare insolvency, rendering them unable to guarantee full pension payments in 
underfunded plans.
483
  
In August, 2014 Alberta introduced sweeping pension reforms in its new Employment Pension 
Plans Act (EPPA). Regulations came into force on Sept. 1, 2014. Among the many changes in the 
new EPPA was the introduction of a comprehensive target benefit plan (TBP) regime. Alberta is the 
second jurisdiction, after New Brunswick, to implement comprehensive TBP rules as a design 
option for plans registered in the province. Under the EPPA, TBPs will not be limited to 
collectively bargained workforces, as has been proposed in some other jurisdictions. Jana Steele 
compares TBPs in Alberta to those in New Brunswick:
484
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Unlike New Brunswick, the Alberta TBP rules do not, at this time, permit the conversion of 
a traditional DB plan provision to a target benefit provision on a retroactive basis. However, 
a traditional DB plan may convert to target benefit for future service and new hires. Bill 10, 
the Employment Pension (Private Sector) Plans Amendment Act, 2014, which is currently 
under review by the all-party Standing Committee on Alberta’s Economic Future, proposed 
amendments that would permit such retroactive conversion of accrued DB benefits to a TBP 
regime. 
The new Alberta rules also contemplate temporary improvements in retiree pensions under 
TBP provisions. Where the target benefit component of a plan has accessible going-concern 
excess, the plan can be amended to provide for a temporary improvement in pension 
payments, provided that it will continue to have accessible going-concern excess after 
taking into account the costs of the temporary improvement. 
Alberta has adopted an adverse deviation approach (PfAD) to risk management, as opposed 
to the probabilistic approach adopted by the New Brunswick TBP legislation. The PfAD 
under the Alberta rules is determined by two components: (i) a certain percentage based on 
the percentage of the fund that is invested in equities and (ii) the amount, if any, by which 
the assumed discount rate exceeds the benchmark discount rate. For example, if a plan’s 
equity allocation is 20%, and the assumed discount rate exceeds the benchmark discount 
rate by 0.01%, the PfAD would be 10.15%. Based on a table in the regulations, the equity 
allocation of 20% requires that 10% be added to the PfAD. The second component is the 
addition of 0.15% to the PfAD for every 0.01% that the assumed discount rate exceeds the 
benchmark discount rate. The regulations also require that stress testing be performed in 
respect of elements that the actuary believes may pose a material risk to the TBP’s ability to 
meet funding requirements. Such testing must be done in a manner satisfactory to the 
Alberta superintendent. 
Under the new Alberta TBP rules the normal cost of the target benefits and PfAD are 
required to be funded. Where there is an unfunded liability, either the actuarial valuation 
must show that the expected contributions will be sufficient or a plan text amendment must 
be filed concurrently to reduce or eliminate benefits or increase contributions, such that the 
funding requirements can be satisfied. Although not required to fund on a solvency basis, 
Alberta’s target benefits are required in actuarial valuations either to include a statement that 
the target benefit component does not have a solvency deficiency or disclose the total 
amount of the target benefit component’s solvency deficiency. 
The new legislation requires all types of pension plans to have a written governance policy 
that meets the prescribed rules. In addition, for plans that contain a benefit formula 
provision (i.e., a target benefit provision or traditional DB provision), a funding policy that 
complies with prescribed requirements is required. Although such policies need not be filed 
with the regulator, Alberta registered plans must have them in place by Aug. 31, 2015. 
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Steele notes that the Alberta Employment Pension Plans Act (New Act) and its associated 
regulation also states that the administrator of a plan, other than a TBP, that contains a benefit 
formula (i.e. defined benefit plans) may set up a solvency reserve account within the pension fund. 
A solvency reserve account is an account to which are deposited payments made in respect of a 
solvency deficiency. Despite the wording of the plan text, the prescribed portion of the actuarial 
excess or surplus in the solvency reserve account may be withdrawn, subject to the 
Superintendent’s consent. Effectively, this amendment mitigates the risk of “trapped surplus” if a 
plan’s solvency ratio improves considerably in between valuations.  The cost certificate must 
account separately for the solvency reserve account, and the actuarial excess in relation to a 
solvency reserve account is to be calculated on a plan termination basis. This should go a long way 
in addressing the issue of asymmetry, wherein employers are currently reluctant to fund DB plans 
above minimum levels because of their limited access to surplus (as per the application of trust 
principles in Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada). 
485
 In other words, there should be less pressure 
on actuaries to project higher investment returns in order to reduce employer funding requirements. 
On September 30, 2015 British Columbia introduced sweeping changes to its Pension Benefits 
Standards Act, many of which mirror Alberta’s amended Employment Pension Plans Act and 
regulations. The amendments are part of an effort by British Columbia and Alberta to harmonize 
their respective pension laws, including the introduction of target benefit regimes. However, a 
distinguishing feature of British Columbia’s amendments is the ability to convert accrued DB 
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benefits to target benefits (In Alberta, a proposed amendment which would have permitted the 
conversion of accrued benefits was defeated).
486
 
In 2014 the federal government launched consultations regarding a potential framework for target 
benefit plans. TBPs are being proposed as a voluntary, sustainable and flexible pension option 
available to federally regulated private sector employers and Crown Corporations under the Pension 
Benefits Standards Act (PBSA).
487
 
Steele continues that potential tax issues associated with single employer TBPs will need to be 
addressed, noting that federal tax legislation is designed to accommodate only DB and DC plans in 
the single employer environment. Also, she reveals that DB tax rules are generally designed for a 
plan in which an employer assumes all funding risk, meaning that pension adjustments (PAs)—
which must be calculated each year by the employer (and which reduce members’ RRSP room)—
do not consider the difference in value between different types of DB plans, such as plans that 
provide final average benefits as compared to those providing career-average benefits.  
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The Canada Revenue Agency would likely regard a TBP as a DB plan for PA reporting purposes. 
Tax regulations also generally limit employee contributions to 50% of the pension cost in a plan 
that provides DB-type benefits. This may restrict plan design options, because if benefits under a 
TBP are reduced, an employee may effectively have contributed more than half where contributions 
are shared. New Brunswick has worked to address this issue by requiring that the employee 
contribution share not exceed 50% of the total amount of contributions.
488
 
Steele concludes that jurisdictions across Canada should move quickly to permit single employers 
to implement TBPs, noting that a TBP model with robust governance and risk management 
processes—as seen in New Brunswick’s model—may be an important step to increasing pension 
benefit security for pension plan members and plan sustainability for employers.
489
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Target Benefit Design Options 
Aon Hewitt notes that private sector single employer DB plans seem particularly ripe for 
conversion to the TB model, considering only 18% were fully funded as of March 30, 2015, 
compared to 36% a year earlier.
490
  
Under traditional DB plans, benefit and funding policies are often separate documents, and 
often one or the other, or both, might not even exist. In developing a TB plan, it is critical to 
outline a policy for the relationship between benefits and funding. In a TB plan, the 
contribution rate is fixed and the target benefit, while a desired outcome, is ultimately a 
variable commodity. This means that under a TB plan the two policies covering benefits and 
funding are inseparable and must be dealt with together. Furthermore, the risk sharing 
arrangement between the sponsor(s) and members must be properly documented and fully 
and openly communicated.
491
 
The ideal private sector situation for a DB plan is one where a single employer is suffering from a 
poorly funded plan, hasn't been able to invest its way out of its pension deficit, is contemplating 
getting out of DB, and has strong unions and/or a culture that limits the viability of a move to DC. 
Aon Hewitt presents a TB funding policy in Appendix 7 on page 304.
492
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C. Governance and Risk Alignment493 
 
In a target benefit plan, members clearly have the greatest exposure to financial risk (i.e. the risk of 
not receiving the benefits at the targeted level). However, Aon Hewitt points out that employers 
involved with setting up a target benefit plan also bear risk- reputational and talent risk. (From both 
a human resources perspective and a financial perspective, the employer will not want the plan to 
appear to have failed and will therefore also have a large stake in its success).  
Governance and risk alignment presents several considerations impacting the governance of a target 
benefit plan. For example, whether or not the arrangement is collectively bargained will clearly 
impact the governance structure. The need to align governance with the unique risk sharing 
arrangement inherent in the target benefit plan design suggests that a substantial measure of 
governance control be transferred from the employer. One possible answer lies in New Brunswick’s 
new target benefit legislation which requires an independent plan administrator. The choice of 
administrator would be influenced by a plan’s stakeholders’ views on balancing security, 
transparency, and control. Aon Hewitt discusses three possible choices for administrator: 
1. Commercial Trustee 
 
The Commercial Trustee model involves contracting the work to a trust company, an option 
which could be expected to provide a high degree of security. 
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2. Pension Committee 
 
The Pension Committee option contemplates a committee with member representation that is 
assigned the powers of administrator, as already provided for in Manitoba and Quebec pension 
legislation. A well-functioning Board of Trustees or Pension Committee, with member 
representation, provides the most opportunity for transparency to members. One of the most 
vital aspects of the target benefit concept is that members understand the true nature and extent 
of the plan’s promises. 
 
3. Employer Management Team 
 
An employer management team would give the employer the most control. Some might be 
concerned about the concept of the employer as administrator. While there are certainly reasons 
an employer might not want the role of administrator, there are reasons supporting the idea:  
A. There are no such concerns in respect of the typical DC pension plan, where the employer is 
often the administrator, even though employees bear more risk than with a target benefit plan. 
B. By setting up a target benefit plan, the employer takes on the role of helping individual 
employees manage their pension risks. This is perhaps a paternalistic view, but it is also one of 
the reasons for considering target benefit instead of DC. 
Policymakers will likely want to protect members by implementing a fairly strict regulatory burden 
regarding benefit/funding policies and ongoing sustainability testing, while allowing more 
flexibility with governance. However, a key question which needs to be addressed is the extent to 
which plan members would be bound by decisions made by pension committee members, 
particularly in cases where no union (and no voting) exists. Pension standards legislation clarifying 
this issue could strengthen the hands of non-union and retiree representatives.  
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions Report suggested that the presence of plan member 
appointees on the governance body is one of the strongest governance safeguards possible, noting 
that the allocation of risk between employer(s), employees, and potentially retirees, makes member 
involvement in the administrator’s function critical to the long-term success of target benefit plans. 
 226 
 
There is also a role for the administrator to play in providing professional assistance to members to 
manage their risks. The governance of target benefit plans requires a distinction between the 
administrator and the stakeholders, with clear responsibilities and powers for each. Barry Gros 
notes that rigorous legislation of governance and risk management expectations should 
considerably lessen concern about exactly who must be involved in the governance of such plans.
494
 
He discusses the governance of TB plans as follows: 
In Canada, we have regulated the DB and DC design to death, but with little positive impact on 
actually delivering sustainable retirement systems. While it is time for change, we don’t necessarily 
need radical change. We actually have the tools in place – we just need to use them more effectively 
and permit more flexibility in their application.  The policy applies a moderate approach when 
setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks. The ideal would be to 
achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained. Benefit affordability 
testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past versus future benefits, 
application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that strike the balance 
between being conservative without being unduly risk averse.
495
  
 
The Association of Canadian Pension Management outlines the funding requirements of target 
benefit plans in Appendix 8 on page 306.  
Conclusion 
 
A debate currently underway within the pension industry concerns the relative merits of traditional 
actuarial practices (which tend to obscure the economic value of defined benefit (DB) pension plans) 
and the valuation principles of financial economics. Actuaries frequently stretch their professional 
judgement (as agents of employers) in estimating higher equity returns than actual market returns, 
thereby underestimating DB funding requirements.
496
  In other words, actuarial discretion has 
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become an integral part of the funding policy of defined benefit pension plans, distorting true 
market valuations.  
TBPs can be an attractive legal remedy to both members and employers. Members receive many of 
the same benefits as if they had participated in a traditional DB plan, including pooling of 
investment and longevity risk, but the employer no longer bears all of the funding risks associated 
with DB benefits (this funding risk is seen as a key motivating force behind the decline in DB plans 
in the private sector). The actuarial valuation of a TBP determines the ability to fund promised 
benefits, with no concept of actuarial "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. In other words, 
funding is fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding policy 
including: 
1. Benefit/funding test conducted by actuaries on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection 
valuation. 
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing conducted by actuaries to estimate the probability that the 
plan benefits are sustainable. 
  
3. A moderate approach when setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks. 
The ideal would be to achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained.  
 
4. Benefit affordability testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past 
versus future benefits, application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that 
strike the balance between being conservative without being unduly risk averse.  
 
It is important to note that target benefit plans are not a panacea to replace fully funded single 
employer defined benefit pension plans already meeting sponsors’ and members’ retirement goals. 
However, TBPs do offer both funding and benefit certainty in the wake of underfunded and/or 
underperforming DB pension promises.  
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CHAPTER 8-CONCLUSION 
 
A. Current Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Canada 
 
Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private 
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer 
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets 
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and 
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque. 
 
Defined benefit (DB) plans (in which retirement benefits are guaranteed for a worker’s life based on 
income and years of service) provide advantages to both employers and employees. Employees 
receive security with respect to mortality and investment risk, while employers are better able to 
recruit and retain high quality employees. In addition, DB plans offer employers funding flexibility 
(through actuaries, who they hire, using their discretion to estimate lower than market contribution 
levels).  DB plans have recently faced serious funding challenges resulting from a perfect storm of 
weak equity markets, low interest rates, and weak economic conditions. In 2000 asset values began 
a downward trajectory while liabilities continued their steady rise, resulting from ever increasing 
years of service, wages, and longevity, among other factors. Consequently, annual accrued assets 
were often lower than annual accrued liabilities, resulting in asset-liability mismatching and 
associated underfunding. As asset values began to fall below liability values, employers were 
required to make additional contributions (special payments) to meet their plans’ annual liabilities 
(i.e. assets must equal liabilities for full funding). Unfortunately many employers were unable to 
afford these additional funding requirements. In response to funding deficits, companies moved a 
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higher percentage of their asset allocations into riskier equity investments in an attempt to increase 
returns. Actuarial projections of returns on these equities were often higher than actual market 
returns, resulting in further underfunding and insolvencies. The Economist Magazine describes the 
scenario stating: 
False precision and reckless approximation have defined the actuarial profession’s role in the DB 
funding crisis that has enveloped corporate pensions on both sides of the Atlantic. Although 
actuaries have not been the only cause—companies, trustee boards, governments and accounting 
rules have all played their part—they have been surprisingly hapless at their main task: forecasting 
funds' future liabilities and assessing how many assets will be required to meet them. Their failure 
has hastened the collapse of final-salary (defined-benefit) pension schemes, many of which have 
ballooning financial deficits.
497
  
Professor Divya Anantharaman of Reuters Business School concluded (from her survey of the 
American actuarial profession) that economic bonding created by fee dependence does appear to 
affect the chosen discount (interest) rate, a primary driver of the reported pension obligation and the 
resulting funding status. Clients from whom actuarial practice offices derive a large fraction of their 
revenues receive recommendations for obligation-reducing (higher) discount rates when the plan 
sponsor has strong incentives to understate the pension obligation, and for obligation-increasing 
(lower) discount rates when the plan sponsor has incentives to overstate the pension obligation.   
Anantharaman’s study revealed that actuaries’ pension assumptions are a conduit for earnings 
manipulation for many reasons. First, statutory accounting requirements for pensions and post-
retirement benefits are complex, and even sophisticated investors have trouble understanding them 
fully (Brown 2004; Franzoni and Marin 2006; Picconi 2006). Second, actuarial assumptions involve 
very long-term forecasts about the future. Disentangling deliberate manipulation of these forecasts 
from honest errors is difficult (Brown 2004). The “take away” from Anantharanman’s study is that 
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the conflict of interest between the actuary and the employer (i.e. the actuary is paid by the 
employer) tends to bias actuarial projections of investment returns toward the high side, resulting in 
lower employer contributions and the underfunding of DB plans in these times of low investment 
returns.
498
  Although no such study has been conducted in Canada, there is plenty of anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that similar actuarial biases exist in the valuation of private sector single 
employer DB pension plans (See Arthurs, Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, 2008). 
Incidentally, actuarial biases also exist in public sector DB pension valuations. Actuary Malcolm 
Hamilton of the C.D. Howe Institute discusses the federal Public Service Pension Plan (PSPP): 
The payroll for members of the federal Public Service Pension Plan (the largest in Canada with 
more than 300,000 active and 170,000 retired members) was about $20 billion in 2012, with 
pension contributions totaling about $4 billion. At fair market value, pension contributions would 
have been about $8 billion. As a consequence, the federal government underestimated the 2012 
compensation of these members by $4 billion and reached a long list of erroneous conclusions 
about the cost of its pension plans and the compensation of its employees. 
 
Actuarial and accounting standards do not explicitly advocate or endorse the use of funding or 
accounting numbers in compensation studies but the standards-setting bodies and the professionals 
involved know, or ought to know, that numbers prepared for one purpose are being used for other 
purposes to which they are ill-suited. In this sense, actuarial and accounting standards have become 
the enablers of bad financial practice even though the standard-setting bodies do not advocate or 
condone bad practice.
499
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The legal issue emanating from systemic underfunding of private sector single employer defined 
benefit pension plans in Canada is whether or not actuaries have been using their discretion in a 
manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the 
legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. This thesis argued that the complex 
and often times confusing regulatory regimes currently governing pension actuaries in Canada 
affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB plan underfunding, insolvency, and 
retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of dollars. 
 
The federal PBSA and Ontario PBA both introduced numerous regulatory amendments in an 
attempt to address DB plan underfunding. For example, they increased the time allowed to fund 
accumulated deficits by 5-10 years, permitted annual deficits to be spread over a number of years 
(smoothing), and required actuaries to provide sensitivity analyses of the impact of a range of 
discount (interest) rates on funding requirements. The PBSA also implemented an extension of 
smoothing techniques to apply to the calculation of solvency deficiencies (i.e. funding shortfalls), 
allowing actuaries to average annual solvency deficiencies over the previous three years in 
calculating minimum funding requirements.  In other words, it permitted a reduction in the level of 
payments required to extinguish an annual shortfall under the assumption that a pension deficit is 
only an aberration or temporary departure from the normal value of a plan’s equity investments (i.e. 
market forces will eventually increase investment returns, eliminating any deficits). However, 
critics claim there is no empirical evidence to justify such an assumption (Bader and Gold, 2009). 
The reality is that numerous regulatory amendments have only served to push funding problems 
down the road, as investment returns have remained stubbornly low since 2000. 
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Canadian pension accounting standards, including the ability to defer and amortize experience gains 
and losses, the inclusion of expected additional returns from risky assets in the expected return on 
assets (EROA) calculation, and the ability to use a smoothed value of assets to calculate the EROA 
have also contributed to DB plan underfunding by permitting companies to under-report pension 
liabilities on their balance sheets. In other words, until 2011 employers were pressuring actuaries to 
use these accounting rules to underestimate their plans’ liabilities in order to improve their 
companies’ reported profits. In 2011 the adoption of International Accounting Standards Section 19 
(IAS 19) disallowed the use of these accounting standards to artificially inflate corporate 
profitability through the underfunding of defined benefit pension plans.  
Underestimating costs of changing demographics (i.e. operating on the assumption that plan 
members will die sooner than they likely will) has also contributed to DB underfunding. Mark 
Yamada, CEO of PUR investing (a firm specializing in DC plan investments) comments on this 
underfunding phenomenon: 
There’s no actuary who correctly anticipated the nature of the changing demographics. I’ve not seen 
a single actuary take responsibility for this problem….As the car is careening down the road, the 
actuary is yelling directions to the driver while staring out the back window (Benefits Canada, 
2015).  
In 2014 the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) issued the first-ever mortality tables based solely 
on Canadian pensioner mortality (actuaries previously used United States-based pension mortality 
tables to help them arrive at their assumptions). As a result, pensioners’ life expectancies will 
typically increase by about 2 years, increasing DB plan liabilities by approximately 3% to 10%.
500
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B. Governance of Funding Valuations 
In the 1980s and 1990s Canadian regulators introduced minimum funding levels (i.e. solvency 
valuations) required to pay a plan’s liabilities in the event a plan was discontinued (wound-up) for 
any reason. Solvency valuations
501
 estimate a plan’s asset and liability values using market rates, 
whereas actuarial discretion is used to estimate asset and liability values in going concern 
valuations. All single employer plans must be funded at the higher of the two valuations.  In other 
words, if the going concern funding level
502
 falls below the solvency funding level, the DB plan 
must be funded at the higher solvency level.  
Market discount rates have been in a downward trend for many years, whereas actuaries’ estimates 
of discount rates have only dropped slightly, resulting in lower going concern funding requirements 
than solvency valuation requirements (because the higher the interest (discount) rate, the lower the 
level of current funding required to meet future pension obligations). Consequently, the higher 
solvency valuations have become the driving force in the funding of DB plans. When solvency 
funding rules were first designed in the 1980s, their primary objective was to protect plan members’ 
benefits in the event of plan termination. This benefit security was to be achieved by requiring 
additional employer contributions to the plan (over a 5-year horizon) if a solvency test, required to 
be conducted at each actuarial valuation, revealed a deficit. Unfortunately, the theory behind 
solvency funding rules has not turned out as well in practice as was hoped. The unexpected high 
incidence of insolvent organizations winding up their underfunded DB pension plans has subverted 
this benefit security objective. It was probably never contemplated that solvency valuations could 
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result in a measurement of liabilities that far exceeded going concern liabilities, mandating 
repayment in 5 years instead of 15. In 2013 50% of DB plans in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension 
jurisdiction with 1.5 million private sector single employer DB member workers and retirees) were 
less than fully funded on a going concern basis, compared to 91% on a solvency basis.
503
 Similarly, 
95% of DB plans in Canada were less than fully funded on a solvency basis in 2013.
504
 
Corporate plan sponsors with otherwise healthy balance sheets have been put into difficult financial 
situations because of the funding requirements and short funding periods required for solvency 
deficits, resulting in repeated rounds of solvency relief granted by governments. In short, as DB 
pension plans have matured in a low interest rate environment, “as and when needed” solvency 
funding exemptions have become the norm. These underfunding issues are, to some extent, the 
result of trying to support benefits that were implemented in an era when costs were substantially 
lower than they are today, raising the  question of whether the funding problems that DB pension 
plans have encountered since 2000 are truly a funding requirement issue or in reality, a benefit issue.  
Numerous regulatory amendments have not prevented plans from being insufficiently funded for 
long periods of time, and they certainly have not prevented plans from terminating with deficits.  
C. The Superintendent of Financial Services 
The Superintendent of Financial Services is the actor with the most significant and numerous 
responsibilities with respect to the regulation of defined benefit pension plans both federally under 
the PBSA and in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension jurisdiction) under the PBA. For example, the 
Superintendent may require the preparation of actuarial valuation reports on an annual rather than a 
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triennial basis if a plan’s solvency ratio (assets/liabilities) falls below a certain threshold.  In 2013, 
816 defined-benefit plans or 60% of all active Ontario plans with solvency concerns were required 
to file annually rather than triennially. Federally regulated plans (which constitute 6% of all 
regulated pension plans in Canada) are held to a higher standard than Ontario plans, being required 
to file annually if their solvency ratio is below .120. OSFI estimates that approximately 61% of 
federally regulated defined benefit plans were underfunded on a solvency basis at December 2013, 
compared to an estimated 90% at December 2012. At December 2013, 7% of plans had an 
estimated solvency ratio of less than 0.80, compared to 61% at December 2012.
505
 Amazingly, 
nearly all of Ontario’s active plans (except 33) would be required to file annual actuarial valuation 
reports if the federal solvency threshold of .120 was applicable in Ontario. According to the Auditor 
General the proportion of underfunded defined benefit pension plans in Ontario increased from 
74% to 92% from 2005 to 2013, while the total funding shortfall increased from $22 billion to $75 
billion over the same period. 
 
In 2011 the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) carried out reviews of 30% of the 
1700 actuarial reports it received, ensuring that actuaries’ data, methods and assumptions met its 
standards. However, since 2011 FSCO has conducted detailed reviews of a much smaller number of 
actuarial reports (on a sample basis), no longer formally tracking the number of reviews it performs 
or reporting the results. In contrast, the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
(OSFI) conducts detailed actuarial valuation reviews on 30% of its DB plans annually, publicly 
reporting its observations to help educate plan sponsors and actuaries on its standards. The Auditor 
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General of Ontario’s 2013 Report expressed grave concerns about the Ontario Superintendent’s 
regulatory standards:  
FSCO’s Superintendent has limited powers under the Pension Benefits Act (Act) to deal 
with administrators of severely underfunded plans, or those who do not administer plans in 
compliance with the Act. FSCO’s federal counterpart, the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions, has the legal authority to terminate a plan, appoint a plan 
administrator or act as an administrator even if the plan is not terminated, and to require 
more frequent actuarial valuations of pension plans. FSCO can only prosecute an 
administrator or must order a plan to terminate before it can then appoint or act as the 
administrator. In addition, FSCO cannot impose fines on those who fail to file information 
returns on time; we noted that FSCO took little or no action against late filers. 
 
….FSCO should make better use of the powers it already has under the Act to monitor 
pension plans, especially those that are underfunded. Over the last three fiscal years 
(2010/11-2013/14), FSCO conducted on-site examinations of only 11% of underfunded 
plans on its solvency watch list; at this rate, it would take about 14 years to examine them 
all. As of September 2014, it was still in the process of finalizing its risk-based methodology 
for selecting higher-risk plans to examine. The examinations FSCO did conduct did not 
adequately cover significant areas, such as whether investments complied with federal 
investment rules required for pension plans…. The information provided by plan 
administrators and made public by FSCO is of little use to plan members for assessing and 
comparing the performance and administration of their pension plans with other plans or 
relevant benchmarks; nor would members find it of value in assessing whether FSCO had 
adequately protected their interests.
506
 
 
In 2008, FSCO was given the power to impose administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) in the 
mortgage sector, resulting in a 95% compliance rate by mortgage brokers submitting statutory 
filings in 2013/14. However, no such action has been taken in the pension sector. In 2014, 1,384 
Ontario pension plan administrators had not submitted one or more statutory filings on their due 
dates and were past due for over one year. FSCO followed up on only 13% of these cases (176 
plans) by sending a letter requesting compliance with filing requirements. No action was taken on 
the other 1,208 plans, including 127 with pension assets of more than $1 million. Furthermore, 
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FSCO levies no penalties on administrators who file persistently late and has taken legal action 
against plan administrators only twice who fell years behind in filings (the courts imposed fines in 
these cases). In contrast, OSFI has a five-stage rating system to determine the level of intervention 
required:  
• Stage Zero: No significant problems. Ongoing monitoring of the plan continues.  
• Stage One: Early warning. Deficiencies in the plan’s financial position are identified and it 
could be placed on a watch list. OSFI increases monitoring of the plan and may require addi-
tional relevant filings.  
• Stage Two: Risk to solvency. OSFI intensifies its supervisory interventions, requiring that 
the administrator take actions such as submitting a revised or early actuarial report or holding 
meetings with plan members.  
    • Stage Three: Future solvency in serious doubt. OSFI escalates its intervention because of 
immediate threats to plan members’ benefits. OSFI can remove the plan administrator and 
appoint a replacement; designate an actuary to prepare a report for funding purposes; bring 
action against the administrator; or terminate the plan.  
• Stage Four: Permanent insolvency. OSFI facilitates the wind-up of the plan. 
 
 
In short, the Auditor General left no doubt that FSCO’s oversight of actuarial discretion has been 
sub-standard. 
 
D. Governance of Actuarial Discretion 
As noted above, current pension funding policy in Canada permits actuaries to use their discretion 
to estimate higher than market investment returns to reduce employers’ contributions, with the goal 
of sustaining financially troubled DB plans. However, the fact that the number of workers enrolled 
in private sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by 
500,000 (from 2 to 1.5 million) since 2000 is evidence that this policy is not working. The 
economic impact of losing private single employer defined benefit pensions is significant, 
considering they pay each retired member approximately ¾ of a million dollars more than defined 
contribution plans (see CFIB study in Appendix 1-page 269). Greater transparency would flag 
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many of these financially troubled plans before they become insolvent. Nicholas Le Pan, former 
OSFI Superintendent of Financial Services discusses the issue of transparency: 
The days of basing assumptions and valuation solely on “actuarial judgment” are just about over. 
That doesn’t mean there isn’t room for judgment, but judgment needs to be adequately supported 
and explained. Too many people still perceive a lot of this to be the “actuarial black box”. Most 
users that I talk to still perceive it that way, and that’s partly their fault, but it’s partly actuaries fault 
because communication requires both sides to be committed to try to better explain what they’re 
doing.
507
  
 
In short, the risk that is currently carried on defined benefit pension fund balance sheets in Canada 
has not been clearly articulated, resulting in most plan members naively believing that the current 
regulatory arrangements are designed to guarantee full funding under the current formula for 
contribution rates. This belief is simply false.
508
 
There is no doubt that Canada’s current DB pension funding policy is dated.  It was implemented in 
the early 2000s as a short term solution to a short term problem (i.e. low investment returns) which 
has morphed into a chronic problem. In other words, the policy may have been successful if 
investment returns remained low for only a short time period (i.e. 2 -3 years) and subsequently 
returned to more normal (i.e. higher) levels, thereby eliminating actuarial deficits. However, the 
reality is that actuaries’ estimates of investment returns have been consistently higher than actual 
returns over the past 15 years, resulting in chronic underfunding and insolvencies. The actors 
governing pension funding in Canada have clearly failed to address this reality. 
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Although the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (a self-regulating, professional body) changed its 
standards in 2011 to improve the transparency of actuarial valuations (by updating how actuaries 
determine assumptions, apply actuarial methods and prepare their reports for all funding actuarial 
valuations), it has been complicit in permitting actuaries to use wide discretion in estimating higher 
than market discount rates in order to potentially reduce funding requirements. The exercise of an 
actuary’s professional judgment and discretion is the first source of insolvency risk for defined 
benefit pension plan members. Therefore, unless the actuary uses conservative assumptions, the 
plan members face the risk that minute variations in actual experience (from actuaries’ estimates) 
will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the plan sponsor will 
not be able to make them due to its insolvent status, or the size of the payments will drive the plan 
sponsor into insolvency proceedings.   
The Supreme Court of Canada’s surplus policy over the past 20 years (from Schmidt in 1994 to 
Manitoba Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, while making them wholly 
responsible for deficits (i.e. asymmetry). Employers, fearing trapped surpluses, have responded by 
pressuring actuaries (agents of employers) to use their overly broad discretion to project higher than 
market estimates of investment returns to reduce plan contributions levels. In other words, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s surplus policy has (advertently or inadvertently) compromised the 
ability of actuaries to make conservative funding estimates. 
Numerous Ontario PBA and federal PBSA regulatory amendments (see Appendix 3-page 278) over 
the past decade have not prevented plans from being insufficiently funded for long periods of time, 
and certainly have not prevented plans from terminating with deficits. The reality is that legislators 
have refused to adopt potentially more effective remedies to control actuaries’ discretion such as 
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making actuaries fiduciaries, abolishing employer-actuary agency, increasing the Superintendent’s 
oversight powers and mandating the use of lower discount rates.  
E. Legal Remedies 
1.Adopting Single-Employer Target Benefit Plans 
Adopting target benefit plans as a legal remedy to actuarial underfunding would serve to eliminate 
the impact of actuarial discretion on DB plan underfunding, considering that benefits are adjusted 
up and down to match investment returns (i.e. continually adjusting the level of benefits based on 
investment returns effectively eliminates actuarial surpluses and deficits), guaranteeing full funding. 
Clare Pitcher of Benefits Canada sums up the benefits of target benefit plans:
509
 
Opening up access to private pension plans via the TBP for the remaining 60% of Canadian 
workers will cost nothing to the government or taxpayers, as there is no Pension Benefits 
Guarantee Fund safety net. In fact, the ultimate beneficiary —along with the newly covered 
employees themselves—will be future taxpayers, as the potential need for government 
social assistance down the road will be reduced significantly. 
What’s needed now is to take this “new” plan design from the point of conception to the 
actual birth of the new TBP for use in the single- as well as multi-employer environment—
and in the non-union as well as union environment—thereby increasing the pie and 
broadening pension plan coverage across the province and the country. 
However, Robert Drummond (Professor emeritus at York University) tempers Pitcher’s enthusiastic 
portrayal of target benefit plans, noting that they are really only defined contribution plans in 
disguise: 
To say, ‘This is the target benefit, but if we don’t reach it, well, too bad’— then, in effect, you’re 
saying it’s a DC plan.” While the targeting may give employees a sense they’ll achieve the income 
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they’re aiming for, there’s no guarantee. And without the guarantee, you still put the risk on the 
shoulders of the employee.
510
 
It is important to point out that target benefit pensions are not being proposed in this thesis as 
replacements for the vast majority of private sector single employer defined benefit pensions which 
provide their members with ¾ of a million dollars more in retirement income than DC plans (see 
the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses’ 2013 study discussed on page 9 of Chapter 1). 
However, they are certainly an attractive alternative to DB plans which are chronically underfunded 
and in danger of insolvency. It is time for governments to adapt the multi- employer target benefit 
model for use by employers in serious financial trouble in order to arrest the continuing decline of 
private sector single employer defined benefit pensions in Canada.  
2.Fixing Discount Rates 
Public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability of DB plans by 
permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates (For example, a 2% increase in the 
discount rate reduces an employer’s steady state pension contribution rate by a whopping 30-40%). 
Unfortunately, this policy has resulted in excessive DB plan underfunding and insolvencies. While 
mandating fixed rates (effectively eliminating actuaries’ discretion) would eliminate underfunding 
resulting from actuaries estimating higher than market returns, it would also greatly increase the 
cost of funding DB plans, making them unaffordable for many employers. 
3.Eliminating Agency and Making Actuaries Fiduciaries 
Actuaries are impacted by two major legal factors. Firstly, actuaries are agents of plan sponsors, 
meaning that they are prone to being influenced by their employers’ wishes to make minimum 
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contributions. Secondly, because actuaries are not fiduciaries, they are not liable for plan deficits. 
These two factors have been instrumental in allowing employers to pressure actuaries into 
estimating lower, more affordable contribution levels (by projecting higher investment returns on 
pension assets than actual market rates). In short, actuarial discretion has (either advertently or 
inadvertently) become an important factor in the funding policies of both the Ontario PBA and the 
federal PBSA, allowing financially challenged plans to remain solvent through unrealistically low 
employer funding.
511
 The problem with this type of funding policy is that chronically low returns 
have resulted in large deficits. Many DB sponsors have responded by switching to defined 
contribution (DC) plans, freezing their DB plans (i.e. not allowing new employees to join), or 
declaring bankruptcy (note that pensioners are unsecured creditors).  Two potential legal remedies 
to this underfunding problem include eliminating employer-actuary agency by mandating that 
regulators hire pension actuaries and also making actuaries fiduciaries (thereby making them legally 
liable for any funding deficits). However, to date legislators have been more fixed on permitting 
actuaries to use their wide discretionary scope to underfund DB plans in an attempt to sustain them, 
rather than curbing their discretion. 
4.Increasing Superintendent’s Regulatory Oversight 
The Ontario Superintendent of Financial Institutions should be given more effective oversight 
powers to more quickly identify those plans with serious underfunding problems. 
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5.Restricting the Use of Smoothing to Push Funding Problems Down the Road 
A technique called smoothing has been incorporated into actuarial practice in Canada to insulate 
employers from sharp fluctuations in the values of DB pension assets and liabilities, and the 
resulting plan contributions required to meet funding obligations. However, smoothing 
methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined by actuarial practice. 
Consequently, the potential exists for smoothing to be used to opportunistically hide funding 
problems. More importantly, smoothing can detract from a clear understanding of a plan’s funded 
position if it is not fully explained in a valuation report so pension members are capable of 
understanding the true risk inherent in their pension contract. Stricter regulation of smoothing 
would make DB funding problems more transparent to regulators. 
6.Establish An Actuarial Oversight Board 
Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private 
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer 
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets 
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and 
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque. I argue that the best remedy to this systemic 
underfunding is the establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board comparable 
to the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) established in 2003 to regulate auditors.  
 
The issues surrounding the professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those 
that faced the auditing profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s 
(Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds 2009). Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving 
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them susceptible to the conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on the one 
hand, and serving the needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective may be 
to justify ways of spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent review 
of the U.S. actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another actuary to 
provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the actuary’s work 
product” (CRUSAP Task Force 2006).  
 
The Canadian Board’s mandate would be similar to the U.K. Actuarial Public Oversight Board 
(POB) established in 2005 “to promote more effective scrutiny and monitoring, to ensure that 
actuarial information is produced in accordance with the relevant technical and ethical standards, 
and to examine the current framework of self-regulation by the actuarial profession with respect to 
potential issues such as professional standards that have been weak, an absence of proactive 
monitoring of compliance and professional standards, and a profession that has been too 
introspective, not forward-looking enough.
512
 
Similar to the U.K., Canada’s Oversight Board would be responsible for providing more effective 
scrutiny of actuarial discretion, as well as establishing clearer lines of accountability of actuaries to 
regulators, to the profession and to clients and employers. It could conduct detailed studies on how 
to best to govern actuaries’ discretion, addressing issues such as the conflict of interest that 
surrounds actuaries as agents of employers. The U.K. model (discussed below) could be adapted to 
Canada:  
While the U.K. Actuarial Profession is still responsible for setting and operating its own regulatory 
arrangements, these are subject to review and scrutiny by the POB. If it has any concerns–in the 
                                                             
512
 Society of Actuaries, The Morris Review of the UK Actuarial Profession, 2009. Online: < 
www.soa.org/library/newsletters/the.../the 2005august.aspx >. 
 245 
 
public interest–about the efficacy of the arrangements, it may make recommendations to the 
Profession. The Profession will then comply with the recommendations within a reasonable period, 
or explain in writing why it is not doing so, on the basis that its reasons will be published and be 
subject to public scrutiny and media comment. The Profession will naturally think very carefully 
before it decides not to follow a POB recommendation.  
The Profession's staff supplies the POB with explanations and statistics about its regulatory 
operations and have regular meetings. This activity has added to operating costs, but can be a useful 
discipline as it provides an external challenge to our work which might otherwise be lacking in a 
member-led organisation. For example, two recent FRC/POB consultations–on promoting actuarial 
quality, and the monitoring and scrutiny of actuarial work–have looked at how the Profession's 
activities fit with the work of financial services and pensions regulators, and the responsibilities of 
senior management and governing bodies, auditors and actuarial consulting firms.
513
  
More specifically, an independent external oversight board could mandate that all provincial 
pension regulators implement a five-stage rating system (similar to that of Canada’s federal pension plan 
regulator (OSFI)) in order to standardize intervention into underfunded DB plans (before potential 
insolvency results in secured creditors claiming  all of a company’s assets):514  
• Stage Zero: No significant problems. Ongoing monitoring of the plan continues.  
• Stage One: Early warning. Deficiencies in the plan’s financial position are identified and it 
could be placed on a watch list. Provincial regulator increases monitoring of the plan and may 
require additional relevant filings.  
• Stage Two: Risk to solvency. Provincial Regulator intensifies its supervisory interventions, 
requiring that the administrator take actions such as submitting a revised or early actuarial 
report or holding meetings with plan members.  
    • Stage Three: Future solvency in serious doubt. Provincial Regulator escalates its intervention 
because of immediate threats to plan members’ benefits. Regulator can remove the plan 
administrator and appoint a replacement; designate an actuary to prepare a report for funding 
purposes; bring action against the administrator; or terminate the plan.  
• Stage Four: Permanent insolvency. Regulator facilitates the wind-up of the plan. 
 
 
Similar to the U.K., a Canadian actuarial oversight board could be combined with the Canadian 
Public Accountability Board (CPAB) for efficiency reasons. 
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514 Supra, See note 506. 
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E. Conclusion 
One can only wonder how many post United Steel pension funding fiascos are currently brewing in 
Canada. Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully 
funded by law (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), the legal 
issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not actuaries have been using their 
discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre 
contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. 
This thesis argued that the complex and often times confusing regulatory regimes governing 
pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB plan underfunding, 
insolvencies, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of dollars. It concluded that 
the best legal remedy to arrest the underfunding and decline in the number of private sector single 
employer defined benefit pensions in Canada (by half a million since 2000) would be the 
establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board. 
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APPENDIX 2 
ACTUARIAL COST METHODS USED IN FUNDING DEFINED BENEFIT   
    PENSION PLANS 
 
Overview 
One of the main reasons sponsors have abandoned (or frozen) DB plans in favor of DC plans is the 
volatile impact of DB plans’ uncertain costs and funding contributions on  their financial statements 
(especially since the mandatory adoption of “marked to market” accounting principles by public 
companies in 2011). DC plans do not necessarily have lower costs than DB plans, but they do have 
more predictable contribution levels. As discussed in previous chapters, DB contributions, which 
are directly linked to the funded status of DB plans, are notoriously difficult to predict.  
Actuarial cost methods are used to smooth DB contributions and to dampen their volatility.  These 
methods vary in their degree of transparency and on their impact on the schedule and volatility of 
contribution levels. It is important to note, however, that the ultimate cost of a pension plan is 
dependent on the level of benefits promised. In other words, the ultimate cost of a DB plan is not 
affected by the actuarial cost method. Actuarial cost methods simply allocate different portions of 
the total cost of a pension scheme to different fiscal years throughout the life of the scheme.
515
 Juan 
Yermo comments on actuarial cost (funding) methods: 
Actuarial funding methods should foremost be transparent. Actuarial funding methods that 
lead to sensible and smooth contribution patterns could be encouraged by regulators, 
although the specifics of a country’s pension system must be taken into account. For 
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 Juan Yermo and Clare Severenson, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Defined Benefit Plans and the 
Need for Counter-Cyclical Funding Regulations, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private 
Pensions, No. 3, OECD Publishing. Online: < www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km91p3jszxw-en >. 
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example, in Sweden pension costs in the main collectively bargained DB plan that covers 
700,000 white-collar workers are required to be made using an actuarial cost method that 
spreads the cost of salary increases over employees’ remaining years until retirement. This 
means that young people have very low pension costs whereas old people are significantly 
more expensive, especially should they receive a large pay increase. As Swedish DB 
accruals are directly linked to pension costs, this actuarial cost method is required in the 
collective agreement and would be difficult to change without restructuring the pension 
system. 
In jurisdictions such as Canada, where a range of actuarial funding methods are available, 
plan sponsors most often use the straight-forward, yet somewhat volatile projected unit cost 
(PUC) method for funding purposes, since that method is typically required for accounting 
valuations. The PUC definition of accrued liabilities is clear and readily comparable with 
the accumulating fund assets, making favourable and unfavourable experiences easy to 
identify and understand. Finally, the PUC is the method selected by the major accounting 
bodies for the international pension expensing requirements
516
 that were recently imposed 
on plan sponsors.
517
 
 
A numerical example may help clarify a key practical difference between the Projected Unit Cost 
method and another actuarial method called the Entry Age Method. Suppose a plan sponsor needs 
to contribute $15,000 for a particular employee who will retire in five years, and that the sponsor 
fully funds the cost specified by either method. Under the  Projected Unit method, the sponsor 
recognizes and funds, say, $1,000 in the first year, $2,000 in the second year, $3,000 in the third 
year, $4,000 in the fourth year, and $5,000 in the fifth year. Under Entry Age Normal, the sponsor 
would pay a level amount of contributions over the five year period at a rate of $3,000 per year. In 
other words, the sponsor using the Entry Age Normal method would have an actuarial accumulated 
                                                             
516
 In November 2011, the Accounting Standards Board of Canada (AcSB) amended Section 4600, 
regarding pension plans, in Part IV of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook. 
These changes come as a result of the issuance of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 13, 
Fair Value Measurement, in Part 1 of the CICA Handbook. Section 4600 requires the use of fair value for the 
measurement of investment assets and investment liabilities and also requires disclosures about how fair 
value has been determined. 
517
 Ibid. 
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liability of $9,000 and accumulated assets of $9,000 after 3 years. Using the projected unit credit 
method, the plan would have a cumulative liability of $6,000 and assets of $6,000 after 3 years.  
It is clear that the two approaches have different patterns of asset accumulation and liability 
recognition over time. Assuming the same funding ratios, the Entry Age Method attempts to create 
level contributions each year. In contrast, the Projected Unit Method is back- loaded (i.e. costs are 
lower early in an employee’s career and increase dramatically as retirement nears.) 518 This method 
is obviously detrimental to employee’s ability to receive their accrued pensions if a plan becomes 
insolvent in their early years of service. 
   
In summary, an actuarial cost method is analogous to a mortgage on a house. A mortgage is simply 
a way of assigning the cost of the house to different years so that it is paid off over a certain period 
of time. In the case of a DB funding method, a methodology is used to assign the cost of a 
member’s benefits to different years. The Projected Unit Cost Method is the most popular method 
used in DB plans in Canada for the following reasons:
519
  
1. It is more transparent than most other methods, and it produces a form of balance sheet that 
most people can understand.  
2. Its definition of accrued liabilities is clear and readily comparable with the accumulating 
fund assets.  
3. Favourable and unfavourable experience is easy to identify and understand. 
4. It is the method selected by the major accounting bodies for the pension expensing 
requirements that have been imposed on plan sponsors. 
The major funding problem associated with the Projected Unit Cost Method is that it is back-
loaded, meaning that most of the costs of an employee’s pension are paid in his or her later years of 
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service. In other words, in the event of insolvency an employee’s accrued years of service will not 
generally be funded.    
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APPENDIX 3 
  
Federal PBSA, Income Tax Act and Ontario PBA Amendments Addressing Underfunding 
 
A. Income Tax Act Amendments 
1. Increase to the Pension Surplus Threshold  
Policy-makers have always sought to limit pension contributions to the amounts necessary to 
provide pension benefits because pension funds are sheltered from tax. In other words, they wanted 
to prevent over contributions for the purpose of tax avoidance. This is a legitimate policy objective, 
and it was the rationale for the original 10% surplus rule. However, the amended Income Tax Act 
(ITA) increased the allowable surplus from 10% to 25% in 2010.
520
 James Pierlot of Benefits 
Canada discusses the reasons for increasing the surplus limit:  
A typical plan’s funded ratio can expect to change by more than 10% one year in three with routine 
variations in investment return and bond yields….There is a 25% likelihood that a 10% actuarial 
surplus in a plan valued on a going-concern basis and with assets smoothed will evaporate over any 
three-year valuation cycle. If a plan’s assets are valued on a market basis, the likelihood is higher—
33%. It’s clear that whether a plan’s assets are valued on a smoothed or on a market basis, 10% is 
not a sufficient margin to prevent a plan from going into deficit on a regular basis. A larger funding 
buffer can make pension contributions more predictable by reducing the need to increase pension 
contributions when there is an economic downturn or market correction—exactly when many 
employers are looking to reduce costs.
521
  
Unfortunately, the amended 25% surplus threshold did not mitigate employer’s limited access to 
surplus. 
 
                                                             
520
 However, employers are unlikely to build up surpluses in DB plans unless and until the issue of ownership 
of, and access to, surplus is better clarified in legislation. So far, pension reforms have not addressed this 
thorny issue. (Paul Litner, Seeing Change, Benefits Canada, 2010). Online: < 
www.benefitscanada.com/pensions/...law/bill-c-9-seeing-change >. 
521
 James Pierlot and Steve Bonnar, A Tale of Two Tax Rules, Benefits Canada 2007. Online :< 
www.benefitscanada.com/pensions/...law/a-tale-of-two-tax-rules >. 
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2.  Investment Rules 
The amendments removed the quantitative limits in respect of resource and real property 
investments, now limiting pension funds to investing a maximum of 10% of the market value 
(rather than book value) of assets of the pension fund in any one entity.
522
 The changes also 
prohibited self-investing, meaning that an employer will no longer be permitted to invest any 
amount of the pension fund in its own debt or shares. Previously such investments were permitted 
provided the employer’s shares were sold on a designated stock exchange.   
The federal government stated in its Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that the reason for these 
changes was that in a prudent person environment,
523
 the quantitative limits in respect of real estate 
and resource properties are considered cumbersome and no longer required. However, the 30% 
concentration limit on ownership of the securities of a single entity remains, also for “prudential 
reasons.” Amanda Darrach of Benefits Canada commented on these new federal investment rules: 
As the regulators have moved into this “prudence” environment, those responsible for 
pension fund investment must pay attention to what, exactly, prudence is. The British court 
in Cowan v. Scargill, in discussing in which types of investments a pension fund could 
invest, required a trustee to “take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he 
were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally 
bound to provide….” 
For the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), prudence 
contains the following elements, which plan administrators will recognize as elements of 
fiduciary duties owed to plan members: “a duty to act prudently and with due diligence 
when managing the pension fund and its assets, a duty of loyalty to the pension fund and its 
members and a duty to be fair and even-handed when dealing with competing interests.” 
                                                             
522
 Previously, a  pension plan could hold no more than 5% of its portfolio in a single parcel of real estate or a 
Canadian resource property, no more than 15% total in Canadian resource properties and no more than 25% 
total in a combination of real estate and Canadian resource properties. 
523
 The November 2009 release of the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities’ (CAPSA) 
consultation paper called The Prudence Standard and the Roles of the Plan Sponsor and Plan Administrator 
in Pension Plan Funding and Investment (CAPSA Paper) was quickly followed by the federal government’s 
announcement that the federal investment rules (FIR) would be amended to remove the quantitative limits on 
real estate and resource income properties. 
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There appears to be two aspects to prudence. One is the type of investments chosen by a 
pension fund. The other is the process by which those investment decisions are made…..The 
changes to the federal investment rules (FIR)…. may give plan administrators a little more 
room to manoeuver when making investment decisions. However, these changes should also 
remind administrators that each decision should be well considered, well documented and, 
yes, prudent.
524
 
The federal government’s emphasis on “prudential reasons” in this amendment appears to be 
edging sponsors and their agents (i.e., actuaries), ever closer to having a fiduciary duty. 
B. Federal  Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA)525 
1. Effective 2010 -Power to Replace Actuary 
Bill C-9 amended the PBSA to give the Superintendent the authority to designate an actuary 
to prepare an actuarial report or termination report in respect of a plan where the 
Superintendent believes that this is in the best interests of plan beneficiaries. The 
administrator is entitled to review a draft of the designated actuary’s report and may also 
provide comments. Once finalized, the plan administrator will be required to fund the plan 
in accordance with the designated actuary’s report.  
Bill C-9 also provided that the administrator must pay the reasonable fees and expenses of 
the designated actuary associated with preparation of the Superintendent-commissioned 
actuarial report out of the pension fund, which may be intended to override plan or trust 
language that would otherwise prohibit the payment of administrative expenses from a 
pension fund. 
This amendment imposed a safeguard against accepting actuarial funding estimates which, in the 
opinion of the Superintendent, are not realistic based on current market conditions.  
2. Effective  2010-New Solvency Funding Standard to Reduce Defined Benefit Funding 
Volatility 
One of the most significant changes to the PBSA funding rules was the introduction of a new 
 
                                                             
524
 Amanda Darrach, Pension Landscape Requires Due Diligence, Benefits Canada, 2010. Online: < 
www.benefitscanada.com/pensions/.../pension-legal-landscape-requires >.  
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 Murray Campbell and Ken Burns, Lawson Lundell LLP, Pension Reforms 2009, Pension and Employees 
Benefits Bulletin. Online: < www.lawsonlundell.com/media/news/143_Pension_Reform.pdf >. 
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standard for calculating solvency deficiencies. The purpose of the new standard was to reduce 
funding volatility for sponsors of defined benefit pension plans. Solvency funding is now 
determined based upon a three-year average of the funded ratios. Annual valuation reports are now 
required to be filed regardless of the solvency ratio.
526
 Each valuation establishes a new payment 
schedule of equal annual payments required to fund the plan based on the average solvency ratio, 
with the deficit being consolidated annually. This change will likely increase plan administration 
expenses, as prior to 2010 plan valuations could be prepared and filed once every three years if the 
plan was well funded. This new methodology is intended to provide plans with some relief from 
fluctuations in the markets and interest rates. 
Although these relief measures are an attempt to relieve some of the pension funding burden faced 
by plan administrators during difficult economic times, it should be noted that they also increase the 
risk of  plans terminating with funding deficiencies because contributions are deferred to future 
years. Plan administrators (who bear fiduciary obligations to their members) should be aware that 
                                                             
526
 Subsection 12(2) of the PBSA and Section 2 of the Directives of the Superintendent pursuant to the 
PBSA (Directives) generally require that an actuarial report be prepared as of the effective date of the plan 
and annually thereafter as at the plan year-end (except under certain circumstances, as described below). 
A plan administrator will generally be permitted to file an actuarial report every three years if:  
1. The solvency ratio disclosed in the most recent actuarial report filed with OSFI was 1.20 or greater. 
2. The pension plan meets the definition of a designated pension plan (Designated Plan) under 
Regulation 8515 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) (Designated plans are generally executive compensation 
DB plans not maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, in which the total of the pension 
credits of all specified individuals in the plan is more than 50% of the total of all pension credits of all 
individuals the plan for the year.) (Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Pension Plans Glossary. 
www.cra-arc.gc.ca.). 
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as solvency deficits increase, administration decisions will come under increased scrutiny, making 
them more susceptible to legal challenges.
527
 
3. Introduction of a Solvency Margin 
A solvency margin concept has been introduced for federally regulated pension plans. The solvency 
margin effectively restricts an employer’s ability to take a contribution holiday unless the plan is 
105 percent or more funded on a solvency basis. While a 5% margin is no doubt a good idea, it 
discourages employers from maintaining surpluses, exacerbating underfunding.  
4. 2014-Proposed Amendments to the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) 
In response to the significant cost pressures put on plan sponsors to meet DB plan funding 
requirements (caused by record low interest rates, volatile equity markets and increasing longevity) 
the federal government released a potential framework for target benefit pension plans (“TBPs”) on 
April 24, 2014.  A TBP is a “middle ground” between defined benefit (“DB”) and defined 
contribution (“DC”) plans. Benefits from TBPs are “targeted,” but not guaranteed (or “defined”) 
and may be adjusted based on the financial status of the plan. Unlike DB plans under the current 
legislation, accrued benefits can be reduced. Required contributions in TBPs are capped or fixed in 
accordance with the terms of the plan.
528
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 Kecia Podetz and Emond Harden, LLP, Ontario and Federal Government Provide Temporary Funding 
Relief for Pensions, 2010. Online: < www.ehlaw.ca/whatsnew/0908/Focus0908 >. 
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 Level Chan, Stewart McKelvey LLP, April 2014: Federal Target Benefit Plan Consultation, 2014.  Online: 
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C. 2010-Amendments to Ontario Regulated Plans Under the PBA529 
1. New Rules for Payment of Surplus to an Employer  
 
The provisions of the PBA have been changed to clarify the rules regarding the payment of surplus 
to an employer in three circumstances: a continuing plan; a full plan wind up; and a partial wind up. 
The new provisions enacted by Bill 120 changed many of the rules as amended by Bill 236. Under 
the new surplus rules now in force, surplus can only be paid to the employer if one of the following 
two conditions is satisfied:  
 
(a) the employer demonstrates that it is entitled to the surplus under the terms of the pension plan 
(which involves a review of all current and historical documents relating to the plan and the pension 
fund), or  
(b) a written agreement that allows surplus to be paid to the employer (which requires the 
agreement of at least two-thirds of the plan members and an appropriate number of former members 
and other persons entitled to payments under the plan).  
 
Section 77.12 of the PBA also provides that if the allocation of surplus is not addressed within a set 
period of time (to be determined by the regulations) following the partial or full wind up of a 
pension plan, the Superintendent has the authority to determine whether an arbitrator ought to be 
appointed to resolve the issue.  FSCO has indicated that, until it issues a formal surplus refund 
policy, the Superintendent considers the agreement of two-thirds of the total number of former 
members and other persons entitled to payments under the plan to be “appropriate”.  In other words, 
employers’ access to surplus is severely restricted, promoting minimum funding. 
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 Elizabeth M. Brown et. al., FTR Now Pension and Benefits, Ontario Pension Reform Round Up, Hicks 
Morley, 2010. Online: < www.hicksmorley.com/images/pdf >. 
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2. Immediate Vesting 
 
Under the old PBA rules employees registered in a plan less than two years were entitled only to a 
refund of their pension contributions plus interest. Bill 236 amendments provided immediate 
vesting and locking in of benefits for both DB and DC plans. In other words, upon termination of 
their membership, all members are entitled to the actuarial equivalent of their benefits (at a 
specified retirement age) based on their number of years of service.  
 
3. Grow-in Rights530 
 
 
Grow-in benefits entitle certain employees, who are terminated before they meet the eligibility 
requirements for enhanced benefits, to become entitled or in essence, to “grow into” the enhanced 
pension benefits even though their employment is terminated before they meet the eligibility 
requirements. Members of DB plans will qualify for grow-in early retirement benefits if their age 
plus service equals 55 points at the time of termination of employment.  This means that if the plan 
provides enhanced benefits, such as unreduced early retirement to members who meet certain 
conditions, members who are terminated before meeting those conditions, but whose age plus 
service equals 55 points, can grow into and qualify for such enhanced pension benefits after their 
employment is terminated.  An example is presented below: 
Assume a plan provides for unreduced pension if the employee completes 30 years of 
credited service.  If an employee is terminated before achieving 30 years of service, but has 
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55 points, the employee “grows into” the unreduced pension based on the actual service 
prior to termination.  If the employee had 25 years of service at termination, then 5 years 
after termination the employee may receive an unreduced pension based on 25 years of 
service.   
The old PBA rules provided grow-in benefits to members affected by full and partial wind-ups only 
if they met certain criteria, whereas the new rules will provide grow-in rights to all members who 
are involuntarily terminated in Ontario. Effective 2012, grow-in rights were provided to all 
members who were terminated without cause and whose combined age and service totaled at least 
55.  These new rules expanded grow-in coverage. This amendment could significantly increase a 
DB plan’s liabilities considering the thousands of lay-offs in Ontario’s manufacturing sector.  
 
4.   Special Orders  
 
One such measure is granting the Superintendent the authority to issue special orders to file reports. 
Specifically, new subsection 87(6) of the PBA now allows the Superintendent, in prescribed 
circumstances, to order a plan administrator, employer or any other person to prepare and file a new 
actuarial report or another prescribed type of report in respect of a pension plan if, in the opinion of 
the Superintendent, there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe: 
(i) there is a substantial risk to the security of benefits payable under the plan; or  
(ii) there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the plan.  
5. Actuarial Methods and Assumptions Used in Preparation of Reports 
 
The Pension Reform Legislation amended subsection 87(4) of the PBA to permit the 
Superintendent to make an order requiring an administrator to take action, where the 
Superintendent is of the opinion that the assumptions or methods used in the preparation of a 
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report are not consistent with accepted actuarial practice and to permit the Superintendent to make 
an order requiring the administrator to take action where the Superintendent is of the opinion that 
the assumptions or methods used in the preparation of a report are inappropriate in the 
circumstances, regardless of the use of accepted actuarial practice. 
6.  Permitted Use of Letters of Credit 
 
The Pension Reform Legislation contains provisions that enable an employer to use one or more 
letters of credit in lieu of cash contributions towards a solvency deficiency. The employer can use 
letters of credit (meeting prescribed criteria) in order to cover up to 15% of solvency liabilities. 
While most of the fees or expenses associated with obtaining or holding a letter of credit cannot be 
paid from the pension fund, fees associated with their enforcement may be. Unfortunately form plan 
members, letters of credit may be defaulted on in insolvency proceedings.  
D. 2011 PBA Amendments531  
 
1. Trigger for Annual Actuarial Valuations532 
Effective December 31, 2012, the Ontario PBA Regulations were amended to specify that annual 
actuarial valuations as of a date on or after December 31, 2012 for all pension plans (excluding 
JSPPs and specified Ontario multi-employer pension plans) are required where the actuarial 
valuation either excludes liabilities in respect of plant closure or permanent layoff benefits, or is 
funded less than 85% on a solvency basis.  
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2. Enhanced Disclosure Regarding Funding533 
Effective January 1, 2012, the prescribed requirement for pension plan annual statements was 
amended. Annual statements were required to include information regarding the transfer (solvency 
asset/liability) ratio of the pension plan set out in the two most recent actuarial valuations, and an 
explanation of the transfer ratio and how it relates to the level of funding of members’ benefits.  
E. 2014 Proposed PBA Amendments 
1. Target Benefit Pension Plans534 
The Pension Benefits Act (Ontario) (PBA) currently permits multi-employer pension plans 
established pursuant to a collective agreement or trust agreement to provide target benefits. 
Amendments to the PBA in 2010 introduced new target benefit provisions, available only to plans 
the contributions under which are collectively bargained, and subject to prescribed requirements. 
However, as of May 1, 2014 those provisions had not been proclaimed in force, no enabling 
regulations had been published and no framework had been developed for single employer TBPs. It 
is still unclear if the government intends to eliminate the requirement under the 2010 amendments 
that contributions to a TBP be collectively bargained, limiting their availability as a design solution 
to unionized employees.  
2. Defined Benefit Plans535 
The 2014 Ontario Budget proposed the following amendments applicable to DB pension plans, 
including: 
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 Lorraine Allard and Mark Firman, McCarthy Tetrault, Ontario Budget 2014: The Pension Budget, 2014. 
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535
 Ibid. 
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1. New regulations defining the level at which a "contribution holiday" may be taken and its 
duration. There is no indication as to what this threshold may be.  
2. New regulations requiring accelerated funding of benefit improvements in underfunded 
pension plans.  
3. Additional rules to support the long-term sustainability of DB plans following stakeholder 
consultations. It is unclear what these additional rules may be.  
4. An extension (to December 31, 2017) of the temporary exemption on (i) multi-employer 
plans; and (ii) jointly-sponsored pension plans (JSPPs), that are not subject to solvency 
funding, from the requirement that plans with solvency ratios of less than 85 per cent file 
valuations annually rather than triennially. The government will consult on permanent rules 
for such plans.  
5. Amendments to the PBA to permit the conversion of single-employer pension plans (SEPPs) 
to JSPPs. Among other things, conversion would require: preserving beneficiaries’ accrued 
benefit entitlements; providing advance notice to plan beneficiaries and trade unions; and 
obtaining the consent of the Superintendent of Financial Services and a requisite number of 
plan beneficiaries. New regulations would also permit employers to transfer SEPP liabilities 
to an existing JSPP. 
6. As discussed above, the PBA currently exempts certain named JSPPs from solvency funding 
requirements. The 2014 Budget announced that the government may introduce broader 
solvency funding exemptions for JSPPs. If so, this could be the primary reason for the 
sponsor of a SEPP to consider converting to a JSPP. 
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APPENDIX 4  
Discount Rates in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States 
 
1. Discount Rates in Great Britain  
Dimitri Vittas of the World Bank notes that the United Kingdom has a long history of debating the 
proper valuation of pension liabilities, which is difficult to summarize in a way that does justice to 
the complexity and richness of the ongoing debate. The UK authorities imposed a Minimum 
Funding Requirement (MFR) in the mid-1990s, but this was short lived because it was cast in rather 
simplistic and inflexible terms that did not reflect changing market conditions. The MFR has been 
replaced with a more flexible approach that places strong emphasis on the strength of the employer 
covenant.
536
 Vittas discusses DB plans:
537
 
In occupational pensions, pension plan trustees are required to adopt prudent assumptions, 
assisted with some guidance provided by the regulators. Trustees, in consultation with 
sponsoring employers, are allowed to set technical provisions either on the basis of the 
characteristics of the pension liabilities or on the assets backing the liabilities.
538
 In general, 
the discount rates should be below the expected long-term returns on plan assets to reflect 
the various risks facing the pension plans and to meet the legal requirement for "prudence". 
Although the margin for prudence is not defined, an equity premium of around 1.5 percent 
over government bond rates is widely used for the liabilities of active members and a much 
smaller minimal risk premium for the liabilities of retired members. However, great 
emphasis is placed on the strength of the sponsor covenant.
539
 This is another way of 
                                                             
536
 Dimitri Vittas, Discount Rates and the Valuation of Pension Liabilities, World Bank, 2010. Online: < 
www.previdencia.gov.br/arquivos/office/4_101201-142645-419.pdf >. 
537 Ibid. 
538
  Technical provisions are the scheme-specific funding standard which pension schemes must target. 
539
 For example, Towers Watson has developed sophisticated proprietary tools allowing it to integrate 
covenant risk directly into Asset-Liability Management (ALM) analysis. It incorporates specific sponsor 
financial strength and risk exposures, and projects forward the likely range of future financial states of the 
sponsor. This is done in a way that is entirely consistent with the projected assets and liabilities of the 
pension plan. It investigates those projected scenarios when the sponsor is expected to default and 
assesses the likely reduction in benefits that members subsequently receive. This allows Towers Watson to 
develop measures that are more tailored and informative for fiduciaries. Linking these with more traditional 
upside ALM metrics such as expected return gives fiduciaries a next-generation risk/return tool that pushes 
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underscoring the exposure of pension plans to the solvency and integrity risks of the 
sponsoring employers. Pension liabilities are allowed to be valued at discount rates that are 
linked to the expected returns of pension plan assets, but the UK Pensions Regulator 
requires financially weak companies to use least-risk discount rates for the valuation of their 
pension liabilities. In addition, sponsoring employers are required to make up any shortfall 
on least-risk discount rate valuations before they transfer the liability through an insurance 
buy-out. 
In other words, the UK Pensions Regulator adopted the opposite approach of most actuaries by 
invoking a low discount rate (i.e. higher contributions) when employers face financial difficulties 
and a high discount rate (i.e. lower contributions) when they are financially strong. This 
conservative regulatory regime should, in theory, promote full funding of financially troubled plans. 
However it begs the question of whether or not a sponsoring employer experiencing financial 
difficulties will be able to make the higher contributions necessary using a lower discount rate. 
Vittas  continues: 
The UK authorities monitor the performance of pension funds but have not imposed the 
maintenance of buffer reserves. The trustees of pension plans are required to obtain actuarial 
valuations at least every three years. They must establish recovery plans in consultation with 
the sponsoring employer showing how any funding shortfall will be eliminated. In the event 
the recovery period exceeds 10 years, it may be investigated by the regulator and may be 
amended.
540
 
Several European countries have, however, taken action to address the issue of the proper valuation 
of pension liabilities and the maintenance of adequate buffer reserves. Most notable among them 
are the Netherlands and Denmark.
541
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the envelope. (Towers Watson, Sponsor Strength Covenant-Asset Liability Modelling (ALM), 2012.  C-ALM 
Online: < www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media >.  
540
 Ibid. 
541
 Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, Actuaries and Discount Rates, 2013. Online: < 
www.actuaries.org.uk › Research and resources >. 
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2. Discount Rates in the Netherlands   
Edward Pond notes that similar to other OECD countries, the Dutch pension system is a multi-pillar 
system. Occupational pension plans are for the most part organized as multi-employer pension 
funds that are governed by collective labour agreements. These funds had long been based on final 
salary DB pension plans with special provisions for vesting and portability that did not penalize 
transfers across funds and thus did not discourage labour mobility. 
During the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s Dutch pension funds increased their investments in 
equities, seeking higher returns, expanded benefits and contribution holidays. However, similar to 
other pension plans around the world, Dutch plans experienced a solvency crisis in 2001-2004 as a 
result of both a large drop in equity prices and low interest rates. This crisis caused funding ratios to 
decline significantly, from 131 percent in 2000 to 97 percent in 2002.
542
  
The fall in the funding ratio reflected to some extent the adoption of 'fair value' accounting, 
replacing the traditional actuarial approach which aimed at stabilizing both the contribution rate and 
the funding ratio of pension funds by using actuarial estimates of assets and liabilities. The old rules 
mandated pension funds to discount liabilities at a constant rate of 4 percent rate and to report assets 
at actuarially adjusted values. The new rules require pension funds to use fair market values
543
for 
both assets and liabilities. Use of the euro swap yield curve is compulsory.
544
 
                                                             
542
 Edward H.M. Ponds and Bart Van Riel, Sharing Risk: “The Netherlands New Approach to Pensions, 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College”, 2007. Online: < www.crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2007/04/ib_2007-5.pdf >. 
543 In the Netherlands the Financial Assessment Framework (Financieel Toetsings Kader -- FTK) (part of the 
new Pension Act) was introduced in January 2007.  It mandated a market-based valuation of pension 
liabilities for funding purposes, without any amortisation or smoothing options. As in other countries, 
estimated future salary growth is not to be considered in the measure of accrued liabilities. Future benefits 
are discounted using the current yield curve on default-free capital market instruments, rather than the fixed 
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The solvency and supervisory regime in the Netherlands has also been tightened. Pension funds are 
required to maintain a minimum solvency requirement of 5 percent of technical provisions as well 
as a buffer over liabilities, which depend on their asset composition and the extent of asset liability 
mismatches. The buffer is designed to reduce the probability of underfunding to only 2.5 percent 
within a one year horizon. Funds that invest more in equity or in fixed income assets with a shorter 
duration than the duration of liabilities must maintain stronger buffers. 
Pension funds may opt to comply with a standardized model or build their own internal models to 
compute their solvency requirements, although these models need to be approved by the 
supervisor.
545
 In the standardized model, the solvency buffers are calculated through a stress test 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
rate of 4 percent as has been historically the case. The market yield is corrected for expected inflation if 
indexation of accrued pensions is unconditional; that is, if it does not depend on the performance of the 
pension fund. Liability measures are also expected to take into account further increases in longevity. 
Sponsor companies are also required to separate the liabilities that are "conditional" on the investment 
performance of the pension fund from those that are "unconditional". Funding requirements are applied only 
to unconditional liabilities (Juan Yermo, Reforming the Valuation and Funding of Pension Promises, OECD 
Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 13, OECD Publishing. Online: < 
www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/39427286.pdf >.) 
544 The yield curve is a curve showing several yields or interest rates across different contract lengths (2 
month, 2 year, 20 year, etc...) for a similar debt contract. The curve shows the relation between the (level of) 
interest rate (or cost of borrowing) and the time to maturity, known as the "term" of the debt for a given 
borrower in a given currency. For example, the U.S. dollar interest rates paid on U.S. Treasury securities for 
various maturities are closely watched by many traders, and are commonly plotted on a graph which is 
informally called "the yield curve". More formal mathematical descriptions of this relation are often called the 
term structure of interest rates. ((Wikipedia) Online: < en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yield_curve >.) 
An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties to exchange streams of interest payments. Typically, 
one stream of payments is based on a fixed rate of interest and the other stream on a floating rate of 
interest. Only the net cash flows are paid; the notional principal on which the interest payments are 
calculated is not exchanged. A forward rate agreement is equivalent to a single-period interest rate swap, in 
which interest payments are exchanged only once. A swap can be characterised as a portfolio of forwards. 
(Eli Remolona, The Euro Interest Rate Swap Market, BIS Quarterly Review, 2003. Online: < 
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0303f.pdf >.) 
545
 The year 1923 saw the creation of insurance supervisor Verzekeringskamer, whose remit was expanded 
in 1952 to include pension funds. In 2001, the name was changed accordingly, to Pensioen- & 
erzekeringskamer (Pension and Insurance Supervisory Authority of the Netherlands). On 20 October 2004, 
this PVK merged with De Nederlandsche Bank. (De Nederlandshe Bank, History of the PVK, 2007. Online: < 
www.dnb.nl/en/about-dnb/organisation/history >. 
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based on six broad risk factors and a formula for aggregate risk that takes partially into account 
correlations across asset classes. The methodology implies that the typical Dutch fund will need to 
maintain a sizable buffer amounting to 30 percent of technical provisions (funding requirements). In 
order to reduce the size of the buffer, pension funds will need to reduce their asset/liability 
mismatches by shifting from equities to bonds or by increasing the duration of their bond portfolio. 
Pension funds with a funding shortfall are required to return to 100 percent funding within 3 years, 
while they are given 15 years to rebuild the solvency buffer to the required level.
546
 
The new solvency approach, especially the compulsory use of the euro swap yield curve, have been 
criticized by the pension funds for being inflexible and for failing to take properly into account the 
long-term nature of pension liabilities. Nordic regulators, in particular, have been concerned for 
some time about persistently low interest rates and the lack of liquidity
547
 at the long end of the 
curve (long term investments, usually over 10 years)  as insurers and pension funds in the region 
typically discount their liabilities using market rates.
548
 Dutch pension funds, for instance, are 
                                                             
546
 Gregory Brunner et. al., World Bank, Risk Based Supervision of Pension Funds: A Review of International 
Experience and Preliminary Assessment of First Outcomes, Policy Research Working Paper 4491, 2008. 
Online :< www.elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4491>. 
547
 The degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the market without affecting the asset's 
price. Liquidity is characterized by a high level of trading activity. Assets that can be easily bought or sold are 
known as liquid assets. (Investopedia. Online: www.investopedia.com/ >.) 
548
 The yield curve is simply the yields on bonds of varying maturities (typically from three months to 30 
years) plotted on a graph. The yield curve illustrates what is called “the term structure of interest rates,” or 
the idea that a bond’s maturity and yield are connected. Typically (but not 100% of the time), short-term 
bonds offer lower yields, while longer-term bonds pay higher yields. As a result, the typical shape of the yield 
curve is a curve that begins on the lower left and moves to the upper right. This is typically referred to as a 
“normal” yield curve. Keeping in mind that prices and yields move in opposite directions, different factors 
influence movements on either end of the yield curve. Short-term interest rates (also called “the short end of 
the yield curve”) tend to be influenced by expectations for U.S. Federal Reserve policy. Short-term rates tend 
to rise when the Fed is expected to raise interest rates, and fall when it is expected to cut rates. Longer-term 
bonds (or the “long end” of the curve) are influenced to some extent by the outlook for Fed policy, but other 
factors play a role in causing long-term yields to move up or down. Foremost among these are the outlook 
for inflation, economic growth, supply-and-demand factors, and investors’ general attitude toward risk. Very 
generally speaking, slower growth, low inflation, and depressed risk appetites will help the performance of 
longer-term bonds (and cause yields to fall). Faster growth, higher inflation, and elevated risk appetites will 
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required to use a discount curve based on the euro swap market.
549
 This low rate setting has meant 
soaring liabilities and deteriorating funding ratios. As a consequence of the continuing credit crisis, 
this swap curve has reached record lows, resulting in low coverage ratios for many Dutch pension 
funds (which under current regulations have to be remedied within three to five years). This has led 
a large number of pension funds to announce benefit cuts for 2013 and beyond. This is certainly not 
true for all funds, however, as investment policy and hedging policies have diverged widely during 
the past few years.
550
 ABP, the largest Dutch pension fund, recently called on the authorities to 
adopt a more pragmatic approach and reconsider the mandatory use of the current swap curve, 
which has been depressed to very low levels by policy measures to contain the 2008 global 
financial crisis. ABP warned that cuts in benefits might have to be implemented since despite a 
strong investment performance on its asset portfolio it was unable to eliminate its reported funding 
shortfall. 
3. . Discount Rates in the U.S. 
Prior to passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, DB plans in the United States were 
permitted to smooth assets over five years and to discount liabilities using a five-year weighted 
average of interest rates. This smoothing produced a distorted picture of the financial health of 
plans during the early 2000s and led to very inadequate minimum funding contributions. This was a 
significant factor in the termination of the plans of United Airlines, US Airways, and Bethlehem 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
hurt performance (and cause yields to rise). All of these factors push and pull simultaneously to influence the 
direction of longer-term bonds. (Thomas Kenny, What is the Yield Curve? 2014. Online: < www. 
bonds.about.com › About Money › Bonds › Advanced Bond Investing >.) 
549
 The euro interest rate swap market is one of the largest and most liquid financial markets in the world. 
Indeed, the swap curve is emerging as the preeminent benchmark yield curve in euro financial markets, 
against which even some government bonds are now often referenced.  
550
 Gerard Roelofs et. al, IPE Magazine: The Netherlands, Pension Turmoil, Investment and Pensions 
Europe (2012). Online: < www.ipe.com/the-netherlands-pensions-turmoil/44229.fullarticle >. 
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Steel, all of which continued to increase benefits to members even though they were significantly 
underfunded on a solvency (termination) basis. The United States’ Administration at that time 
strongly urged the Congress to reduce the permitted smoothing in the funding rules. Subsequently, 
the Pension Protection Act prescribed two year smoothing for discount rates. 
Corporate pension plans in the U.S. determine the current value of their liabilities by using the rate 
of return on corporate bonds; otherwise known as the discount rate.  As historically low bond rates 
over the past several years forced higher funding contributions, U.S. corporations lobbied Congress 
to change the discount rate.  Pension discount rates were recently amended in the U.S. Highway 
Bill 
551
which was signed into law by President Obama on June 27, 2012. Under this new legislation, 
pension plans will be able to use a rate based on the average of the past 25 years instead of 
discounting long-term liabilities using a rate based on the average of the past two years, This is 
expected to increase the discount rate used to determine DB liabilities by more than two percentage 
points, increasing the current discount rate from the 4 percent range to roughly 6 percent.  Since 
liabilities are sensitive to discount rate assumptions, a plan's liabilities will change roughly 15 
percent for every one percentage point change in the discount rate.  For example, Boeing reports 
that a mere quarter of a point increase in the discount rate could cut its pension liability by $1.7 
billion. 
Since 2002, Congress has, on several occasions, let specific corporations use a higher discount rate 
to determine their contributions, including American Airlines which reduced its annual contribution 
to employee pension plans by $2.1 billion. Unfortunately, the airline ultimately faced a shortfall in 
its pension plan that it could not afford to fund. It filed for bankruptcy in 2011. This begs the 
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 Public Law 112-141,112th Congress. 
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question of why Congress would go along with a policy that provides short-term relief to employers 
but much longer-term risk to the pensioners.  For one reason, ensuring the financial health of 
corporate America is vital to job creation prospects in these times of high unemployment. 
Furthermore, if corporations put less money into their pension plans, the federal government is left 
with more income to tax.  According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the result of shifting 
pension funding money from pension funds to income statement results in $8.8 billion more in 
taxes over the next 10 years. An example of the impact of a higher discount rate is provided below: 
Let's say you promise to pay your employee $1 million in benefits in a lump-sum, 30 years 
from today.  Assume your investments will return 10 percent annually. If you invest 
$57,300 today it will grow into $1 million over the next three decades. However, if you only 
assume a return of 7 percent, then you would have needed to put in $131,400 today to have 
the same payout. 
In other words, increasing the discount rate to the Highway legislation’s unrealistic levels promotes 
the underfunding of DB pension plans and places the burden of the shortfall on both current and 
future generations, as many of these plans will undoubtedly face insolvency down the road. As 
Jason Fitchner states “That's not good funding policy, no matter what the short-term fiscal gains are 
for companies and government coffers.”552 
    
 
       
 
 
          
                                                             
552
 Jason Fitchner, and Eileen Norcross, Real Clear Policy, Paying Over Pension Liabilities, 2012. Online: < 
www.realclearpolicy.com/.../paving_over_pension_liabilities_164.html >. 
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      APPENDIX 5   
Actuaries’ Assumptions 
 
Actuaries’ Economic Assumptions 
(i) Assets 
At the end of 2012, Canadian pension schemes held approximately 34% in fixed investments, 17% 
in Canadian equities, 15% in global equities, 10% in real estate and the remainder in other 
investments.
553
 Practical methods of valuing pension plan assets for funding purposes have been 
described and classified, notably by Jackson & Hamilton (1968), Trowbridge & Farr (1976, p. 88), 
Winklevoss (1993, p. 171) and in a recent survey by the Committee on Retirement Systems 
Research (1998).  Market-related methods are used most frequently in most jurisdictions.
554
 
In Canada, the current market value of plan assets is used or else an average of current and past 
market values is taken in an attempt to remove short-term volatility.  The assumptions the actuary 
must make in the valuation of assets include the employee and employer annual plan contribution 
rates, the rate of return on the assets and the discount rate to convert the future returns on the assets 
into current dollars on the valuation date.  
 
 
                                                             
553
 Canadian Institutional Investment Network, Canada’s Pension Landscape Report-The Evolution of Risk 
(Toronto: Invesco, 2012) at 9. 
554
 M. Iqbal Owadally and Steven Haberman: Society of Actuaries, The Pension Forum, Online: < 
https://www.soa.org/.../pension.../pfn-2000-vol13-iss1-haberman-owadal >. 
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(ii) Liabilities 
In a defined benefit plan, the company is responsible for funding its employees’ pension benefits. 
The value of the pension benefits earned (the “service cost”) is typically specified in the plan text in 
terms of years of service and percentage of salary. However, in any given accounting period in 
which pension benefits are earned by an employee, the total length of service, the final average 
salary, and the number of years a pensioner will live after retirement are obviously, all uncertain. 
This means that the cost of the pension benefits (liabilities) can only be estimated based on the 
pension plan formula in the plan text and on actuarial assumptions about the determinants of the 
pension liability such as discount rates, inflation, and expected pay increases.
555
 These three 
actuarial assumptions are discussed below: 
1. Discount Rates 
For pension funding, this assumption is used to discount future benefits to determine the value of 
plan liabilities on the current valuation date. The discount rate should be a reasonable 
approximation of the future rates of return on the pension plan’s assets. The discount rate is often 
referred to as the valuation interest rate.  Different plans will have different discount rates, 
reflecting different investment strategies and varying opinions of future rates of return on plan 
investments. It is typically selected as a long-term reflection of the value of plan assets and 
liabilities.  
 
 
 
                                                             
555
 Ibid. 
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2. Salary Scale  
 
This assumption is used to project an individual’s future compensation based on current 
compensation. The salary scale assumption reflects expected inflation, productivity, seniority, 
promotion and other factors that affect wages. 
3. Inflation 
 
Inflation is a fundamental component of all economic assumptions made by actuaries and is 
generally estimated from government and private sources. 
(iii) Pension Liability Calculations 
A pension plan’s liabilities can be calculated in different ways, but the same principles always 
apply. The actuary calculates the expected future pension payments for each participant in the plan 
using the company’s participant data and plan provisions. These future benefit payments consider 
the individual’s compensation and service history, and when that individual might be expected to 
die, quit, become disabled or retire. All projected future pension payments are discounted to current 
dollars using a discount rate estimated by the actuary. Actuaries call this discounted amount the 
present value of future benefits (PVFB). The PVFB represents the present value of all accrued 
benefits (as of the valuation date) expected to be paid from the plan to current plan members, retired 
or working.  If actuarial assumptions are correct, the company will eventually need to set aside 
enough money (assets) to equal the PVFB (to cover all of the projected pension payments to current 
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workers and retirees). Actuaries have developed cost methods to divide the PVFB into the 
following three categories-past, present and future liabilities:
556
 
(i) Actuarial Liability (AL) is the portion of the PVFB that is attributed to past service. 
This is the estimate of the value of the compensation that was earned in prior working years 
and is often referred to as the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). Different cost methods 
(see Chapter 2 on page 249) calculate the AL differently, but it always reflects only past 
service.  It reflects past service up to the current valuation date and reflects expected future 
pay increases. The AL reflects future pay increases because most pension plan benefits in 
Canada are calculated based on a worker’s final 5 years of earnings before retirement.  
(ii) Normal Cost (NC) is the portion of the PVFB that is attributed to the current year of 
service. This is the current value of the pension compensation being paid this year. Different 
cost methods calculate the NC differently, but generally it reflects the current year of service 
and may reflect expected future pay increases. It is also referred to as the Service Cost (SC). 
(iii) Present Value of Future Normal Costs (PVFNC) is the portion of the PVFB that will 
be attributed to future years of service. Quite simply, it covers compensation that hasn’t yet 
been earned. This number is not normally disclosed and is rarely used in any cost 
calculations. 
The following example illustrates the differences in the above calculations.
557
 
Joe participates in a pension plan that gives him 1 percent of final salary for each year of 
service he earns under the plan (1 percent x salary x service). Joe is currently age 55, has 
worked for 20 years for the company, and his current pay is $50,000. The actuary assumes 
                                                             
556
 American Academy of Actuaries, Fundamentals of Current Pension Funding and Accounting for Private 
Sector Pension Plan at 5, 2004. 
557
 Ibid. 
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Joe will retire at 65, after working 30 years for the company, with an estimated future pay of 
$75,000. 
Joe’s present value of future benefits or PVFB is based on the salary he is actually expected 
earn from the plan at the end of all of his years of service. His PVFB is the actuarial present 
value of all the pension benefits he is projected to have earned at age 65. This projected age 
benefit is calculated as 1 percent multiplied by his projected salary at 65 multiplied by his 
projected service at 65, or 1 percent x $75,000 x 30 years = $22,500. 
 
• Joe’s actuarial liability or AL can be calculated using several funding methods. In this 
example, the most common method used in Canada, the Projected Unit Cost Method (based 
on past service and expected future pay cost method). The liability is based on Joe’s 
expected future salary, but only takes into account the service he’s earned up to the 
valuation date. The AL is the actuarial present value of 1 percent x his projected salary at 65 
x his years of service up to the current valuation date (at age 55) = (1% x $75,000 x 20) = 
$15,000.  
• The normal cost or NC is calculated under the same method as the AL, but only reflects 
the projected funding requirement for the current year of service. So, continuing with the 
Projected Unit Credit Cost method, the NC is the actuarial present value of (1 percent x his 
projected salary at 65 x 1 year of service), or the actuarial present value of (1 percent x 
$75,000 x 1 =$750.     
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APPENDIX 6  
Surplus Regulatory Amendments to the Federal Income Tax, the Ontario PBA,  and the 
Federal PBSA 
 
1. Federal Income Tax Act (ITA) 
 
All registered pension plans in Canada must comply with the rules found in the Income Tax Act 
(Canada) and its regulations. Bill C-9 has increased the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a 
defined benefit provision of a plan for contributions made in respect of post-2009 service from 10 
percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities without triggering adverse tax consequences. This 
amendment was designed to put less pressure on pension plan sponsors to deal with surplus 
management issues.
558
 However, new provincial regulations and case law have made it much more 
difficult for sponsors to access surplus, casting doubt on whether they will be willing to accumulate 
additional surpluses in their pension plans under improved economic conditions. A key current 
impediment is the asymmetry faced by sponsors, whereby pension fund surpluses are increasingly 
seen as the property of plan members, while deficits remain the sole responsibility of the sponsor. 
For example in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada case Schmidt v. Air Products, the Court 
held that pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the surplus upon wind-up 
unless the pension text says otherwise. 
2. Ontario PBA 
The statutory framework governing occupational pension plans for Ontario employees remained 
largely unchanged for about 20 years until 2010 when the Ontario government passed two 
significant pension reform Bills (120 and 236), amending the Pensions Benefits Act (PBA). The 
                                                             
558
 Jean-Pierre A. Laporte and Susan G. Seller, Pension Reform: Ontario’s Bill 236 and Canada’s Bill C-9 
Are Now Law-Are You Ready? Bennett Jones Pension and Benefits Update, 2010. Online: < 
www.bennettjones.com >. 
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Pension Benefits Act (PBA), as amended by the Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 2010 (Bill 236) 
and by Securing Pension Benefits Now and for the Future Act, 2010 (Bill 120), introduced new 
surplus withdrawal rules that came into force in 2010. Under the new surplus withdrawal rules an 
employer can receive payment of surplus from a continuing pension plan or on the wind-up of a 
pension plan in one of three ways:
559
  
1. If the documents that create and support the pension plan and pension fund provide for the 
payment of surplus to the employer; or  
2. If a written agreement between the employer and at least two-thirds (2/3) of members and an 
appropriate percentage of former members, retired members and other persons who are 
entitled to payments under the plan provides for the payment of surplus to the employer; or  
3. if the payment is authorized by a court order declaring that the employer is entitled to 
surplus while the plan continues (where the application is for consent to payment of surplus 
to an employer out of a continuing plan), or when the plan is being wound up (where the 
application is for consent to payment of surplus to an employer out of a plan that is being 
fully wound up).  
 The major reforms impacting actuarial surplus are: 
1. Section 77.1- elimination of partial wind-ups (i.e. S.C.C. Monsanto Decision which 
awarded employees surplus no longer applicable) 
 
2. Section 77.11- plan text rules supreme in governing surplus entitlement. If the text is 
silent on payment of the surplus to the employer on wind-up, it shall be distributed 
proportionally to members, former members and retired members.  
3. Section 77.11(4) - If a pension plan is a successor pension plan and if it is being wound 
up, the employer is not entitled to payment of surplus under the pension plan unless the 
documents that created and supported the original pension plan and pension fund and those 
that create and support the successor pension plan and pension fund both provide for 
payment of surplus to the employer on the wind -up Agreement about surplus. 
4. Section 77.11 (7) - A written agreement among the following persons may provide for 
payment of surplus to the employer in the circumstances specified in the agreement and as 
of the date specified in the agreement: 
 
1. If the surplus is to be paid to the employer while the pension plan continues in 
existence, 
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 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Surplus Withdrawal, 2012. Online: < www.fsco.gov.on.ca >. 
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i. the employer, 
ii. at least two-thirds of the members of the pension plan (and, for this purpose, a trade 
union that represents members may agree on behalf of those members), and  
iii. the number which is considered appropriate in the circumstances by the 
Superintendent of former members, retired members and other persons who are 
entitled to payments under the pension plan as of the specified date for payment 
of the surplus. 
2. If the surplus is to be paid to the employer on the wind up of the pension plan,  
i. the employer, 
ii. at least two-thirds of the members of the pension plan (and, for this purpose, a 
trade union that represents or represented members on the date of the wind up 
may agree on behalf of those members), and  
iii. the number which is considered appropriate in the circumstances by the 
Superintendent of former members, retired members and other persons who are 
entitled to payments under the pension plan as of the date of the wind up. 
 
5. Section 77.11 (8) - A written agreement prevails over any document that creates and 
supports the pension plan and pension fund and it prevails despite any trust that may 
exist in favour of any person.  
 
6. Section 6 (10)  -An arbitration award prevails over any document that creates and 
supports the pension plan and pension fund, it prevails over subsections (3) and (4), and 
it prevails despite any trust that may exist in favour of any person. 
 
7. Section 55.1 (1) - An employer required to make contributions under a pension plan, or 
a person or entity required to make contributions under a pension plan on behalf of an 
employer, may reduce or suspend, in the prescribed manner, contributions for the 
normal cost of the pension plan if the pension plan has a surplus and if such other 
requirements as may be prescribed are satisfied.  
8. Section 80-The long-awaited amendments to the Ontario Pension Benefits Act ("PBA") 
regarding the transfer of assets between pension plans became effective on January 1, 
2014. New supporting Regulations under the PBA[1] (the "Asset Transfer Regulations") 
also came into force on January 1, 2014 mandating  that If the original plan has a surplus 
as of the effective date of transfer, the amount of assets to be transferred must include a 
portion of the surplus determined in accordance with the Asset Transfer Regulations. In 
other words, Section 80 of the Ontario PBA (mandating the transfer of DB pension 
surplus to the transferred employees’ new DB plan) trumps the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s 2010 decision in Burke. 
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The underlying policy of this new Ontario surplus legislation is as follows: 
a. A written agreement prevails over any document that creates and supports the 
pension plan and pension fund and it prevails despite any trust that may exist in 
favour of any person.  
b. Employers must adhere to strict guidelines to access actuarial surplus in on-going 
plans and terminated plans.  
c. Employers are entitled to take contribution holidays under specific guidelines 
prescribed in regulations. 
 
In summary, surplus withdrawal is severely restricted by trust law, as per the Supreme Court 
decisions above. However, trust law may be trumped by written agreements as per pension 
standards legislation (Section 77.11(8)) above). 
3.Federal PBSA 
The federal government passed Bill C-9 in 2010 (which came into force in July, 2011), introducing 
the following reforms to surplus and contribution holidays under the Pension Benefits Standards 
Act: 
1. Payments by employer 
3.9(13.5)…the introduction of a solvency margin that precludes sponsors from taking contribution 
holidays, unless the solvency ratio exceeds full funding plus the margin, which is set at a level of 5% 
of solvency liabilities; 
 A solvency margin concept has been introduced for federally regulated pension plans. The 
solvency margin effectively restricts an employer’s ability to take a contribution holiday unless the 
plan is 105 percent or more funded on a solvency basis. This legislation provides a more stable 
funding policy for DB plans by preventing employers from taking contribution holidays every time 
a small surplus exists, reducing it to zero.  
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 2. Partial termination 
(4.1) Only the Superintendent may declare part of a pension plan terminated. 
Employers who sell a part of their business should consider the potential effect these new 
restrictions will have on members. In the scenario where the transferring employer and the 
purchaser do not agree to a transfer of assets and benefit liabilities, the employer will not be 
permitted to declare a partial wind up to distribute benefits, including any actuarial surplus, to the 
transferred employees. Under these cir*cumstances, the PBSA Sale of Business Provisions deem 
transferred employees’ membership in the original employer’s plan not to have ceased and require 
such members to continue to accrue service, including benefits and any actuarial surplus in the plan. 
This “partial termination” legislation (similar to the “payments by employer” legislation above), 
was intended to provide a more stable funding policy by protecting the interests of transferred 
employees until the deal is completed. 
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  APPENDIX 7  
Target Benefit/Funding Policy
560
 
Ta          Table 1: Key elements of a TB benefit/funding policy   Nature  
Te        Funding methodology  A benefit/funding "test" to be used to measure 
the long-term sustainability of the relationship 
between "funds available" and "funds required", 
where: "funds available" refers to more than the 
existing assets and includes expected 
contributions in the future; and, "funds required" 
refers to the value of both past and future 
benefits.  
 
Ac         Actuarial assumptions  A basis for setting actuarial valuation 
assumptions to value the "funds required".  
Re         Reserve levels and trigger points  Consisting of a pre-defined range/zone of 
acceptable financial measures along with trigger 
points that would signal benefit adjustments.  
Be          Benefit priorities  A pre-determined approach to benefit 
adjustments at each trigger point.  
"D         “Disaster” plan  A clear accountability and responsibility for 
"disaster" scenarios, where results fall far outside 
of the range of the pre-defined trigger points.  
 
Aon Hewitt specifically outlines two actuarial principles required for target benefit plan 
sustainability testing: 
1. The actuarial valuation determines the ability of plan funding to support benefits, 
with no concept of "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. Plan funding is 
fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding 
policy. The actuarial valuation takes a long term view. It includes a benefit/funding 
test conducted on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection valuation.  
 
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing is conducted to estimate the probability that the 
plan benefits are sustainable. From a regulatory point of view, there are already 
guidelines and tools at hand to successfully implement TB.
561
 We believe the key to 
regulating TB pension plans is the benefit/funding policy. The policy needs to be 
                                                             
560
 Ibid. 
561
 Multi-employer plans are regulated target benefit plans. 
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clear, sufficiently detailed, and reasonable in light of the risk-sharing deal between 
plan sponsor and members. It needs to* be supported by a sustainability analysis that 
involves adequate risk testing using projection valuations, and that analysis must be 
revisited periodically. In addition to a solid benefit/funding policy, the governance 
structure and member communications must also be aligned to the risk-sharing 
nature of the pension deal.  
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APPENDIX 8  
Funding Requirements of Target Benefit Plans
562
 
 
1. Need for Flexibility  
Rigid funding rules would be an important deterrent for employers who would consider 
establishing TBPs (as was the case for member-funded pension plans in Quebec).
563
 In order for 
TBPs to become a successful pension arrangement, an important degree of flexibility must be 
allowed under the funding regulations that will be adopted in respect of TBPs. 
2. Actuarial Assumptions 
 
As discussed above, the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) and the Actuarial Standards 
Board (ASB) have already set out numerous standards and guidance that should be followed for 
the valuation of pension plans, based on the structure of the pension plan and the risks and 
obligations that it entails. Target benefit pension plans have existed for decades in several 
jurisdictions (e.g., MEPPs) and valuation assumptions are monitored in the current framework.  
Given the delicate balance of delivering the promised benefits versus providing adequate 
benefits and intergenerational equity, the policy objectives of any constraints that might be 
imposed by regulators on the actuarial assumptions that may be used for valuation purposes 
should be clearly articulated. However, it should be clearly understood by all stakeholders that 
any mandated margins will reduce the benefits of the plan on a per dollar contribution basis, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the plan in delivering adequate retirement benefits.  
With any margin, there will be a shift in intergenerational equity. It may be difficult to justify 
why a desired margin should be established if the funding target is 100% over time (recognizing 
                                                             
562 The Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM), ACPM Target Benefit Plan Paper, ACPM, 
2012. Online: < www.acpm.com/ACPM/.../ACPM_Target_Benefit_Plan_Paper(Final).pdf >. 
563
A member funded pension plan (MFPP) is a defined benefit plan with a career average earnings or flat 
benefit formula without automatic indexation in which the risks of plan funding are borne entirely by the 
members. Employer contributions are set in advance and do not vary in case of actuarial deficit. Actuarial 
deficits incurred while the plan is in force are funded by active members. Asset shortfalls on plan termination 
result in a reduction of the pension payable to members and beneficiaries. On the other hand, surplus assets 
while the plan is in force or on its termination are used to increase benefits or give members a contribution 
holiday, subject to certain constraints. In other words, employee contributions fluctuate depending on 
actuarial deficits and surpluses. (Normandin Beaudry, Member Funded Pension Plans, NB Bulletin Vol. 10 
N. 2, 2007.  Online: < www.normandin-beaudry.ca › Publications › Archives › 2007 >.) 
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that any margin creates a lower benefit target). At the time when sponsors are determining the 
TBP provisions, any desired funding margins should be documented in a funding policy to be 
adopted for the plan.  
The TBP text or its funding policy (or administrator to the extent allowed by the TBP text or 
funding policy) should be allowed to determine when specific margins for adverse deviation are 
required and their magnitude. In other words, no minimum margin should be required by the 
legislation. However, margins can be developed and communicated in a funding policy to 
reflect the economic realities, desired risk tolerance and the importance of intergenerational 
equity.  In addition, it is important for TBP members and sponsors to be informed that there is 
no participation in the Ontario PBGF
564
 and that deficits on wind up are not required to be 
funded. 
3. Valuation Methods and Rules  
 
The target benefits should be measured and funded on a going concern basis. A valuation on a 
wind up basis should only be required for disclosure purposes. The actuarial method used (e.g., 
projected unit credit, modified aggregate, etc.) should not be defined in the legislation but 
should be determined by the TBP sponsor (in consultation with actuarial advisors) and 
articulated in the plan text or funding policy (or assigned to the administrator by the TBP text or 
its funding policy), including a clear definition of what happens to benefits if funding deficits or 
surpluses emerge. Again, we believe that CIA professional standards and guidance will suffice 
to produce the proper valuation of the liabilities. If regulations were to prescribe the valuation 
standards and methods they must clearly address the variety of inherently different risks by type 
of plan, which we believe would be too constraining or cumbersome.  
An amortization period should be determined by the TBP text, funding policy or administrator 
based on the objectives of the plan. If the pension regulators should deem it necessary to impose 
a maximum permitted amortization period, the current period applicable to going concern 
deficits DB plans (i.e., 15 years) should be preferred. 
                                                             
564
 This fund is exclusive to Ontario – no other province in Canada has a fund like this. Members outside 
Ontario with DB pension plans unfortunately don’t have their pension guaranteed by the 
government…..There are certain instances where your pension isn’t fully covered by the fund. The fund only 
covers the first $1,000 per month of your pension – anything in excess is not covered. While required 
employer premiums continue to rise, the $1,000 per month guarantee has remained the same since 1988. 
There are several further instances where you won’t be covered: benefit improvements that came into effect 
three years prior to the wind up date of your pension plan, pensions from federally-registered pension plans 
(industries like airlines and transportation) and any pension plan indexing that place plan wind ups. The fund 
is exclusive to DB pension plans – Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans are not covered. (Sean Cooper, 
Million Dollar Journey, A Primer on the Pension Guarantee Fund, 2012. Online: < 
www.milliondollarjourney.com/a-primer-on-the-pension-benefits-guaran...>.). 
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4. Disclosure  
 
A TBP sponsor, or else the administrator in some cases, should be required to adopt both a 
funding and a benefit policy reflecting the terms of the TBP text, and such policies should have 
to be communicated to all plan members and the participating employer(s).  
5. Plan Termination  
Rules as to treatment of benefits/funding on plan termination must be clearly set out in the TBP 
text, and be subject to (i) prescribed minimum standards, and (ii) regulatory approval. Minimum 
standards must set out those items to be included in the plan text, but should include some 
flexibility. Once established in the plan text, there should be little or no discretion left to the 
administrator, except where interpretation may be required. In other words the plan text should, 
to the extent possible, address how deficits and surplus gets allocated on wind up. For example, 
if there is a deficit, the plan text may require that benefit improvements within the 5 years 
preceding wind up get reduced first or may establish other types of priorities. 
 
6. Treatment of TBPs for Accounting Purposes  
One of the reasons why some employers do not wish to continue sponsoring a DB pension plan 
is the way that accounting rules impose recognition of financial risks (i.e. liabilities) on their 
financial statements.  If we would like employers to embrace TBPs, it is considered crucial for 
employers (especially in the private sector) to be able to account for their participation in the 
TBP using the accounting rules applicable to DC plans, as is the case for most MEPPs. 
However, it will be important to ensure that no rules relating to TBPs that are incorporated into 
the pension standards legislation could compromise the classification of TBPs as DC plans for 
accounting purposes. For example, there should be no rule requiring a minimum benefit equal to 
the member’s accumulated contributions. However, it would still be possible for some plans to 
provide such a minimum guarantee if desired, although some employers may be reluctant to 
participate in such plans if they are concerned about the accounting treatment. 
 
It will also be important to verify whether certain transitional rules might have an impact on 
whether a TBP retains certain DB features that make it impossible to apply the DC accounting 
rules. For example, depending on enabling legislation, if an employer wishes to transition from 
an existing DB plan to a TBP in respect of future service, but the transitional rules impose the 
continuation of certain DB features (such as a minimum pension for past service or for existing 
retirees), it is not obvious at this point that an employer could simply maintain two components 
within a single plan or whether it would be necessary to completely segregate the two groups in 
separate plans. Such potential uncertainty would need to be clarified when rules are drafted. 
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7. Treatment of TBPs for Tax Purposes  
 
TBPs are intended to be tax-assisted retirement savings plans and as such amendments to the 
ITA will likely be necessary to recognize the TBP as a new type of retirement savings plan, 
similar to the ITA amendments recently proposed for PRPPs. The ITA treatment of TBPs 
should ensure that:  
1. Employer and employee contributions to the TBP are deductible.  
2. Investment income and gains on assets held by the TBP are non-taxable.  
3. Benefits are taxed in the hands of the individual member upon retirement.  
4. Benefits payable from the TBP are eligible for pension income credits and pension income 
splitting, as with other types of pension payments.  
5. Tax limits are calculated using either (i) DB tax limits (which are benefits focused), or (ii) 
DC tax limits (which are contributions focused). 
 
8. Transitional Rules  
In order for TBPs to be a viable alternative for plan sponsors, it is considered essential to permit 
the transition or conversion of benefits from a sponsor’s current DB plan to a TBP. It is 
suggested the following rules be adopted for transitioning past service traditional DB benefits to 
a TBP: 
 
A. Structure and Funding of Past Service Benefits  
 
For simplicity, in order to transition past service traditional DB benefits to a target benefit 
design, a TBP should be a stand-alone pension plan. New hires who enter the TBP would accrue 
all benefits on a target basis. Those employees who would “convert” or “transition” from the 
employer’s traditional DB plan to the TBP should accrue future benefits (from the effective date 
of transfer) on a target basis. The employer should be permitted to offer these employees and 
inactive DB plan members the option of transferring past service benefit liabilities (and a 
proportionate amount of the DB plan assets) to the TBP.  
Where there is a funding deficit in respect of transferred DB liabilities, the employer should 
continue to fully fund these liabilities by way of special payments for the remainder of the going 
concern or solvency amortization period in accordance with the schedule of payments as of the 
date of conversion. The key concept regarding the 100% past service benefit funding is that a 
former DB member should commence participation in the TBP with a clean slate and assume 
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the risk the TBP represents after this date. The funding payment schedule in respect of past 
service benefits should not vary from what is in place prior to conversion. Any experience gains 
or losses in respect of these benefits that occur after the date of entry should fall under the TBP 
design and as such these past service benefits could be increased or reduced. Should the TBP be 
terminated prior to the end of the past service funding payment schedule, the employer would 
still be required to pay the remaining balance of its schedule of payments as at the date of 
conversion. 
 
B. Consent to Transition/Convert  
Similar to the current rules for conversions from DB to DC benefits, if the DB plan sponsor 
wishes to offer a DB to TBP conversion each active or inactive member eligible for the 
conversion option should be given the right to elect whether or not to convert their past service 
benefits to the TBP (regardless of whether or not he or she is represented by a union). Each 
eligible member should receive a statement setting out the information needed in order for the 
member to make an informed decision. The information to be contained in the statement should 
be prescribed. 
 
9. Implementation of Target Benefit Plans565 
 
A. From an operational and design perspective: 
 
1. Joint governance-There are additional fiduciary risks associated with a TB plan if the 
employer manages it independently of members. The sharing of all plan risks between 
employers and members can be achieved only if all parties actively participate in the 
management of the plan in a meaningful way. 
2. Scale-These plans need to be large enough to have meaningful pooling of plan risks, as well 
as have the resources to handle the additional management costs. 
3. Regular ongoing monitoring-The use of stochastic projection tools rather than typical 
deterministic actuarial valuations are critical to understanding how to test the pricing of plan 
benefits and to determine reasonable margins and reserves. 
4.  Distinct benefits/funding policy-With fixed contribution rates, the funding policy should 
provide clear direction on margins to establish in the pricing of plan benefits and target reserve 
levels and should also specify trigger points for benefit adjustments. 
                                                             
565 Barry Gros, Karen Hall, and Claude Lockhead, A New Approach for Sustainable Retirement Income, 
Plans and Trusts, 2013. Online: < www.ifebp.org/inforequest/0163251.pdf >. 
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5. Equity-driven designs-Intergenerational equity can be managed through a focus on career 
pay, minimizing early reti+rement subsidies and having no subsidized spousal benefits. 
6. Cost-sensitive designs-It is important that the TB design be based on conscious identification 
and decisions regarding allocation of plan costs. This might involve providing benefit indexing 
only nominally or on a conditional basis, or defining normal retirement age in terms that adjust 
with mortality improvements. 
7. Expanded member communication-The nature of a TB plan warrants clear and ongoing 
communication, with the potential upside of much greater member engagement. 
B. From a regulatory perspective: 
 
1. Exemption from regular funding rules for traditional DB plans. 
2. Acceptance as a DC plan for pension accounting purposes. 
3. Acceptance as a DC benefit for tax-reporting purposes (i.e. pension adjustment). 
4. Availability outside of collectively bargained situations, provided certain governance-related 
criteria are met. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
